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Current resource policies for mobile phone apps are based on permissions that uncon-
ditionally grant or deny access to a resource like private data, sensors and services. In
reality, the legitimacy of an access may be context-dependent - for example, depend-
ing on how often a resource is accessed and in which situation. This thesis presents
research into providing bounds on the access of JavaScript apps to security and privacy-
relevant resources on mobile devices. The investigated bounds are quantitative and
interaction-dependent: for example, permitting one access each time the user presses
a specified button.
Two novel systems are presented with different approaches to providing these
bounds. The system PhoneWrap injects a quantitative policy into an app and enforces
the bound dynamically during runtime by monitoring the resource consumption and
the user interaction. If the injected bound is exceeded, the resource request is replaced
by a deny action. This way, PhoneWrap restricts the unwanted behaviour while the
expected functionality can be performed. Policies for this system describe the UI el-
ements which trigger the expected resource consumption and the number of resource
units consumed for each interaction. The enforcement of the policies is achieved via
wrapping the critical APIs using JavaScript internal features. The injection of a policy
can be performed automatically. PhoneWrap is the first system using the lightweight
wrapping method to inject policies directly into mobile apps and the first to combine
quantitative policies with interaction-dependencies.
The second system AmorJiSe statically analyses the resource consumption of a
given JavaScript program. This system automatically infers amortised annotations on
top of given JavaScript data types. The amortised annotations symbolise reserved re-
source units stored in the data structures. This way the amount of resource units avail-
able to the app is expressed dependent on the size of the data structures. The resulting
function types of the UI handlers can be used to extract interaction-dependent bounds.
The correctness of these bounds is proven in relation to a resource-aware operational
semantics. AmorJiSe extends the known amortised type paradigm to JavaScript with
its dynamic object structures and applies this paradigm to the novel domain of mobile
resources.
Although, the two systems are based on similar resource models and produce sim-
ilar resource bounds, they use different methods with different properties which are
presented in this dissertation.
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Lay summary
Apps on smartphones request a set of permissions during installation to access the pri-
vate data (Contacts, accounts, emails), the sensors (location, camera, microphone) and
services (phone calls, messages, playing music). During installation the user cannot
know how these resources are used by the program. Abuse of these resources in the
wrong context poses a threat to the users security or privacy
This dissertation aims to provide more information and control how the requested
resources are used. Instead of the permission, which can only grant full access at any
time, the systems presented here provide a bound on how often the resource is used
and connect the use to a specific action of user for example a specific button.
This is achieved by two different methods. The system PhoneWrap alters the be-
haviour of an app in a way that the app cannot use the resource more often than speci-
fied in the bound. This is achieved by granting the app the correct number of one-time-
tickets, which the app has to pay every time it accesses the resource. If the app tries
to use the resource without paying a ticket the access is replaced by a suitable deny
behaviour.
The other system AmorJiSe analyses the app before it is executed and provides
information on how oft and connected to which user interactions the resource is used.
The results of this analysis are mathematically proven for all possible behaviours of
the app.
Although the two systems provide similar results, the methods have different prop-
erties and are therefore suited for different situations.
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Right, my phone. When these things first appeared, they were so cool.
Only when it was too late did people realize they are as cool as electronic







Phones and other mobile devices are permanent companions in our modern lives. As
such they are filled with personal information, secrets used for authentication or pay-
ments and their services, such as text messaging, generate additional fees. Smart-
phones are equipped with a variety of sensors, cameras and microphones which could
record every detail of the user’s life. Their huge potential make them a valuable target
for advertisers and malicious software as recognised by security software vendors and
security advisers:
30% of Android apps may expose users to data loss and privacy violations
(Marble Labs Mobile App Threat Report for January 2014)
[...] during the second half of 2015, only 18% of new and updated apps
were benign, 30% were moderate or suspicious, and the remaining 52%
were unwanted or malicious (Webroot "2016 Threat Brief")
[...] recent polls show that 9 in 10 Americans feel they have in some way
lost control of their personal information
(The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact sheet Jan 2015)
Operating system for smartphones have recognised this threat and protect the crit-
ical resource to mitigate the potential damage of malicious apps. The prevalent such
system is Android with around 80% market share. The resource access control in
Android and similar systems is based on permissions. The app requests a set of per-
missions each of which, if granted by the user during installation, grants unrestricted
access to a specific resource. However, there is no fine-grained control on how often
and in which context the app may use a granted resource. A previous study [36] shows
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that 93% of the free apps ask for at least one potentially dangerous permission. Users
often have to guess for which functionality of the app a permission is requested and
accept the risk of the permission being abused. Contrary to the perception that phone
users do not care about the permissions, the following statements show the reaction
when users discover resource access in a context or quantity they did not expect:
The app requests permission to access and record audio without my con-
firmation and to access my camera and take video or pictures without my
confirmation. Why do they need this capability?
(Facebook Community forum)
You say "It’s not that these are randomly turning on and taking pictures
and/or recording convos" but the thing is by giving carte blanche approval
they can.
(Facebook Community forum)
Why would whatsapp access my contexts over 7000 times when I only
opened the app maybe less then 100 times? [...] Deleted that app is what
I did.
(Review of “DTEK by BlackBerry” on Google Play)
For the life of it, I cannot see any rational reason why a ride-sharing app
would require to pry into your browsing history, much less other apps that
you use or are running.
(reddit /r/privacy)
These show that, for some users, more information and control over the resource access
is needed. However, asking the user for every access request breaks the workflow and
is not acceptable for the user.
The missing control can be provided in the form of interaction-dependent bounds
on the resource access. Modern apps are interaction-centric: during launch they only
initialise and display the elements of the user interface. Afterwards, every time the user
interacts with one of those elements, the requested functionality is executed. Therefore,
access to the correct resources in the appropriate amount for each functionality can be
associated to the UI elements. Ideally, the app is not granted the permission to access
a resource unconditionally, but may access the resource a bounded number of times
every time the user activates a specific functionality.
Many security and privacy concerns for mobile systems can be considered as a re-
source problem: messaging, phone calls and other billable services are resources by
themselves and bounds on their usage limit the bills the app generates; location track-
ing accesses the GPS sensors and the data connection and bounds on the access to these
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resources ensure the private location information is only accessed when justified by the
functionality; private data leakage can be limited to the amount the user is comfortable
to provide to a specific app by considering the content (pictures, documents or contact
data) stored on the phone as resource; denial-of-service attacks exceed the capacity
of the attacked resource and bounds can successfully counteract them; buffer over-
flows over-use the resource memory space and a bound on the memory usage makes it
possible to prevent or anticipate potential threats.
To protect the user in all these scenarios, security frameworks are required to pro-
vide more fine-grained bounds on the permitted access.
As programming language for mobile apps, JavaScript is becoming more and more
important. JavaScript has been the dominant language for web applications and, since
many mobile apps perform functionality similar to web applications, it is an obvi-
ous choice for mobile apps. Emerging mobile operating systems like Tizen [38] and
ChromeOS [60] build directly on JavaScript as their primary app programming lan-
guage. For Android and other non-JavaScript operating systems various frameworks,
e.g. Adobe PhoneGap, Sencha Touch or ratchet1, package JavaScript into native apps
to install and execute HTML / JavaScript apps seamlessly. With over 400,000 devel-
opers and over 1 million apps, Adobe PhoneGap [59] is the most popular such frame-
work. It executes the JavaScript code on all major mobile platforms in an instance of
the built-in browser of the operating system. The same JavaScript app can be packaged
for multiple different operating systems this way and apps can even re-use code from
a web page.
On top of the standard JavaScript language features, PhoneGap offers plugins
which access the native capabilities and sensitive resources of the mobile phone. These
plugins are naturally governed by the default access policy of the operating system,
but, as discussed above, permissions are not fine-grained enough to efficiently guard
the resources. If a permission has been granted, the app and the contained third party
code can use all known exploits for JavaScript to abuse the granted resources. The
Microsoft Security Intelligence Report [86] identified JavaScript exploits as “the most
commonly encountered type of exploits with an encounter rate more than four times
as high as the next most common type of exploit.” For this reason methods to provide
more control over the resource usage of such apps are even more important.
Since JavaScript is interpreted during runtime, JavaScript apps include the full
source code of the app. This presents an opportunity to provide those bounds.
1see Section 2.1.4 for more details
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
1.2 Problem definition
This thesis considers the following research hypothesis:
By using static analysis or dynamic enforcement it is possible to automatically
impose quantitative bounds on the resource consumption of mobile apps written
in JavaScript which allow the resource access required for the wanted features
while rejecting unreasonable resource usage.
The hypothesis differentiates between two components of the app’s behaviour. Its
wanted functionality are the actions expected or requested by the user. On top of that,
many apps provide unwanted functionality which could be intrusive ads, malware or
additional features not required by the individual user. An indication whether a feature
is wanted or unwanted are the user interactions with the app. By interacting with the
app’s user interface the user activates features and, therefore, implicitly confirms the
legitimacy of the following actions.
Each wanted feature of an app requires different amounts of resources. Some func-
tionalities require one special kind of resource (like sending an SMS) other require
a larger set of different resources. A policy maps each functionality to its required
amount for each resource. The specific values in the policy can depend on the user.
Therefore, users need to be able to specify individual policies to capture their individ-
ual resource requirements.
Apart from picking or creating the correct policies, the restriction should be applied
automatically. This includes, in particular, that the user does not have to understand or
annotated the source code of the app or the restriction. Manipulating the source code
exceeds the capabilities of the average mobile phone user and would therefore restrict
the user base to a small set of experts.
Two principle ways of imposing a bound on an mobile app will be considered: an
app can either be checked against a given policy before installation and rejected in case
it does not comply or an app can be prevented from exceeding the bound during the
execution and stopped or altered if the bound is exceeded.
To capture the various resource scenarios, the resource model in this work uses
abstract resource units. The concrete instantiation of a resource unit depends on the
resource and use case. For example, each file system access might be considered
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one resource unit or, to be more fine-grained, the units might be proportional to the
amount of accessed data. By using this abstraction, the proposed methods are capable
of handling all security issues mentioned above and many more resource problems.
The specification of the bound has to be flexible enough to separate wanted from
unwanted resource behaviour for real-world apps. The bounds may be interaction-
dependent to reflect the interaction-centric design of modern apps. They describe
which user actions trigger resource access and how many units may be consumed in
response to each interaction. When the performed functionality depends on the user’s
input, the bounds have to be data-dependent, for example, depending on the size of an
input.
The quality of a given bound highly depends on the resource, the expected func-
tionality of the app, on the device and the user itself. For example, if on the device
each sent SMS is billed, even small numbers may be unacceptable, especially to pre-
mium rate numbers. On devices with an unlimited message allowance, larger bounds
suffice. Some users might consider a scan through the contacts and a consequent up-
load to the cloud as breach of privacy, others consider occasional scans as acceptable
functionality to find friends using the same app. Company issued devices might have
a different demand on the resource restrictions than private devices. The policy author,
which could, for example, be the end user, device administrator or a security provider,
has to take this whole context into account to describe the reasonable usage.
1.3 Example
As a simple example, consider a fictional Android app Pic-Up which allows to upload
pictures from the external storage of the phone onto a public sharing web page. The app
scans the external storage for pictures and then presents a list with all found pictures to
the user. The user can select one or more of the presented pictures and press “upload”
to queue all selected pictures for upload. As soon as a data connection to the server
becomes available, Pic-Up uploads the queued pictures. This functionality justifies
access to the external storage, which is guarded by the Android permission READ_
EXTERNAL_STORAGE.
The expected resource behaviour of the app includes one access to the external stor-
age during initialisation to scan for uploadable pictures. Furthermore, once the upload
capability becomes available, the app accesses each selected picture once. However,
due to the granted permission READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE, Pic-Up is able to read all
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Figure 1.1 Example: Pic-Up
(Screenshot taken from Tonido app, as example how Pic-Up’s UI could look like.)
files on the storage at any time including all downloaded files, the documents, the
stored music and video files. Imagine a similar but malicious app Pic-Down which
performs the same functionality but additionally uploads all pictures and private doc-
uments found on the device onto a malicious server. In the app-store both apps look
equal, since they require the same permissions, but Pic-Down potentially leaks the
user’s confidential documents and pictures. This kind of attack is common with An-
droid apps. A survey [80] found that 90% of the most popular apps have a fake app
which adds malicious behaviour like data theft or premium service abuse.
The expected resource access of the app’s advertised functionality can be described
with interaction-dependent bounds. Pick-Up has to access the storage once at the be-
ginning and once for each selected picture. Therefore, if the user in multiple sessions
first marks c1 pictures for upload, then c2 ... and finally ck pictures, the number of
legitimate accesses can be bounded by 1+ c1 + ...+ ck. The malicious behaviour of
Pic-Down exceeds this bound. The bounds can therefore help to differentiate the ex-
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pected behaviour from the potentially malicious one.
1.4 Methods and goal
This thesis presents two approaches to bound the resource usage of JavaScript apps,
the dynamic system PhoneWrap and the static system AmorJiSe. The two systems
provide the bounds with different methods:
1.4.1 PhoneWrap
The dynamic system PhoneWrap inserts a resource monitor into a PhoneGap app pack-
age and mediates access to the guarded resource.
Given an app package, PhoneWrap inserts a script which instruments all critical re-
source APIs at the top of the main HTML file of the app. The instrumentation monitors
the resource consumption and user interaction during runtime and executes an appro-
priate deny behaviour if the resource consumption exceeds the bound specified in the
policy. The isolation of the enforcement script from the application code is achieved
by JavaScript function scopes and, hence, enforced directly by the JavaScript engine.
The modified app is packaged into an Android package and re-signed with a policy
key2. As a result, the modified app can be executed on an unmodified mobile phone.
PhoneWrap can be used either by the end user itself, by the app developer or a third
party and the policy files can be shared by experienced policy providers similar to the
lists currently used for ad-blockers. This way, less experienced smartphone users can
choose a policy which fits their usage scenario of the app and inject it directly into the
downloaded app. PhoneWrap supports the policy author by extracting all necessary
information from the app package and helps to select the UI elements which trigger
the resource accessing functionality via normal interaction with the app. This way, the
policy can be specified without deep knowledge about the implementation details of
the app or PhoneWrap.
PhoneWrap can even be used to insert multiple different policies into an app. As a
result, a resource access is only granted if each policy grants access individually. This
is useful when different parties (e.g. app developer, app distributor, device administra-
tor and device user) have different requirements on the resource behaviour or multiple
resources have to be guarded.
2For a more detailed discussion see Section 4.4
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1.4.2 AmorJiSe
The static system AmorJiSe uses type inference to statically infer bounds on the re-
source usage of given JavaScript source code. AmorJiSe’s analysis can be performed
a-priori, ahead of installing the app so that the user can avoid even partial execution
of unwanted behaviours. It can also be used to compare the resource need of different
apps with similar functionality.
AmorJiSe infers types for all subexpressions of the analysed code including infor-
mation about their resource usage. The resulting types for the input values of a program
imply data-dependent resource bounds and the function type of the input handlers im-
ply interaction-dependent bounds. These bounds are mathematically proven correct in
the sense that the provided resource-aware execution model does not consume more
resources during the evaluation of an analysed expression than specified by the bound.
Rather than defining yet another type system for JavaScript, the types of AmorJiSe
are designed to extend an existing type system. The added resource inference layer
of AmorJiSe itself is designed to be fully automatic and strict: the inference does not
require additional annotations in the JavaScript source code and the results may conser-
vatively over-estimate the behaviour of all possible executions. However, depending
on the underlying type system, the combined system can benefit from additional infor-
mation such as source-code annotations or allow unsound under-approximations under
certain conditions.
AmorJiSe infers the types via reduction to a linear programming problem (LPP)
which can be solved with conventional solvers. The result can also be used as a cer-
tificate or “digital evidence” [11, 107] for the analysis: either the developer or a third
party, for example the distributor of the app, can execute the analysis ahead of time
and supply a certificate consisting of the types and the solution for the LPP together
with the app. During installation, the device can then check the code against the struc-
ture of the provided types and, while doing so, re-create the LPP on the annotations.
The provided solution to the LPP can then be checked efficiently. Since neither the
type inference nor the LPP solver have to be re-executed, the certificate verification is
suitable even for devices with less computing power like smartphones.
1.5 Outline and contributions
The three main contributions presented in this thesis are:
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1. PhoneWrap and its prototype implementation which is, to the best of my knowl-
edge, the first system to combine quantitative and interaction-dependent resource
policies and enforce these policies in JavaScript apps using a runtime wrapper.
2. A detailed investigation of JavaScript typing mechanisms, including a counter
example pointing out a previously unknown flaw in the type checking algorithm
of the type system JST0 [8] and a proposed fix.
3. AmorJiSe, the first amortised type system for a core of JavaScript. It shows
how sound amortised types can be inferred in the presence of the dynamically
changing object structures of JavaScript.
The remainder of this thesis is structured in the following way:
Chapter 2 introduces JavaScript and the JavaScript mobile app framework Phone-
Gap with the focus on the challenges for analysis. This chapter also provides an
overview of resources accessible to PhoneGap apps and surveys the related work on
resource analysis.
Chapter 3 presents the formal description of the novel interaction-dependent ticket-
based policies as enforced by PhoneWrap including the policy description, policy state
and transitions. Furthermore, it outlines the formal definition of wrapping as an en-
forcement method and proves the soundness of the formal model.
Chapter 4 presents the dynamic system PhoneWrap which enforces quantitative
resource policies by wrapping the resource relevant APIs with a policy wrapper. It
introduces the methods and the different steps of the policification process consisting
of unpacking, analysis, policy creation, policy injection and repackaging of the apps
for installation. To show the feasibility of this approach, the tool is applied to real-
world apps downloaded from the Google Play Store.
Chapter 5 presents the discussion of existing type systems for JavaScript in prepa-
ration for the system AmorJiSe. Different properties of type systems and requirements
for the underlying type system of AmorJiSe are discussed. Based on those proper-
ties the existing type systems are examined and common methods and differences ex-
tracted. The conclusion of this chapter is that the system JST0 [9] by Anderson et al. is
the best foundation for AmorJiSe.
Chapter 6 introduces AmorJiSe, an amortised extension for a static type system for
JavaScript. The chapter presents the basic type system, its properties and the type in-
ference algorithm. Furthermore a formal resource annotated semantics is given against
which AmorJiSe is evaluated. The system is parameterised by the resource model,
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which makes it possible to reason about different resources. The main result of this
section is the formal proof of soundness for AmorJiSe against the specified operational
semantics.
Chapter 7 discusses the chosen underlying system JST0 and presents the flaw in
its type checking soundness proof. This flaw is discussed and a full counter example
provided which evaluates to a runtime error but is typed as value. Therefore, the type
checking system cannot have the claimed soundness property. This chapter further-
more shows how an adaptation of the type inference rules can be used to fix the flaw
in the type checking rules.
Finally, Chapter 8 closes the thesis with a conclusion, comparing the two systems,
and final remarks about future work on this topic.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter discusses the background for the research results presented in this the-
sis. In particular, it presents the language features of the JavaScript language and its
challenges for analysis, the structure of JavaScript apps and the resources accessible
by them. Furthermore, this chapter discusses previous research in the area of the Java-
Script language, its use in the real world, related analysis efforts and mobile resource
policies.
2.1 The JavaScript language
JavaScript was introduced in 1995 by Brendan Eich at Netscape (see [105]) as language
for web applications in browsers. It was first standardised in 1997 as ECMAScript [61].
The language is currently published in version 6 (ES6), but versions 5 (ES5) and 3
(ES3) of the language are still widely used. The current standard consists of over 500
pages of prose. An official reference implementation for JavaScript does not exist.
Instead, each browser implements the standard supporting the majority of the features,
but differing in some details.
The language is imperative and object-oriented with inheritance based on proto-
types instead of classes. It has various built-in libraries, e.g. to interact with the
HTML DOM tree. JavaScript was developed as a scripting language, with the aim
to implement client-side features for web pages quickly. For this reason, JavaScript
executes many expressions, which would result in runtime errors and termination in
other languages. However, the behaviour of such expressions is often surprising for
inexperienced JavaScript developers. With version 5, JavaScript introduced the strict
mode(ES5S) to improve the semantics of JavaScript without breaking the backwards
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compatibility of older programs. It can be optionally enabled by including the string
“strict mode” as the first expression in a JavaScript file or function body and disables
the often criticised features causing the scope to be non-static: in strict mode the with
operator is no longer available, eval cannot declare new variables and a few other fea-
tures allowing the program to access the scope directly, like the binding of this to the
global scope object in functions, are more restricted.
The following section presents a summary of JavaScript’s features which pose a
challenge for analysis of JavaScript apps. They illustrate why analysis techniques for
other language cannot be applied directly and, instead, JavaScript analysis is a research
area by itself. The features discussed here apply to version 3 and the normal mode of
versions 5 or later. Differences in the strict mode are mentioned separately.
2.1.1 Language features
2.1.1.1 Prototypal inheritance
The feature that separates JavaScript distinctively from other object-oriented program-
ming languages, such as C or Java, is the inheritance mechanism which JavaScript
handles via prototype chains. Objects are not created from classes which inherit from
each other, but each object instance inherits from another object instance, called its pro-
totype. This prototype can itself have a prototype which results in a prototype chain.
During field lookup, the JavaScript runtime engine scans through this chain to find the
requested field. Assume an expression tries to access the field m of an object o:
{...} {...} {m:42,...} {m:0,...}o=
p1 p2 p3
prototype prototype prototype
First, the object o itself is scanned for the field m and, if found, the stored value is
returned. If the field is not present in the object itself, the search proceeds at the
prototype, until the field is either found or an object without a prototype is reached in
the prototype chain. In the latter case the value undefined is returned.
In the example here, assuming the objects o and p1 do not contain the field m, the
field m is found at the second prototype p2, returning the value o.m=42. The JavaScript
standard only allows to set the prototype link via the prototype property of the con-
structor of an object. However, in all major JavaScript implementations the prototype
can be manipulated directly using the __proto__ property of an object.
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The prototypes are not involved in assignment. In an expression like o.m=44 the
direct field m of the object o is either overwritten or created, independent of the field m
in any of the prototypes. Thus, in this example, the field m is created in the object o,
resulting in the following prototype chain:
{m:44,...} {...} {m:42,...} {m:0,...}o=
p1 p2 p3
prototype prototype prototype
Afterwards the field m of the object p2 is shadowed by o.m and not accessible
directly through o anymore. Only when the field m of the object o is deleted later, the
field m of p2 becomes visible for o again.
2.1.1.2 Non-static scope
The values (or references to the values in the heap) of variables in JavaScript are stored
in a scope chain consisting of scope objects. This chain begins with the global scope
and ends in the most recent scope object which contains the local variables. Each
of the scope objects is handled as a standard JavaScript object including an attached
prototype chain. By default all created scope objects only have the special object
Object.prototype as prototype, but via features like with and direct access to the
scope chain, more complex structures can be created. Injected code could potentially
abuse this to alter the code of an intended harmless program.
When a variable is accessed, JavaScript first searches in the most recent scope
object and its prototype chain. If the variable was not found, the search continues in
the prototype chain of the next more general scope object. Prototype chains of the
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Every function call adds a freshly created scope object to the scope chain in which
the function is defined. The local variables of the function body are stored in this fresh
scope object and the function body has furthermore access to all variables defined in
the scope of the function definition. In contrast to other popular languages like C or
Java, blocks {...}, including the branches of a conditional statement or the body of
a while loop, do not create a new scope object but are ignored for the bounds of the
scope.
JavaScript programs can manipulate the scope chain directly. By using the with
statement, an expression can add an arbitrary object o as most local scope to the scope
chain. As a result, local variables in the newly defined scope are equivalent to fields
of o. Adding or deleting fields of o also manipulates the available local variables. By
other methods, a JavaScript program can obtain a reference to the global scope object.
Modifications of this object change the global variables equivalently. This behaviour,
called dynamic scope, results in a scope structure depending on the runtime state of
the program. Depending on the current runtime values, a variable x might address
different locations in the scope chain.
Another unintuitive feature of JavaScript are the declarations. Local variables and
function statements declared throughout the scope’s code are moved to the top of the
scope. This behaviour is called hoisting. JavaScript executes the code of a scope
in three passes. In the first two passes only function statements and local variable
declarations are inserted into the fresh scope object. During this phase, declarations
are executed independent of control flow operators. For example, declarations in both
branches of an if statement are executed. The final pass executes the actual code in
this prepared scope with all the local variables already declared.
The interaction between hoisting and JavaScript’s scoping sometimes results in
surprising behaviours. In the example in Figure 2.1, the outer scope defines a variable
x. The call to function f in line 6 creates a new scope objects on the scope chain and
initialises it with the variable declarations in the function body. Therefore, the scope
object for the function body already contains the local variable x before the function
body is executed. The assignment in line 3 assigns the value 2 to the variable x in the
inner scope and the value of the variable x in the outer scope still equals 1 after the
function call.
If a JavaScript file is executed in strict mode, the with operator and similar features
are not available and the program is instead statically scoped: the structure of the scope
is independent of the runtime state, but instead only depends on the position of the
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Figure 2.1 Example Hoisting
1 var x = 1;
2 function f() {
3 x=2;
4 var x; // Executed before the assignment in line 3
5 }
6 f();
7 x; // equals 1
executed expression in the code. This simplifies the situation for analysis.
2.1.1.3 Hidden memory operations
An assignment to an undefined variable creates the assigned variable fresh in the most
global scope object without warning or error. Object extension behaves similarly. If
an expression assigns a value to a new field of an object, this field is silently created in
the given object. This implicit definition poses a challenge to code analysis, since the
set of defined variables or the set of fields of an object is difficult to determine.
In the example in Figure 2.2, line 2 implicitly declares the global variable x by
assignment. Line 3 extends the object stored in x by the field m. After the function call
the field x.m contains the value 3, even though the variable x and the field m were never
declared.
Figure 2.2 Example Implicit Allocations
1 function f() {
2 x = {};
3 x.m = 3;
4 }
5 f();
6 x.m; // equals 3
2.1.1.4 Flexible function definitions
JavaScript offers polymorphic and variadic functions. Polymorphic functions can be
called with parameters of different types, while variadic functions can be called with a
variable number of parameters. If a function is called with fewer parameters than spec-
ified in the function definition, the remaining parameters store the value undefined.
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If the function call provides more parameters than specified in the function definition,
the additional parameters are accessible through the arguments object. In the exam-
ple in Figure 2.3, the function f is defined with exactly 1 parameter but called with
2 parameters in line 1 and without parameters in line 9. When the function is called
without parameters the explicitly defined parameter x is set to undefined as used in
line 3. Line 5 and 7 access the non-specified parameter via the array arguments. This
way, the function can return the input 6 for the call in line 1 without naming it in the
function definition.
Figure 2.3 Example Flexible functions
1 f(5,6); //returns 6
2 function f(x) {
3 if (x==undefined)
4 return 0;




9 f(); //returns 0
JavaScript functions fulfil three different roles: functions, methods and construc-
tors. The subtle difference is the value of the variable this inside the function body.
Consider Figure 2.4. A method (line 5) is called as a field of an object and the variable
this contains the receiving object. A constructor (line 6) is called with the prepended
new operator and this contains a newly created empty object to be extended by the
constructor body. A regular function call (line 7) is called without additional keywords
and this is bound to the global scope object.
Figure 2.4 Example Functions, Methods, Constructors
1 function f() {
2 return this;
3 }
4 var o = {m:f};
5 o.m(); //returns o
6 new f(); //returns a fresh object {}
7 f(); //returns the global scope object
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2.1.1.5 Dynamic types
During runtime, values in JavaScript have dynamic types associated with them. How-
ever, value updates are not restricted by the type. An integer variable can be updated
with a string or object value, changing its dynamic type. This behaviour may result
in dynamic variable types dependent on the previous control flow. In Figure 2.5 the
local variable y is initialised as object in line 2. Line 3-6 update y either with a string
or an integer depending on the value of x. Therefore, the resulting type of y in line 7
depends on the value of x.
Figure 2.5 Example Dynamic Types
1 function f(x) {
2 var y = {};
3 if (x==3)
4 y = ‘‘String’’;
5 else




As scripting language, JavaScript is designed to throw as few exceptions as possible.
For this purpose, JavaScript converts many values automatically into the required dy-
namic type. For example, the if statement expects a Boolean as condition but an
integer or even string value as condition will be converted to Boolean by a list of rules.
One extreme example are the operators + and ==. The + operator first converts both
operands to primitive values via the valueOf method. It then executes string concate-
nation if the typeof function identifies at least one of the primitive operands as String.
The other operand is potentially converted to String via the toString method. Other-
wise, both operands are converted to a numeric value and arithmetically added. The ==
operator has 9 separate cases which involve converting Objects and Function to prim-
itive values and Boolean and String values to numeric values. Only in cases where
these extensive coercion protocols fail, mainly when accessing undefined as object
or function, a TypeError is thrown.
Conversions from primitive values to objects produce object wrappers, which con-
tain the original value and can be extended with additional fields. It is worth noting
18 Chapter 2. Background
that, if a variable gets wrapped in this way, the value of the variable in the scope is
not overwritten with the wrapped object. This can lead to surprising behaviour. Con-
sider, for example, the code in Figure 2.6. Line 1 defines x to be an integer. Line 2
accesses the field a of x. Since integers do not have fields, JavaScript reads the value
of x from the scope, creates an integer object wrapper and assigns to its field a. Since
the result is not assigned back to x, the original variable is still a simple integer. The
second conversion in line 3 creates a new integer object wrapper without a field a and
therefore the return value is undefined. Line 4 converts x.a to a Boolean. Since the
value undefined converts to false, line 5 is not executed.
Figure 2.6 Example implicit Conversion
1 var x = 4;
2 x.a = true;
3 x.a; //equals undefined
4 if (x.a) //undefined converts to false
5 x = 6;
2.1.1.7 Metaprogramming
JavaScript’s eval operator takes a string and executes it as JavaScript code. In practice,
evaluated strings are often constructed dynamically or even received from a remote
server. As eval can parse the whole JavaScript language, its arbitrary effect is difficult
for static analysis. Figure 2.7 shows a program which downloads a string from a remote
server and executes it as JavaScript. The behaviour of this code cannot be determined
before execution. Static analysis has to assume the worst-case. However, previous
research [99] has shown that eval is often used for operations which can be achieved
without the use of eval. For example, JSON data obtained from a server can be parsed
using the JSON library instead. Based on pattern recognition, many use cases for eval
can therefore be translated into analysable code.
2.1.1.8 Computed access
JavaScript provides two different modes to access object fields. The static access o.m
explicitly uses the identifier of the field m. The computed access o[e1] in contrast
allows for the name of the field to be computed by an arbitrary JavaScript expression
e1. The result of the expression is converted to a string and then used as the identifier
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Figure 2.7 Example Arbitrary Code Execution
1 xmlhttp=new XMLHttpRequest()
2 xmlhttp.open("GET","target.com",false);
3 xmlhttp.onreadystatechange = function() {
4 eval(xmlhttp.responseText); //execute received command
5 }
6 xmlhttp.send()
of the field. Usually, during static analysis the exact result of the expression e1 is not
available. Therefore, a sound type system has to make conservative assumptions about
the result of e1 and potentially assume every field of the object has been accessed.
2.1.1.9 Interpretation and extension of the standard
Although JavaScript is standardised by ECMA, implementations of JavaScript inter-
preters are diverse. Some implementations include extra features which are not speci-
fied by the standard. For example, the window variable in most browsers always points
to the global scope object. This feature is not part of the ECMA standard. Another
example is the direct manipulation of the prototype chain via the field __proto__
of an object. On the other hand, implementations lag standardised features or al-
ter their behaviour. At time of writing, according to http://kangax.github.io/
compat-table none of the popular browsers were 100% compatible with the standard
ES5. For example function statements declared in both conditional branches as shown
in figure 2.8 behave differently depending on the browser.
Figure 2.8 Example Differences in JavaScript implementations
1 function f(x) {
2 if (x==3)
3 function g() {return 1;}
4 else
5 function g() {return 2;}
6 g() // might be 1 or 2 depending on the browser
7 }
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2.1.2 Formal JavaScript semantics
Various formalisations of the JavaScript semantics have been proposed covering dif-
ferent aspects of the language.
For the version ES4 of the JavaScript standard (which was never formally released)
a reference implementation in ML covering the whole language was planned [53]. This
implementation covers all ES4 core features including the planned gradual typing.
However, since ES5 and ES6 build upon ES3 rather than ES4, this implementation
cannot be used for real-world code.
A core of ES3 has been formalised as λJS [49]. This work provides a big-step eval-
uation semantic which mainly focuses on the object behaviour of JavaScript including
prototypes. The remainder of the JavaScript language, which λJS does not cover, is
translated into the core language by a desugar function. More details on this work are
given in Section 5.4.5.
Maffeis, Mitchell and Taly [81] aim to formalise the whole standard ES3. This
includes the scope chain built from objects, the proper handling of hoisting, redefini-
tion of JavaScript built-in features and the correct binding for this in functions. The
presented semantics has a modular design to account for differences in JavaScript im-
plementations. Some JavaScript features are omitted, most importantly the switch
and for statements, the Date and Math libraries and regular expression matching.
SES [2] is a semantics presented by Agten et al. describing a subset of ES5S, which
can be handled easier than the whole of ES5S. Taly [111] extends SES to SESlight ,
which covers almost full ES5. The formalised language lacks getter and setter op-
erators, restricts writes and extensions of built-in objects, does not handle prototypes
within the scope chain and requires the JavaScript features executing dynamic code
(eval and computed field access) to specify a set of variables, which the dynamically
executed expression might modify.
Most of ES5 is captured by the semantic JSCert [19] formalised in Coq. From
this formalisation the authors derive the OCaml implementation JSRef which evalu-
ates real-world JavaScript code and is proven sound in relation to JSCert. Via the im-
plementation JSRef, JSCert can be tested against the JavaScript reference tests. This
formalisation only lacks dynamic JavaScript parsing (needed to handle the eval com-
mand) and most of the built-in libraries like Math or regular expressions.
The system KJS [92] models the whole of JavaScript version 5.1 (ES5.1) and a
major part of the libraries for Objects, Functions, Booleans, Errors, Arrays, Strings and
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Numbers. The evaluation of the semantics passes all reference test of the JavaScript
specification. In the absence of a formal specification for JavaScript, this semantics
can be used as a reference implementation.
2.1.3 JavaScript in the real world
Ultimately, research on JavaScript has to be evaluated on code used in the real world.
However, most research makes assumptions about JavaScript code. The validity of
these are evaluated in various studies. This includes checking the differences between
theoretic systems and JavaScript implementations as well as the differences between
benchmarks and real-world JavaScript applications.
Pradel et al. [95] study type coercions in JavaScript code. They instrument all
operations which could lead to coercion and dynamically extract coercions that happen
in a typical run. They find that coercions are widely used and classify most of them
as harmless. Many occur in specific expressions, for example converting the result of
a conditional expression to Boolean or initialising a variable with a default value of a
different type than the actual value. This work also checks for the use of strict and non-
strict equality (=== against ==) and finds that they are used interchangably although in
most cases strict (i.e. without automatic coercion) is sufficient and probably intended.
Richards et al. [101] inspect the traces of benchmarks and popular web pages dur-
ing meaningful use. They find that polymorphic and variadic functions cannot be ne-
glected and programs widely use prototypes, object extensions and dynamic features
like eval and computed object lookup. The comparison between benchmarks and
real-world code shows that the runtime of benchmarks is too short and they do not
use enough eval, polymorphism of constructors and object modifications to represent
real-world programs. JSMeter [96] also compares 11 popular web pages with the V8
benchmarks and selected parts of the SunSpider benchmark collection. They discover
that the considered benchmarks do not test the complex use cases used in the real-world
JavaScript code. Therefore, tests on the benchmarks might be misleading.
Previous work also surveyed the way eval is used in existing code. Richards et
al. [99] find that eval is not solely used for parsing JSON code, but that there are
multiple patterns which it is used for. Jensen et al. [63] go a step further and propose
the Unevalizer framework which replaces eval uses with constant arguments, JSON
or other simple code strings with alternatives using dataflow analysis. Their proof-of-
concept implementation can handle 75% of the eval calls in the experiments. The tool
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Evalorizer [83] has a similar goal, but classifies the different uses of eval dynamically
using execution logs. With this technique the authors are able to replace 97% of the
calls.
Similarly, Park et al. [91] try to rewrite the uses of the with statement. They
discover 7 different patterns for the use of the with command in real-world code and
propose automatic rewriting strategies for all of them. In an evaluation they are able to
rewrite all uses of with except for those mixed with dynamic code execution. These
rewriting techniques can be used to transform real-world JavaScript applications into
analysable code.
For practical JavaScript programming Crockford [25] describes a subset of Java-
Script which should be used since it is free of confusing ambiguities. He discusses
how known programming paradigms can be achieved in JavaScript and how complex
functionality can be programmed without error prone functions like eval. However,
this work is not formalised.
2.1.4 JavaScript for mobile phones
Most current mobile phones have access to a constant Internet connection and many
existing mobile apps provide features similar to web applications. The phones already
provide a JavaScript interpreter as part of their browser. Therefore, JavaScript is an
obvious choice as programming language for mobile apps. New emerging mobile sys-
tems build directly upon JavaScript, for example Samsung’s Tizen OS [38] or Firefox
OS [90] and its derivative H5OS [112]. Apple provides the JavaScriptCore framework
to call JavaScript programs from native code and the Ubuntu phone OS [79] advertises
its HTML/JavaScript SDK.
For all established conventional systems - including Android, iOS, Blackberry
and Windows - various frameworks provide an easy way to develop apps in Java-
Script.Figure 2.10 surveys a selection of the popular such frameworks. An accurate
survey about the available apps and the users of the frameworks in the real world
would require the download of a huge amount of apps directly from the Google Play
Store. Since this is not feasible due to Google’s Terms of Service, Figure 2.10 approx-
imates the number of available apps by the apps showcased on the framework’s web
page and the number of users by the registered users in the development forums. This
approximation should give an overview of the reach of the different frameworks.
This work will focus on PhoneGap, one of the most popular such frameworks, as
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a typical example to create JavaScript apps. A JavaScript app written with PhoneGap
consists of 2 different parts: the platform dependent native part is compiled into the
native language of the operating system and has direct access to the phone’s services
and resources. The JavaScript part implements the user interface and functionality of
the app with access to the platform independent API of the native part.
Figure 2.9 PhoneGap structure
At launch the operating system executes the native part. It creates a browser view
in the respective operating system, initialises the PhoneGap APIs and executes the
HTML/JavaScript part (index.html) within this browser view. PhoneGap developers
have access to the full JavaScript features, including third party libraries like jQuery,
as the app is executed in a standard browser. Additionally, the framework provides a
bridge to access the APIs of the native part: the function exec is available within the
JavaScript part and can call methods of the native part.
This exec bridge is usually used to implement plugins. Each plugin provides a Java
class with the native code to access a specific resource and a JavaScript API mapping
the JavaScript calls to the Java class methods via the exec bridge. A set of core plugins
to access the most common resources is provided by PhoneGap directly and further
functionality like access to various mobile phone sensors is accessible through plugins
maintained by third party developers and listed on the PhoneGap web page.
The back-end of PhoneGap is the Apache Cordova library, which provides the
bridge and essential functionality for the app’s life-cycle. Both PhoneGap and Cordova
are available in Version 5.3.1 via the npm repositories at the time of writing.
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The advantage of PhoneGap apps over pure native code is the portability: the Java-
Script code of the app can be reused and packaged for different platforms by replacing
only the native part of the plugins. The user interface code can be executed and tested
in every browser which makes development and preview easy and the developer has
access to the large set of available JavaScript libraries and frameworks which improve
code development (e.g. jQuery), enhance maintainability (e.g. react) or provide pow-
erful user interfaces (e.g. enyo).
Figure 2.10 JavaScript frameworks for mobile apps
Framework URL Released Apps1 Users2 Functionality
PhoneGap phonegap.com 2009 39003 24,0003 developed the Cordova library




compiles Java code into JavaScript
deploys via PhoneGap
ratchet goratchet.com 2012 3 318
prototyping JavaScript UIs
deploys via different frameworks




tabris.js tabrisjs.com 2014 6 N/A
front-end for Cordova
maps HTML to native UI elements
react native
facebook.github.io
/react-native 2015 90 380
maps HTML to native UI elements
integrates with native code
NativeScript nativescript.org 2015 12 363
open source
compile JavaScript into native
(all numbers as of December 2015)
1as showcased on the page 3stating 400,000 developers and 1 million apps on their web page
2active on the support forum 4stating 875,000 users on their web page
2.2 Resources for mobile devices
JavaScript accesses two principal kinds of resources. One set of resources, the lan-
guage activated resources, is consumed by the operators of the language directly.
Those resources include memory space, processing time and power. The second type
of resources, the API activated resource, is consumed by invocation of APIs, for ex-
ample any of the PhoneGap plugins mentioned in Section 2.2.2. In mobile apps this
category of resources can be further classified as the private data, services (SMS, phone
calls or push notifications) and sensors (camera and microphone, GPS, accelerometer
and gyroscope).
Both language and API activated resources can be abused by attackers. One ob-
vious attack is violation of privacy. The GPS sensor reveals the user’s location and
movement patterns and access to the microphone and camera can potentially record
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confidential information. Overuse of memory, time and power can lead to denial-of-
service attacks, since the resource is not available for other apps. In the smartphone
case this also affects the user’s ability to start and receive phone calls. Notifications
are also targeted by denial-of-service attacks. If an app succeeds to flood the notifica-
tion bar with unimportant notifications, potential security warnings might stay unno-
ticed [20]. This can turn into a social engineering attack, in which the app repeatedly
displays less important confirmations to hide one critical request. By the time of the se-
rious request the user’s attention might have dropped enough to confirm the important
request like an unimportant one. Furthermore, the smartphone can execute billable ser-
vices like SMS and phone-calls. Attackers can send SMS to premium numbers billing
into their bank account and thus cause unexpected bills.
The different kinds of resources result in different challenges to provide bounds on
the usage. The same API activated resource can be consumed by multiple API meth-
ods. To guard an API activated resource, all access methods need to be considered.
On the other hand, analysis of language activated resources needs to take into account
the fine details of the JavaScript semantics, which can even vary between different
JavaScript implementations. Concerning language activated resources, this thesis only
considers memory space, since compared to time and power consumption, memory
consumption is less dependent on the device and subtle differences in the machine
state. State-of-the-art systems [88] in this research area estimate power consumption
of apps with power models with various parameters including the device components
(display type) and settings (brightness).
2.2.1 Classification
Independent of the differentiation between language and API activated resources, re-
sources can also be classified in respect of their consumption behaviour. The following
two questions characterise the consumption behaviour of a resource kind:
• Does an allocation of this resource acquire exactly one unit (unitary) or is it
possible to acquire units of this resource “in bulk”?
• Is it consumed irreversibly (consumables) or can the resource be released again?
All combinations of those two properties results in 4 categories. Each category raises
different analysis questions, depending on how resources in this category are used or
abused.
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count: Every resource usage is unitary and the resource is consumed on usage. For
this resource the consumption is equal to the number of accesses. For example,
the number of HTTP requests sent or the contacts read are both resources in this
category. The analysis question in this context is “How often did the app access
this resource?” and aims to protect e.g. against unreasonable leakage of data.
cumulative: Multiple units per access are possible, acquired units get consumed. An
example is the data traffic or carrier credit used. The analysis answers the ques-
tion “How much of this resource has been consumed in total?”
unique (blocking / non-blocking): Only one unit can be acquired, but the unit can be
released after use. Apps ask (explicitly or implicitly via a library call) for the
access to this resource and ideally free the resource after the resource operation
has been performed. This could be blocking (i.e. only one app can have this
permission at any one moment) or non-blocking (multiple parallel apps allowed).
The user is concerned about the questions “Does the app currently hold this
resource?” and “Did the app ever hold this resource?” Analysis of the first
question protects against monopolies and deadlocks and the second can be used
to infer access to critical data and sections like the password store.
acquire-release: A program can acquire a certain amount of units of this resource and
return parts or all of them after use. The analysis questions are “How many units
were held maximally?” and “How many units have never been returned after
execution?” Examples in this category include the memory space.
2.2.2 Resources in PhoneGap
The strength of PhoneGap apps over JavaScript in a web page is PhoneGap’s infras-
tructure for plugins to access the native resources of the mobile phone. On Android
these plugins are implemented as Java class and provide a JavaScript API to invoke the
Java methods. The central registry for PhoneGap lists 1113 plugins [22nd September
2015] and the npm repository lists 552 [22nd September 2015] for the latest version
of the framework. 18 of them are published as core PhoneGap plugins on the Phone-
Gap webpage [59]. The others have been developed by third party developers. The
following shows how each of the mobile phone resources is accessed in PhoneGap.
Camera The camera is accessed using the PhoneGap plugin
cordova-plugin-camera with its function navigator.camera.getPicture.
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This API activates the camera app of the operating system, inviting the
user to take a picture, which is then returned to the app. Since it does
not take a picture directly, it does not require the permission to access the
camera. The function navigator.device.capture.captureImage imple-
mented in the plugin cordova-plugin-media-capture provides similar
functionality and can additionally capture a video in a similar way via
navigator.device.capture.captureVideo. Even though these APIs do not
access the camera without user interaction, a limit on the times an app is allowed
to call these APIs can prevent the app from flooding the user with requests to
take a picture.
Location The plugin cordova-plugin-geolocation provides two methods to ac-
cess the location: navigator.geolocation.getCurrentPosition queries
the location once, whereas navigator.geolocation.watchPosition returns
the location repeatedly. Instead of PhoneGap’s bridge to Java, the newest im-
plementation on Android directly uses the W3C Geolocation API specification
of the browser view. In older versions of this plugin, the API functions were
called getlocation and addWatch. Any of these APIs require the permissions
android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION or android.permission.
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION. Location data could also be obtained through the
EXIF data extracted from pictures. Therefore, the method navigator.camera.
getPicture should to be considered for location information, too.
Messaging PhoneGap does not promote an official SMS messaging plugin. Instead,
a range of 3rd party plugins with different APIs are available. In the 8757 apps
available for this evaluation 19 different messaging plugins were found and fur-
ther 5 are listed in the PhoneGap plugin repository. Out of these 24 plugins,
12 are only included in one specific app and not available as source code. The
APIs of the available 12 plugins are summarised in Figure 2.11. All analysed
plugins provide exactly one API function each to send SMS with a specified
text to the specified recipients. Additionally, some plugins provide functions to
check whether the current phone has the capability so send SMS or to receive
messages from the user’s inbox. While reading SMS could be considered as part
of the “private information” resource, the obvious resource for those plugins are
the sent SMS.
Instead of sending messages directly, apps can trigger the user’s chosen messag-
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ing app via intends. In this case the message is send by the messaging app and
the PhoneGap app does not require a permission. There are various third party
plugins with APIs to send messaging intends (some included above) or intends
in general. Since the user has to specifically press the familiar “Send” button,
this method is not as critical for the resource analysis.
Movement To access the accelerometer and compass, PhoneGap pro-
vides the plugins cordova-plugin-device-orientation and
cordova-plugin-device-motion. The accelerometer is accessible with-
out permission, while the compass requires the same permissions as the
location. Both plugins provide a method navigator.accelerometer.
getCurrentAcceleration/navigator.compass.getCurrentHeading
to access the sensor once and navigator.accelerometer.
watchAcceleration/navigator.compass.watchHeading to access the
sensor repeatedly.
Notifications The main notification plugin in PhoneGap is
cordova-plugin-dialogs. It does not require additional permissions.
This plugin implements the object navigator.notification with the 3
methods alert, confirm and prompt, which each display an overlay window
with different configuration of buttons. Additionally, it provides the method
beep for audio notifications. JavaScript directly provides similar functionality
with the built-in functions alert, confirm and prompt.
The plugin cordova-plugin-vibration requires the permission android.
permission.VIBRATE to activate the rumble feedback of the device. With
this additional plugin the app might use the methods navigator.vibrate
or navigator.notification.vibrate and navigator.notification.
vibrateWithPattern for tactile feedback.
The notification area in the status bar can be manipulated with the plugin
cordova-plugin-statusbar without further permissions. It implements the
function StatusBar.hide and StatusBar.show to change the visibility of the
system’s status bar.
Contacts The contacts stored on the phone are guarded by the permissions android.
permission.WRITE_CONTACTS and android.permission.READ_CONTACTS.
In PhoneGap they are accessed through the plugin cordova-plugin-contacts,
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which provides the API object navigator.contacts. Its method pickContact
display the system’s “choose a contact” dialog and find can access the contacts
without user interaction. With the function create a new contact object is cre-
ated. Each contact object (freshly created or obtained from the existing database)
has the method save and remove to alter the database permanently.
Audio Much like the plugins to take pictures, the plugin
cordova-plugin-media-capture can use the function navigator.
device.capture.captureAudio to launch the sound recorder of the op-
erating system. In contrast, granted the permissions RECORD_AUDIO the plugin
cordova-plugin-media can directly access the microphone via the function
media.startRecord and media.stopRecord. It can play audio and video files
using the function media.play and change the volume via media.setVolume
with the permission MODIFY_AUDIO_STATE.
Files The plugins cordova-plugin-file and cordova-plugin-file-transfer
operate on the file system. They provide various functions to write and read
files, but are usually restricted to write to the app specific storage. Additionally
the FileSaver object can monitor file changes.
Other private Information The plugin cordova-plugin-battery-status pro-
vides the events lowbattery and chargerconnected to react to the bat-
tery state. The plugin cordova-plugin-device accesses device infor-
mation like the device model, its Universal Unique Identifier and the ver-
sion of the running OS. The plugin cordova-plugin-network-information
allows to inquire the status of the network connection via the method
navigator.connection.type. Furthermore, it provides the events offline
and online to react to changes of this status. The required permissions
android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE and android.permission.
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE are requested by the PhoneGap framework already. The
plugin cordova-plugin-globalization provides several methods which re-
turn location-settings like the preferred language, localisation scheme and for-
mats for numbers, dates and currencies without further required permissions.
In general, the plugins included in the PhoneGap plugin database are maintained
by various third party developers and come without any guarantee. However, emerging
databases like the Telerik [24] marketplace collect open-source plugins and verify them
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manually. Their aim is to provide a guidance for developers, but the documentation
resulting from this process also lists all information needed to identify the resource
consuming APIs for each plugin.
2.2.3 Resource policies for mobile devices
2.2.3.1 Policy models for mobile phones
Most current mobile operating systems employ a permission-based policy to guard the
resources. Apps request permissions for each required resource. The user has to grant
all requested permissions to install the app. After this initial request the app can use
the requested feature freely without additional user interaction. Previous research [37]
suggests that users do not understand the implications of the permissions or do not con-
sider the permissions granted during install time carefully enough. Newest versions of
the Android OS have added options to grant or reject single permissions during run-
time. Even with this modification each permission is either denied or granted uncon-
ditionally, independent of the quantity and context in which the resource is accessed.
This information can be the difference between wanted and unwanted behaviour: a
messaging app has to send SMS to the provided numbers, but only one per recipient
and not without user interaction or to premium numbers. A voice recorder should have
access to the microphone, but only after the user pressed the recording button.
Capabilities [76] offer a finer access control model than permissions. A capability
is an unforgeable token that allow access to a resource. These tokens are provided,
for example as parameters to a function, to the parts of the program that legitimately
requires access and can be forwarded to the appropriate subfunctions to delegate ac-
cess. In some capability systems such delegation is restricted by an additional policy.
A capability can grant access to a single file or enable access to a whole set of resource
APIs.
Confirmation-based policies involve the user in the policy decision during runtime.
The user has to approve every resource access separately. This system might fit more
important resources but quickly drains the user’s attention if too many requests have to
be confirmed. If the mental capacity of the user is exhausted, important confirmations
hidden in a set of less important confirmations have a good chance of being overlooked.
Confirmation based policies also have to handle re-requests appropriately since other-
wise the app could simply ask for the permission repeatedly until it is granted. The
option to grant access in a bulk [13] can improve this approach, for example, granting
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the next 10 accesses or all following requests of this app. This offers a pay-off between
fine-grained control over the resource and mental load. Another important addition to
confirmations for resources, as discussed by Ben Poiesz in the Google I/O 2015, are
reasons why the permission is requested. If the app provides such a reason, the user
can make an informed decision whether to grant the request.
The approach taken in this work aims to combine the permissions based approach
with advantages of “in-bulk” confirmations. The aim is to provide for each granted
permission the information how often and in which context it is used. This information
helps to differentiate between intended features and unwanted behaviour.
This is achieved by providing bounds on the consumption of each resource. These
bounds depend on the runtime situation of the app: the bound on the consumption of
a function depends on the size of the input data and the bound for the whole app de-
pends on the user interaction. The resulting bounds can be described as ticket-based
policies: instead of the permission for unrestricted access to a resource, the app re-
ceives a number of tickets. Every time the app requests access to the resource, it has to
“pay” one ticket. For data-dependent bounds, these tickets can be stored inside the data
structures. For example one SMS ticket can be stored with each contact in a recipients
list. For interaction-dependent bounds the tickets can be generated by the interaction
event. Each press to the button “Send” generates a fresh ticket to send exactly one
SMS. This way, the press to the “Send” button acts as implicit confirmation by the
user, embedded into the work-flow of the app without consuming the user’s mental
capacity. These policies are formally introduced in Chapter 3 and implemented by the
systems in Chapter 4 and 6.
2.2.3.2 Policy enforcement systems
Previous studies [34, 72] have shown that users typically do not know what each An-
droid permission implies. Most users have accepted that standard permissions, such
as full Internet access, are requested by almost all apps and do not pay attention to
the permissions requested by an app during installation. The system Kirin [31] defines
rules describing which sets of permissions collude to a potential thread and warns the
user during installation.
The tool Dr. Android and Mr. Hide [66] divides the existing Android permis-
sions into finer sub-permissions and enforces their usage by a dynamic monitor like
PhoneWrap. The enforced policies are more fine-grained than the stock Android poli-
cies, but neither interaction-dependent nor quantitative.
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Jin et al. [68] enforce more fine-grained access control specifically for HTML5
and PhoneGap apps. Their system allows to grant permissions for each iFrame of the
app separately. This way, they can grant access to the UI of the app but restrict views
inserted by third parties, e.g. ads. The policies presented in this thesis are even more
fine-grained, since they can grant or deny access to each button separately.
There are also various systems which enable the user to control the permissions
with more granularity: MockDroid by Bereford et al. [17] allows the user to revoke
permissions to each app during runtime, causing the operating system to report the
resource as unavailable or to return empty data. This is achieved by modifying the An-
droid access control system directly. The system CRéPE by Conti et al. [23] also mod-
ifies Android and allows the user to restrict resources to a specific context based, for
example, on time or GPS location. The system denies all access outside the specified
context. The system PhoneWrap presented here can replace resource access with the
same countermeasures as MockDroid and allows more fine-grained context-dependent
control than CRéPE based on user interactions with the app.
Felt et al. [35] discuss different methods to make the user of an app aware of re-
source consuming actions with the conclusion that the use of warnings and confirma-
tion dialogs should be minimised to reduce the habituation effect. The interaction-
dependent policies discussed in this thesis implement the “Trusted UI” paradigm pre-
sented in this paper. Enck et al. [30] confirm this paradigm as one of the programming
guidelines for smartphone security.
Access Control Gadgets [102] implement resource policies similar to the interac-
tion policies in PhoneWrap. However, the UI elements granting access in their ap-
proach are supplied by the resource APIs and therefore not as flexible. PhoneWrap
policies instead can choose any UI element from the original app making the ap-
plication of PhoneWrap to existing apps easier. Furthermore, their approach needs
to modify the execution environment to capture the events and protect the gadgets.
PhoneWrap achieves this without modifying the execution environment using Java-
Script’s inherent features.
In an evaluation on over 4000 apps, Elish et al. [29] determine that user interaction
is a good metric to distinguish between functionality and suspicious behaviour. They
examine the portion of critical API calls in the tested apps triggered by user interaction
and discover that the pattern is significantly different for malware and benign apps.
The interaction-dependent policies described in the latter chapters of this thesis use
exactly this difference to restrict unwanted behaviour.
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Quantitative resource policies have been applied to Java apps [26, 33, 108]. Since
Java apps are usually compiled, it is more complicated to wrap the resource APIs with
access to the user interface. Especially PhoneWrap lightweight approach to implement
the resource monitor in the target language is not possible here. Therefore, the existing
tools have to make more complicated modifications.
Wrapping methods injected into pure Java apps have also been considered. App-
Guard [15] disassembles an App and inserts inline reference monitors to mediate the
granted permissions with more fine-grained control. Aurasium [118] replaces the libc
library included in the app to mediate resource accesses. AppGuard could potentially
be extended to incorporate user interaction into its policies, but in the current state nei-
ther AppGuard not Aurasium enforce interaction-dependent policies. However, since
PhoneGap apps handle all user interaction in the app layer implemented in JavaScript,
an enforcement of interaction-dependent policies for PhoneGap apps has to be imple-
mented on the JavaScript layer.
Ticket based policies are discussed by Besson et al. [18] and further examined by
Aspinall et al. [13, 14]. The presented system allows to approve a number of resource
accesses in one confirmation dialog. A dynamic enforcement ensures that an action
is only performed if the program is granted sufficient access to all required resources.
The authors then show that under certain conditions the runtime checks used to enforce
the policies can be omitted.
Despite the attempts in [6] to initiate an adaptation of the mobile phone permissions
to web apps, there is only a sparse protection of critical functions in browsers so far.
The PhoneWrap policies can be applied to web pages to guard the browser-specific
resources including the URL bar, which malign scripts should not write into, pop-up
windows and cookies. However, web pages are downloaded fresh every time the user
visits or navigates. That means, the injection of the enforcement has to be performed
for each page load. The browser Opera and its built-in feature UserScripts enables
PhoneWrap to inject the wrapping script automatically into every fresh loaded page
and enforce PhoneWrap policies for web pages.
2.3 Analysis of JavaScript programs
Previous research of program analysis has taken two different principal approaches:
static or dynamic. In static analysis the source code or intermediate representation is
analysed without executing it. The results over-approximate all possible executions
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of the analysed program. This might also include branches which are never executed.
Static analysis is often executed on a device different than the target device of the
program and runtime overhead is not as critical since the device executing the analysis
can be much more powerful than the execution device.
The dynamic approach monitors one specific execution of the program during run-
time. Therefore, the result only describes one branch of the program with more preci-
sion than static analysis. Dynamic analysis omits dead code, but changes the runtime
performance and potentially the behaviour of the app.
The following presents existing systems and their properties. The resource analysis
presented in later chapters builds upon the existing methods and assumptions.
2.3.1 Dynamic analysis
The work on PhoneWrap is inspired by self-protecting JavaScript [94], which intro-
duces the framework to wrap JavaScript objects and enforces state-based policies in
web applications. The work in Chapter 4 extends this work to JavaScript-based mo-
bile phone apps and enforces concrete interaction-dependent policies. Magazinius et
al. improved the original wrapping method in [82] to protect the JavaScript internal
methods against re-definition. The improvements made there apply in the same way to
the system PhoneWrap.
A common approach is to modify of the browser environment to dynamically en-
force security properties of JavaScript applications. ConScript [84] modifies Internet
Explorer 8 and provides a framework to enforce fine-grained policies in web applica-
tions. Example policies include restrictions of the JavaScript capabilities of included
third party scripts or communication monitoring. Different systems [27, 46, 93] en-
force information flow policies by modifying the Firefox browser: jcshaddow [93]
implements separated variable stores for JavaScript scripts from different sources to
minimise leakage between different scripts, Adsentry [27] executes every script in a
different JavaScript engine and Groef et al. [46] multi-execute one script on two levels,
once with private knowledge but no outputs and once with output but without priv-
ileged data. This guarantees that the output does not leak private data. Richards et
al. [100] modify the WebKit engine to annotate JavaScript functions and values with
ownership and enforce fine-grained access rights. All these system rely on the modifi-
cation of the environment and are therefore specific to one exact version of a browser.
PhoneWrap, in contrast, inserts the enforcement into the app package and can be ex-
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ecuted on any system which can execute the original app. In addition, none of the
systems above is capable of enforcing interaction-dependent policies.
Another dynamic approach is to modify the source code of the web page. Ad-
Jail [113] modifies the code on a shadow-server to separate all scripts from the main
page using iframes. To preserve essential operations AdJail allows communication
between scripts specified in a white list. SafeScript [78] rewrites JavaScript code to
isolate different scripts. Barth et al. [16] rewrite JavaScript files on a proxy to replace
insecure function calls with equivalent secure ones. None of the rewriting systems is
able to enforce policies dependent of the user interaction. Furthermore, while rewrit-
ing is similar to the wrapping performed by PhoneWrap, rewriting needs to take extra
care that dynamically injected code is rewritten as well. PhoneWrap’s wrapping instru-
ments the functions defined in the JavaScript environment which automatically affects
all dynamically inserted code and therefore exposes less attack surface than rewriting.
However, all methods used above to rewrite could be used to insert the PhoneWrap
wrapping script into web-pages.
The system BrowserShield [97] can enforce policies similar to PhoneWrap includ-
ing the interaction-dependent policies. However, this system heavily modifies the
browser and is thus not portable to mobile phones or between different platforms.
Modifying the browser view of PhoneGap apps in this way would require root access
to the mobile phone, which many users are not able or willing to activate.
2.3.2 Static analysis
Apart from type systems, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5, there
are various approaches to static analysis for JavaScript.
Gardner et al. [42] present a logic to describe and reason about complex properties
of the whole JavaScript language. The fully formal approach to the whole language
makes automatic inference hard. To simplify the presentation of the logical properties,
they define a number of layers on top of the basic logic to describe more complex
properties.
The system ENCAP [111] by Taly et al. analyses programs written in the subset
SESlight of JavaScript and reports accesses of security relevant resources which circum-
vent the trusted security APIs. The analysis is a context-insensitive, flow-insensitive
points-to analysis. The function eval is handled conservatively by assuming the dy-
namically executed code aliases every variable with every possible value. ENCAP
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derives its results by solving Datalog facts extracted from the program with conven-
tional solvers. ENCAP could find all APIs accessing a critical resource to construct
resource models for AmorJiSe and PhoneWrap. Otherwise, the results of ENCAP are
orthogonal to the bounds provided here, since ENCAP only finds or certifies the ab-
sence of a resource access as opposed to inferring information about how often the
resources are accessed.
RATA [77] is an abstract interpretation system, which aims to increase the per-
formance of Just-in-Time compilers for JavaScript at runtime. RATA uses 3 different
analysis methods: interval analysis to discover bounds on the values of numeric ex-
pressions, kind analysis to discover NaN values and fractional values and variation
analysis to discover relations between different variables. The 3 methods complement
each other to increase precision. The results are abstract values which contain infor-
mation about the range of values possibly stored in the variables and whether they are
compatible with Int32 values. This information is used to optimise the compilation of
the code. The language covered is a core language named JavaScript=. With respect
to resource analysis, the results of RATA are especially interesting for the memory
resource. The range of values for an expression determines the worst-case for their
resource consumption in the memory and can therefore increase the precision of the
requirement estimation.
2.3.3 Hybrid analysis
Some existing systems combine dynamic analysis with static analysis to improve the
results.
Schäfer et al. [104] use an instrumented execution to track information about the
determinacy of expressions. This system tracks the information during one trace gen-
erally enough, to return sound information about all traces. The results can be used
to increase the precision of static analysis, for example, by replacing computed argu-
ments of eval statements by their possible values. This method has been applied to
different versions of the jQuery library and benchmarks of previous research on eval
elimination. Newer versions of jQuery cannot be handled due to its complex use of
event handlers.
Chugh et al. [22] approach the analysis of JavaScript code including dynamically
loaded code. The system infers the behaviour of the available code statically and then
describe properties the dynamic code has to fulfil to guarantee static properties of the
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whole program. The properties of the dynamic code are derived automatically by a
constraints based solution algorithm. The system then inserts dynamic checkers for
the required properties into the code to enforce the static properties. The soundness of
the results are proven formally for a subset of the JavaScript language. The full system
is tested on the JavaScript code of the top 100 web pages.
The static part of the system Gatekeeper [47] uses points to analysis and dataflow
constant propagation to prove the absence of certain attacks like global namespace
polution and cross-site-scripting (XSS). These guarantees are derived by iteration of
Datalog facts. This analysis is proven sound on a subset JavaScript_Safe of JavaScript,
similar to the strict mode of EcmaScript 5. The eval function and other language
constructs not covered by the subset are handled by runtime checks.
Wei et al. [117] propose a hybrid system which executes the code on a set of as-
sumed comprehensible test cases using a modified version of the WebKit JavaScript
engine. Based on the information obtained during these test executions, the static anal-
ysis then derives information about the taint propagation and aims to prevent leakage
of personal data. The result are pairs of sources and sinks between which the critical
data flows. For the dynamic features of JavaScript the system assumes that all possible
values for the dymanic code are encountered during the tests.
Hackett and Guo [51] use static type inference to improve the benefit of Just-in-
Time compilation for JavaScript. The focus of this work lies on the fact that every
JavaScript expression has a polymorphic type since e.g. every object lookup might
return undefined and integer arithmetic might overflow into a double value. They use
dynamic enforcement to guarantee monomorphic types for the static part. A similar
approach could be taken to handle the corner cases in the type system AmorJiSe.
2.4 Resource analysis
Most of the systems covered so far have qualitative properties as goal, like the ab-
sence of errors or threats. The analysis of the resource consumption of JavaScript code
benefits from these results, but requires additional methods to capture the quantita-
tive behaviour of the analysed JavaScript code. The following presents the two most
evolved approaches to resource analysis.
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2.4.0.1 Amortised types
The work initiated by Martin Hofmann in [54] introduces amortised types. The system
AmorJiSe presented in this thesis takes the idea of amortised types and applies it to
mobile resources in JavaScript.
In the amortised paradigm every data structure includes a certain number of re-
served allocated memory units (only the resource memory is considered in the original
work). The paper [54] introduces the type  that symbolised the allowance to allo-
cate one additional cell in the memory. For example, the type  → Int → List(Int)→
List(Int) of the function insert() certifies that insert() requires one ticket, an in-
teger value and a list of integers and returns a list. The provided resource unit has been
used to insert the new value into the provided list.
The expressivity of the system was extended in [55] by replacing the unit  by
annotations representing a list of units. Since the order of the tickets does not matter
the annotation is represented as a numeric value, the list’s length. Those annotations
can be inserted into function types and data types. A number of tickets inside a data
type can be thought of as a portion of the global freelist reserved for operations on this
data structure. In recursive data structures, such a part of the freelist is associated with
every element. A list of type List(Int,2) has the allowance of allocating two additional
memory cell per element in the list. This allows the list to be copied, with the result
type List(Int,1) for the original list and a freshly created list of the type List(Int,0).
The missing ticket in each element has been used to store the new copy. With this kind
of type it is possible to reason about resource usage dependent on the size of the data
structure.
Hofmann defines the typing rules for this system and presents an algorithm to infer
these types automatically. The inference is achieved by first typing the expressions
without resource annotations. Based on this type derivation the algorithm then gathers
constraints on the resource annotations. The constraints form a linear programming
problem (LPP) and can be solved for rational values (i.e. if resource units can be
broken into fractions) or for integer values in special cases, e.g. if the coefficients in
the LPP fulfil certain conditions.
Amortised types have been extended to handle non-destroying use of variables [12]
and class-based programming languages [56]. An inference algorithm for the latter is
presented in [57]. This is achieved by making the typing rules syntax-driven. Thus,
the generation of the constraints is deterministic and can be solved as before. In this
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implementation Hofmann assumes to have sufficient annotations from the user for the
inference of the resource consumption. In particular the user needs to specify the
resource relation were a variable is accessed more than once. For example for the
consecutive function calls f1(x);f2(x) (both using x) the developer needs to declare
how much of the potential of x will be available during the execution of f1, how much
will be available during f2 and how much will be left with the variable x afterwards.
In related research, linear types, based on linear logic [43], are often use to type
values which can only be used once, just like the allowance symbolised by the original
 type can only be used once. However, advanced versions of amortised types allow a
typed value to be read arbitrary often, as long as it is not used in resource consuming
actions.
For example, consider the upload bandwidth as resource. Was the variable x in the
code
Example 2.4.1.
1 var x = {value: "1.jpg", next: null};
2 upload_list(x);
3 show_list(x);
typed with a linear type, its type would be consumed in the function call upload_list
and the following call show_list could not be typed. In amortised types, the call
in line 2 merely consumes the annotation inside the type of x by 1, which limits the
number of calls to the function upload_list but still allows resource independent
calls like show_list.
Other linear type systems have been designed to only type a subset of the values
with linear types and allow other values to be typed with non-linear types [116]. How-
ever, amortised type systems allow one value to be limited for some uses, but unlimited
for others.
2.4.0.2 Cost relations
The cost relation approach [4], labels the cost of every subexpression with a variable
and translates the program into a set of equations over those variables. The solution
algorithm first transforms the equation system to eliminate indirect loops. The cost of
direct loops is then estimated by over-approximating the worst-case for the number of
loop iterations and the worst-case cost for one loop iteration. These values are obtained
by an iterative procedure to obtain loop invariants and a monotonically decreasing
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ranking function for the iterations. The product of those estimations produces a bound
on the cost of the execution of the loop.
In the follow-up paper [5] this idea is refined to reason about the worst-case cost for
each loop iteration separately. This results in tighter approximations. The algorithm
does not claim to be complete in means of transforming the cost relations nor for
finding the ranking functions and invariants. Experimental results show the analysis to
be a good estimate for well known samples like merge-sort or the recursive solution
for the Hanoi riddle.
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This chapter introduces interaction-dependent ticket-based policies (ITPs) and shows
how to dynamically enforce them in JavaScript apps via API wrapping, a variation
of inlined reference monitors. ITPs enforce a bound on the resource usage of an app
during runtime by managing resource tickets. Each ticket grants a one-time resource
access. Selected user interactions which are expected to trigger legitimate resource
consumption generate additional tickets to “pay” for the expected resource access.
Due to this mechanism, the resulting bounds depend on the user interaction with the
app. Policy violations trigger the specified deny behaviour which can execute arbitrary
JavaScript code to respond to the resource request and preserve as much functionality
as possible without access to the resource.
Inlined reference monitors have been used before to implement policies for Java-
Script web-apps [94] and Android apps [15]. Quantitative policies [33] and interaction-
dependent policies [102] for mobile apps have been studied separately. This work, to
the best of my knowledge, is the first to combine the different fields and to consider
quantitative interaction-dependent policies for JavaScript apps. The result is the first
system to enforce them in an unmodified execution environment.
3.1 Motivating example
The PhoneGap app TrackMyVisit (myzealit.TMV.apk1) by MYZEAL IT Solutions
shown in Figure 3.1 manages a list of journeys and advertises the following features:
1downloaded from the Google Play Store in Dec 2014, now discontinued
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• While a journey is active the app logs the GPS position of the user.
• When the user presses the “Emergency” button, a message is sent to up to 3
specified contacts.
• With the button “Add Image” the app can take pictures and attach them to the
journey log.
Figure 3.1 TrackMyVisit - UI
For this functionality the app requests, among others, the permissions to access the
messaging service, the camera and the GPS location (Figure 3.2). The unrestricted
access granted by these permissions enables the app to perform a number of attacks:
• The app could track the location of the user at all times.
• The app could take pictures in sensitive situations.
• The app could send private information or impersonate the user via messages
and charge for premium messages.
More fine-grained control is required to allow the functionality but prevent these at-
tacks. A true least-privilege policy for TrackMyVisit would grant access to the GPS
sensor only while a journey is active, would allow exactly 1 camera access for each
time the “Add Image” button is pressed and would permit messages only after the
“Emergency” button has been pressed.
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Figure 3.2 TrackMyVisit - Permissions
To achieve this, the interaction-dependent ticket-based policies (ITPs) manage a
set of tickets which are granted to the app at launch or generated by specific user
interactions. Each ticket allows a one-time access to the critical API. This way, the app
is restricted to access the guarded resource exactly as often as needed to execute the
functionality requested by the user. To enforce ITPs, the resource consuming APIs and
the user interaction need to be monitored. The wrapping method monitors the APIs
by overwriting the original API with an instrumented version which has sole access
to the original API. Each time the application code calls one of the resource accessing
functions, the wrapped API first evaluates and updates the policy and either calls the
original API or executes the deny behaviour. The user interactions are monitored by
listening for the user interaction events.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the effect of the policy described above. These example re-
source traces of the TrackMyVisit app record the button events and the API calls.
Trace (a) conforms with the policy and shows how the button “Take Picture” generates
1 camera ticket to be used by the API function captureImage. The button “Emer-
gency” generates 3 SMS tickets, one of which is consumed by the sendSMS function.
The remaining 2 tickets are cancelled when the event handler for the “Emergency”
event is finished. Finally the buttons “New Visit” and “Close My Visit” enable or dis-
able unconditional access to the GPS sensor by granting ∞ many tickets. Trace (b)
does not conform with the policy since it calls the API getCurrentLocation before
the button “New Visit” started a journey and after “Close My Visit” was pressed. In
46 Chapter 3. Interaction-dependent ticket-based policies
both cases the app does not have a GPS ticket to pay for the access. As a consequence,
the enforced trace (c) replaces the violating requests by the deny action. It does not
restrict the legitimate resource access while the journey is active.
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3.2 Policy model
This section describes the formal model of the interaction-dependent ticket-based poli-
cies (ITPs). Here, each ITP guards one abstract resource. To guard multiple resources,
multiple independent ITPs can be defined or multiple resources can be combined into
one abstract resource. For example, the abstract “notification” resource contains pop-
up dialogs, vibration and audio signals. Each notification ticket can be used to activate
either of the guarded features.
3.2.1 Definition
The following describes the formal concept of ITPs. The policy reacts to API calls f
and user events e ∈ UIEvents = {click(button),mousedown(x,y), ...}. The special
event start ∈ UIEvents indicates the launch of the app.
Definition 3.2.1.
• Let a resource model be a function
RM : API →{0,1}
with RM( f ) = 1 if the function f accesses the guarded resource and RM( f ) = 0
otherwise. Call APIs f with RM( f ) = 1 critical API.
• Let an interaction policy ip be a pair of functions
ipl, ipg : UIEvents →Q≥0∞
defining the amount of local and global tickets generated for each event.
• Define a full policy as the triple pol = (RM, ip,deny) with the deny behaviour
deny.
The interaction policy ip=(ipl, ipg) describes two different kinds of tickets. Global
tickets ipg can be used at any time after generation, whereas local tickets ipl are gener-
ated for a specific event. They can only be used within the event handlers for the event
they were generated for and unused local tickets are cancelled after the event has been
handled. Both values ipl and ipg are taken from Q
≥0
∞ = {x ∈ Q|x ≥ 0}∪ {∞}. The
value ∞ is included to describe unrestricted access equivalently to an Android permis-
sion. With fractional value in Q, the system can describe fractions of a ticket. This
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way the policy can require multiple user interactions per resource access and weight
different user interaction differently. The values are taken from Q rather than R to
capture the nature of the implementation better, which cannot represent arbitrary real
numbers.
The function deny describes the behaviour which is executed in case the app re-
quests resource access without sufficient tickets. The deny behaviour may, for exam-
ple, terminate the application, ignore the resource request, return dummy values, grant
access to the resource based on additional conditions (e.g. a user confirmation) and
even manipulate the number of tickets granted to the app.
Definition 3.2.2. Consider an app P.
1. Consider the following resource events r:
(a) API( f ): call to the API f
(b) E(e): the user triggers the event e ∈ UIEvents
(c) Done(e): all handlers for the event e ∈ UIEvents are completed
Enforced traces can also include the additional resource event
(d) deny: the deny behaviour is executed
2. Define a trace t as the possibly infinite sequence r1,r2, ... of resource events
occurring during an execution of an app P.
Write t · t ′ for the concatenation of two traces t and t ′ and P →∗t to assert that the
app P produces the trace t.
3. For each trace t = (r1,r2, ...) define the resource count cres as:
cres(r1,r2, ...) = ∑
ri=API( f )
RM( f )
4. For a trace t = t ′ · (E(e), ...,Done(e)), let the event trace t|e be the shortest suffix
E(e), ...,Done(e) of t.
5. Provided a policy pol= (RM, ip,deny), define the ticket count ctic of a finite trace
r1, ...,rk recursively as
ctic(ε) = 0
ctic(t ′ ·API( f )) = ctic(t ′)−RM( f )
ctic(t ′ ·E(e)) = ctic(t ′)+ ipl(e)+ ipg(e)
ctic(t ′ ·Done(e)) = ctic(t ′)+min(0,cres(t|e)− ipl(e))
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with t = t ′ ·Done(e) in the last case. The number of tickets ctic(t ′ ·deny) in the deny case
can be freely set by the deny behaviour.
Since RM( f ) ≥ 0, the infinite sum ∑ri=API( f )RM( f ) for infinite traces is well be-
haved: it is either finite if ∃i > 0∀r j = API( f j) with j ≥ i : RM( f j) = 0 or ∞ otherwise.
The same holds true for the infinite sums in the following sections.
Intuitively, cres tracks the number of used resources while ctic tracks the number
of available tickets. Each API call subtracts the correct amount of tickets while rele-
vant events add new tickets. The term min(0,cres(t|e)− ipl(e)) subtracts unused local
tickets at the end of an event scope.
JavaScript’s “run-to-completion” model guarantees that in any valid trace each
event is completely handled before the next event is considered. Therefore, the trace t|e
is well defined and, except for the leading E(e) and concluding Done(e), contains only
resource events API( f ) and potentially deny events. Note that, since Done(start)
does not occur in any trace, the interaction policy ip(start) = (n,m) is equivalent to
ip(start) = (0,n+m).
Definition 3.2.3.
1. A trace t = r1,r2, ... conforms with the policy pol, written pol 
 t, if there is no
i such that ctic(r1, ...,ri)< 0.
2. An app P conforms with the policy pol, written pol 
 P, if for every trace t with
P →∗t it holds pol 
 t.
In general, a deny behaviour can freely manipulate the available tickets by setting
the value of ctic(t ·deny) and execute the original critical APIs. Call a deny behaviour
weak, if it does not affect ctic or cres.
Definition 3.2.4. Let a deny behaviour deny be called weak, if
1. it does not affect the number of tickets: ctic(t ′ ·deny) = ctic(t ′)
2. it does not call critical APIs f
Equivalently, a policy pol = (RM, ip,deny) is called weak if deny is weak.
3.2.2 Enforcement
The ITPs are enforced by wrapping all resource consuming APIs and relevant events.
The wrapped functions encapsulate the original API and execute it according to the
policy or call the deny behaviour otherwise.
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Definition 3.2.5. A policy state s = (cl,cg) ∈ R≥0∞ describes the number of available
local tickets cl and global tickets cg. The policy enforcement assumes that the policy
state cannot be accessed by the original app P.
A policy state transition along the finite trace t is written as (cl,cg)→t (c′l,c′g).
This definition allows each of the values cl,cg also to express partial tickets in R.
This way policies can generate partial tickets for each user interaction, weight different
kinds of user interaction differently and require multiple interaction for each resource
access.
Given the policy state, wrapping is defined as:
Definition 3.2.6.
1. For the API f , define the wrapped API wrappol( f ) as the following:
1 if (cl ≥ 1)
2 cl = cl - 1;
3 call f ;
4 else if (cg + cl ≥ 1) //0≤ cl <1
5 cl = 0
6 cg = cg - (1 - cl);
7 call f ;
8 else
9 call deny;
2. Define the wrapped event wrappol(e) as the event e
′ which first updates the policy
state (cl,cg) according to ip, executes the original handlers for event e and finally
sets cl = 0.
3. Define the wrapped app wrappol(P) as the app executing P in an environment
where the critical API f has been wrapped as wrappol( f ) and every event e is
handled as wrappol(e).
The wrapping is assumed to be complete:
• Every call to guarded APIs with RM( f ) = 0 is replaced by its wrapped API
wrappol( f ).
• The app P cannot call a guarded function f otherwise.
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Remark 3.2.7. In the wrapper for an API wrappol( f ) local tickets are consumed pre-
ferred, since their validity period is definitely shorten than the global tickets. This way,
the app has the chance to use the tickets to their full potential. Even if only a partial
local ticket 0 < cl < 1 remains, this partial ticket is consumed first, assuming the re-
maining part to combine a full ticket can be accounted for by the global ticket counter.
For this purpose line 4 checks, whether the sum cg + cl ≥ 1 instead of cg ≥ 1. If this
check is true, line 5 consumes the partial local tickets and line 6 reduces the global
ticket counter by the remaining part.
3.2.3 Properties
Lemma 3.2.8. Given a weak policy pol and a conforming trace pol 
 t, the resource






Proof. It holds cres(ε) = 0 = ctic(ε). Every time cres increases (for some r = API( f ))







The claim follows from ctic(t)≥ 0 for the conforming trace t.
Lemma 3.2.9. For a finite trace t, the policy state (0,0)→t (cl,cg) of a weak policy
tracks the available tickets:
ctic(t) = cl + cg
Proof. This can be proven by induction on the length of the trace t. The only interest-
ing case is t = (t ′ ·Done(e)):
• Assume (0,0)→t ′ (c′l,c′g) with ctic(t ′) = c′l + c′g.
• Since t = (t ′ ·Done(e)) it holds cl = 0, cg = c′g.
Split t = t ′′ · t|e. Due to JavaScript’s “run-to-completion” model, for every event
E(e) in t ′′ also the accompanying Done(e) event occurs in t ′′. Therefore, (0,0) →t ′′
(0,c′′g) →E(e) (ipl(e),c′′g + ipg(e)) →··· (cl,cg). Remember, that t|e only contains API




52 Chapter 3. Interaction-dependent ticket-based policies
If cres(t|e)≥ ipl(e), then c′l = cl = 0 and
min(0,cres(t|e)− ipl(e)) = 0
⇒ctic(t) = ctic(t ′) = c′l + c′g = cl + cg.
Otherwise, if cres(t|e) < ipl(e), then c′l = ipl(e)− cres(t|e) and min(0,cres(t|e)−
ipl(e)) =−(ipl(e)− cres(t|e)). Therefore,
ctic(t) =ctic(t ′)− (ipl(e)− cres(t|e))
=c′g + c
′
l − (ipl(e)− cres(t|e))
=c′g = cg = cg + cl.
Lemma 3.2.10. A wrapped app conforms with its policy:
wrappol(P)→∗t ⇒ pol 
 t
Proof. Assume the claim is not true, then choose a finite prefix r1, ...,ri of t with
ctic(r1, ...,ri) ≥ 0 and ctic(r1, ...,ri+1) < 0. Since ri+1 decreases ctic, it must hold
ri+1 = API( f ). By assumption all critical API calls have been replaced by wrappol( f )
which only calls the original f if ctic(r1, ...,ri) = cl + cg ≥ 1. Due to the definition of
ctic that means ctic(r1, ...,ri+1)≥ 1−RM( f ) = 0 which is a contradiction.
For weak policies Lemma 3.2.8 and 3.2.10 provide an interaction-dependent bound
limiting all possible traces of the injected app. For general policies this bound has to be
adjusted to reflect the deny behaviour. Firstly, deny might access the original critical
API directly for which cres does not account. Secondly, deny might generate additional
tickets allowing the application code access to the critical API through the wrapped
API.
Corollary 3.2.11. A wrapped app wrappol(P) accesses the critical APIs less than the
bound provided in Lemma 3.2.8 plus the number of generated tickets and critical API
calls in the deny behaviour.
3.3 Captured policies
ITPs cover a wide range of common policies including the following ones:
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• Deny all: Without the permission for a resource, Android terminates every re-
quest to this resource with a security violation. An ITP emulates this behaviour
by granting 0 tickets to the resource. In contrast to a rejected permission, ITPs
can apply more versatile deny behaviours, which preserve the remaining func-
tionalities of the app.
• confirm each time: Some security policies ask the user to confirm every re-
source access. For example, Google Chrome recommends the setting “Ask when
a site wants to track your location” as policy for the Google location service. An
ITP implements such a policy by asking the user as part of the deny behaviour.
Since the deny function has access to the policy state, it can call the original
function directly when the user confirms access.
• confirm on first use: The iOS system asks for the permission when a resource is
accessed for the first time and then grants the permission until the app is closed.
This way, in comparison to the Android permissions granted during installation,
the user can make a more informed decision. An ITP can describe these policies
by granting ∞ many global tickets in the deny behaviour after the user confirms
access.
• not before interaction: Some resources are especially critical when they are
accessed in the background. An ITP can grant ∞ many global tickets for each
interaction. This grants access only after the first interaction.
• only in interactions: Some resources should never be accessed unless explicitly
requested by the user. If the details of the accessing user interaction cannot be
specified in advance, ITPs can generate ∞ many local tickets for each interaction,
granting access only in event handlers.
3.4 Discussion
This chapter presented the concept of interaction-dependent ticket-based policies en-
forced by wrapping. It was shown that such policies enforce a bound on the resource
usage dependent on the number and kind of the UI events. With these the resource
behaviour of mobile apps can be described precisely enough to allow the functionality,
while blocking potentially malicious behaviour.
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From the resource classification given in Section 2.2.1 ITPs can guard the resources
described as count, since each resource access is counted as 1 consumed unit and they
cannot be released anymore. By relaxing the resource model to RM : API → Q, ITPs
could also cover cumulative, non-blocking unique and acquire-release resources. Here,
APIs f with RM( f )< 0 symbolise functions releasing resources. For blocking unique
resources the policy needs to be further extended with a maximum amount of tickets
the state can hold at any one time. In reality, the count category covers the majority of
API activated resources and for this reason the policy language presented here is kept
simple, sacrificing the expressivity. Further research into different resources might
make it necessary to implement those extensions.
ITPs can guard almost all PhoneGap resource kinds discussed in Section 2.2.2.
For resources like contacts, which require to create an instance first and then call the
APIs as methods of the instance, ITPs can guard the method in the prototype of the
plugin and effectively wrap all instances. Resources accessed based on events like
lowbattery, chargerconnected, online and offline cannot be wrapped, since
the policy model does not track the listeners to those events. Furthermore, for re-
sources accessed by callback-functions like watchAcceleration, watchHeading and
watchPosition ITPs can only restrict how many callbacks are registered, not how of-
ten they are called. Policies restricting the number of callbacks can be enforced by
wrapping , but require a more complex wrapper altering the parameters and return
values of the wrapped function.
The deny behaviours of the ITPs make it possible to define various existing policies
as ITP. This feature makes the PhoneWrap policies equivalent to edit automata [75]
with its ticket counter as a countable infinite state set. However, it is worth noting that
such edit automata can change the behaviour of the app arbitrarily, if the continuation
of the trace depends on the outcome of the replaced API call.
This theoretical model of the wrapping has a few assumptions. Most critical it
assumes, that the application code cannot access the wrapped assets (function handler
and policy state). The implementation PhoneWrap, in the following chapter, uses the
wrapping approach presented in [94]. This work already had to be corrected in [82],
because these assumptions were not provided properly. The main issue was to store an
unmodified copy of all built-in functions used inside the wrapper. Otherwise attacking
code could overwrite the built-in functions and trick the wrapper to execute malicious
code inside the wrapper due to JavaScript’s dynamic scope. However, verifying or
proving the separation of the wrapper from the application code is a field of research
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in itself which could for example include pointer analysis.
Apart from wrapping, there are other methods which achieve a similar result:
Rewriting modifies the JavaScript code to alter its behaviour. This approach has been
used in web-based applications in previous work [78, 16]. The rewriting method also
needs to wrap all code inserted or modified dynamically at runtime which is a often
used feature in JavaScript. In comparison, the wrapping proposed here modifies the
dynamic execution environment by wrapping the original API such that all code in-
serted after the wrapping procedure is already guarded by the policy. This approach
has a lower runtime over-head and provides less attack surface for a potential policy
bypass.
ITPs could also be enforced on a lower level of execution: PhoneGap apps execute
their JavaScript code on top of the framework’s Java code and the operating system.
Instrumenting the framework level would simplify the specification of the critical APIs,
but does not have access to the user interaction, since interaction is handled in the
HTML / JavaScript layer. Additionally, modifying the operating system would not be
as self-contained as the directly wrapping approach inside the app package.
Previous work [84, 27, 93, 46, 113] modified lower-level systems like the browser-
view or the operating system. However, modifying these systems requires root access
to the phone and needs to be re-applied for every update of the system.
ITPs only regulate how often the guarded resource is accessed, not how it is used
after access. After an app has obtained private information it can share this information
freely. To protect the user against private information leakage, orthogonal methods like




This chapter presents the system PhoneWrap which injects ITPs into real-world Phone-
Gap apps. To the best of my knowledge, PhoneWrap is the first system to enforce
quantitative interaction-dependent policies in unmodified execution environments.1
The system has been developed with the following core aims:
Ease of Use Users with a basic understanding of the user interface and resource be-
haviour of the guarded app and the concept of ticket-based policies are able to
create PhoneWrap policies. Specifically, PhoneWrap does not assume knowl-
edge of the app’s source code or the enforcement method.
Stand-alone PhoneWrap’s enforcement is contained within the guarded app and exe-
cutes in an unmodified environment. Modifications of the execution environment
require root access to the phone which undermines important security principles
and many users are not able or willing to make this modification.
Real-world Real-world apps consist of the JavaScript code but also include the frame-
work configuration and plugins. PhoneWrap automatically extracts all neces-
sary information from a standard Android app package and after policy injection
repacks the app into a package directly installable on the target phone.
The resulting tool is a proof-of-concept implementation and does not claim to be
resilient against all possible attacks, e.g. through global namespace pollution as shown
in [82].
Unless explicitly stated, this chapter discusses the injection of a policy enforcing
bounds on one resource, for example messaging. If multiple resources have to be
1The results of this chapter with some additions from the previous chapter have been published at
the International Workshop on Innovations in Mobile Privacy and Security (IMPS, 2016) [40].
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guarded, PhoneWrap can be used to insert a separate policy for each resource. This
results in separate policy states and different tickets for each resource.
4.1 Terminology
The system PhoneWrap injects a wrapper script into a PhoneGap app to enforce a
bound on the usage of the guarded resource. The app behaviour consists of expected
functionality and potentially unwanted resource access and is implemented in Java-
Script with access to Java functionality implemented in native code. The injected
wrapper script contains the policy describing how often and in which context the ap-
plication code may access the resource to execute the functionality.
Within the wrapping script PhoneWrap defines the wrapper function and uses it to
dynamically instrument all resource consuming or critical APIs. The bounds enforced
by the policy are described in terms of tickets which each allow one-time access to
the guarded resource. A global ticket can be used at any point during runtime while
local tickets can only be used within the scope of the event by which the ticket was
generated.
The PhoneWrap scripts execute the different steps needed to inject the wrapping
script into the app package.
4.2 Policy specification
The PhoneWrap policies are specified as a JSON / JavaScript object. Each field of
the object represents a policy parameter. A detailed reference of all policy parameters
accepted by PhoneWrap can be found in Appendix B.
PhoneGap app developers are already familiar with JSON / JavaScript and existing
infrastructure and tools (such as editors, code highlighting and structured views) can be
used to transfer policies over the Internet or visualise and modify the policy content.
Policy authors not familiar with JavaScript can specify policies using PhoneWrap’s
HTML form shown in Figure 4.1, which embeds the policy parameters into template
sentences.
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Figure 4.1 Create a policy
4.2.1 Policy parts
Essentially, PhoneWrap policies consist of the 3 parts specified in the ITPs (see Defi-
nition 3.2.1):
Guarded resource
The guarded resources are described by their accessing APIs in three different cate-
gories: the policy parameter guard describes the critical JavaScript APIs, guard_exec
describes the critical Java APIs and guard_require describes the critical plugins.
PhoneWrap needs to guard these three different types of APIs in different ways as
discussed in detail in Section 4.3.1.
Interaction policy
The interaction policy in PhoneWrap is implemented as a finite set BP of button poli-
cies. Each bp ∈ BP is specified via the triple (cond,mperms, local). At runtime each
occurring UI event specifies the event target as the UI element the event was triggered
by. When an event occurs, the parameter cond of each button policy bp is evaluated
against the event target and, if it matches, mperms tickets are created. If the flag local
of bp is true, the generated tickets are marked as local to this event.
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where m0 is the number of tickets granted by this PhoneWrap policy at launch. Given
BP= {bp1, ...,bpk} and a trace t = r1,r2, ... (see Definition 3.2.2), the security property
of the ticket-based policy guarantees the bound




ci(t) = |{e ∈ t | bpi.cond(e)}|
is the number of events in t matching the conditions of policy bpi. This bound guaran-
tees that the number of resources units actually consumed by the trace t, is limited by
the appropriate amount per button click. This bound does not factor in the cancelled
local tickets, but instead assumes they are all used in their respective validity scope.
In the policy specification, the parameter buttons specifies the list BP of button
policies. Each bp is defined as a nested JavaScript object with the field cond, mperms
and local. The condition cond itself is an object. Each field of the cond object
describes a property the event target has to fulfil for this button policy to apply.
Deny behaviour
The deny behaviour in PhoneWrap is defined as a JavaScript function with access to
the policy state. This enables many expressive responses fine-tuned to the guarded
resource, for example, terminating the app, ignoring the resource request, returning
dummy values or interactive with user inquiry.
Policy state
During runtime PhoneWrap implements the policy state (cl,cg) of the ITPs via two
counters mperms_local and mperms_global. The initial value of mperms_global is
set by the policy parameter mperms.
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4.2.2 Example policy
An example policy for the “TrackMyVisit” app is given in Figure 4.2. This policy
guards the APIs to send messages specified via the parameters guard, guard_require
and guard_exec. At app launch 1 ticket to access either of these APIs is granted.
The interaction policy button in this example only contains one button policy.
This button policy generates 3 (mperms) local tickets for each click on an element with
the “src” property ending in images/emergency_icon2.png (cond). The parameter
match of the button policy determines how the values in cond are compared to the
properties of the event target. Its value “end” in this policy describes that any but-
ton with an icon path ending in “images/emergency_icon2.png” activates this button
policy. This accounts for the prefix of the absolute icon path during runtime. Possi-
ble values for the parameter cond include “exact”, “different”, “ends”, “begins” and
“contains” which each compare the properties of the occurring event with the property
values specified in the policy in the self-explanatory way. More experienced policy
authors can also use the matching method “regex” to specify the properties of the
policy-activated UI elements as a JavaScript regular expression. The deny behaviour
in this policy simply ignores the resource access and displays the message “Policy:
Denied” instead.
Figure 4.2 Example policy
1 policy = {
2 mperms : 1,













16 deny: function(){alert("Policy: Denied")}
17 }
4.2.3 Extensions
To capture the resource behaviour of real-world apps better, PhoneWrap offers a few
features in addition to the core features of an ITP. The policy state has the switches
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allowAll and blockAll which enable or disable all access regardless of the available
tickets. The corresponding ITP would set ctic = ∞ or ctic = −∞. The starting state of
these switches can be specified in the allowAll and blockAll parameters in the policy
and every button policy can assign a new value to those parameters. A PhoneWrap
policy can also flag a button policy as checkbox or confirm which changes the way
the policy grants tickets for events on those elements. Section 4.3.2.1 discusses in
which situations these policy behaviours are needed.
4.3 Policy enforcement
Inspired by the method proposed in [94], PhoneWrap provides the wrapper script
which contains the policy and the code to wrap the necessary functions. PhoneWrap
inserts this script into the header of the main HTML file and wraps the relevant assets
at multiple stages during the life-cycle of the app. The overall layout of the script is as
follows:
1 function wrapper () { //all locals inside this body are protected
2 // Define policy object
3 // wrap API functions
4 // wrap input elements
5 // wrap auxiliary functions
6 };
7 wrapper();
The whole policy is implemented inside a function body. When this function is
called, JavaScript creates a new scope object for the function body in which PhoneWrap
stores the policy state and the original resource consuming APIs as local variables. The
JavaScript scope ensures that local variables cannot be accessed from outside the func-
tion body and consequently isolates the policy from the application code. The wrapper
script all together contains ~500 LOC which does not influence the package size sig-
nificantly.
The last step, wrapping the auxiliary functions, includes listening for freshly in-
serted JavaScript scripts into the DOM tree of the app. New scripts might contain new
APIs which have to be wrapped, before the app uses them. For this reason, PhoneWrap
wraps all available critical API functions each time a new script is inserted. This en-
sures all critical APIs are wrapped at all times. Since it is not trivial to check whether
a function is already wrapped, PhoneWrap wraps all available function each time the
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wrapping is called. Should a function be wrapped multiple times, PhoneWrap takes
care, that only one ticket is consumed, independent of the number of wrapping layers.
4.3.1 Wrapping API functions
Inside the wrapper script PhoneWrap copies all critical APIs into local variables and
then overwrites the public references by a wrapped version. This includs the APIs
specified by the policy and further administrative functions to guard the integrity of the
policy. The function exec_guard (Figure 4.3), included in the wrapping script, wraps
a function appropriately corresponding to wrappol of the ITPs. As input it expects a
function call consisting of the name of the function and the actual parameter values.
When called, it evaluates the policy state and either executes the deny behaviour or the
original function call. During the wrapping procedure the references to all specified
APIs are overwritten with their wrapped versions in the JavaScript execution environ-
ment.
Inside the wrapper, the policy state is checked and modified in the following order:
1. if blockAll is true → deny access
2. if allowAll is true → allow access
3. if at least one local ticket is available → allow access and subtract one local
ticket
4. if at least one ticket is available (global + local) → allow access, delete all frac-
tional local tickets and global tickets to add up to 1 full ticket
5. otherwise → deny
This policy enforcement is applied to 3 different kinds of APIs:
Java APIs As discussed in Section 2.1.4, PhoneGap plugins are implemented as Java
classes. Via the PhoneGap bridge function exec JavaScript code can call the
Java API directly. For example,
cordova.exec(..., ”SmsPlugin”,”SEND_SMS”,parameters)
calls the method SEND_SMS of the plugin class SmsPlugin with the provided
parameters. PhoneWrap instruments the function exec to appropriately en-
force the policy should exec be called with a Java API as specified in the param-
eter guard_exec of the policy.
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Figure 4.3 Wrapping function
1 var exec_guarded = function(f,f_this ,f_arguments) {
2 var allowed_global = (policy.mperms_global + policy.
mperms_local > 0);
3 var allowed_local = (policy.mperms_local > 0);
4 var perms_pre;
5 if (!policy.blockAll) {
6 if (policy.allowAll) {
7 var back = f.apply(f_this ,f_arguments);
8 return back;
9 }
10 if (allowed_local) {
11 perms_pre = policy.mperms_local;
12 var back = f.apply(f_this ,f_arguments);
13 policy.mperms_local = perms_pre -1; //only ever decrease by
1, even if wrapped by this policy multiple times
14 return back;
15 }
16 if (allowed_global) {
17 perms_pre = policy.mperms_global+policy.mperms_local;
18 var back = f.apply(f_this ,f_arguments);
19 policy.mperms_local = 0;
20 policy.mperms_global = perms_pre -1; //only ever decrease




24 return policy.deny(f_this ,f_arguments);
25 }
JavaScript APIs Most plugins provide a JavaScript interface internally calls the Java
API using the exec function. For example, smsplugin.send calls the Java API
above. Recent versions of PhoneGap initialise these JavaScript interfaces during
the start-up phase. Since this initialisation is performed before the wrapping of
exec, they need to be wrapped individually.
PhoneWrap instruments all JavaScript functions specified in the guard parame-
ter of the policy.
Plugins A fresh copy of the JavaScript API of a plugin can be requested using the
require function. For example, JavaScript code obtains the API for the SMS
plugin by calling require(“cordova/plugin/smssendingplugin”). This is
most commonly used in early versions of the PhoneGap framework which do
not initialise the JavaScript APIs automatically. PhoneWrap instruments the
require function to automatically wrap the critical functions specified in the
policy parameter guard_require before the API is forwarded to the application
code.
JavaScript’s inheritance is based on a prototype chain, which defines the parent
object for each individual object. Before any function is wrapped, PhoneWrap fol-
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lows the prototype chain and wraps the critical function in the most general object to
guarantee wrapping everywhere in the relevant object hierarchy.
When the wrapping script is executed all available APIs are wrapped immediately.
After the initial wrapping, PhoneWrap listens for further critical APIs to become avail-
able and (re-)wraps all APIs defined in the policy accordingly:
• PhoneWrap listens for the event deviceready sent by PhoneGap once all li-
braries are initialised and wraps all available APIs. To receive this event in older
versions of the framework, PhoneWrap re-registers the handler after the Phone-
Gap library has been loaded.
• PhoneWrap registers as an HTML MutationObserver to discover additional scripts
loaded into the app. Every time a new script is loaded into the DOM tree,
PhoneWrap executes the wrapping to cover all APIs defined in this script. This
includes scripts included in the original DOM tree and dynamically inserted
script.
Since all critical APIs are wrapped at multiple points of the app’s execution and
PhoneWrap wraps the APIs on different layers (Java API/JavaScript API/Plugin), the
APIs might be wrapped with multiple layers of wrapper. Depending on the implemen-
tation of the particular plugin, the API function might be wrapped once through the
Java API, and once (either through the plugin or JavaScript API) per included script in
the app’s DOM tree. A usual app contains it’s main script, the cordova library file and
several auxiliary or advertisements script. PhoneWrap, however, only consumes one
ticket per call, independent of the number of wrappers.
4.3.2 Interaction dependencies
The novel advantage of PhoneWrap are the interaction-dependencies. PhoneWrap lis-
tens for user events via the standard HTML event queue and generates tickets for each
event according to the policy. In the HTML event standard each event is first sent to all
of the parents of the target node, starting at the root node of the DOM tree. PhoneWrap
utilises this and attaches an event handler to the root to receive all events.
For each event, the PhoneWrap event handler merges the effects of all matching
button policies before the accumulated effect is applied to the policy state. The lo-
cal and global tickets generated in each matching button policy are simply summed
up. The switches blockAll and allowAll are handled in a conservative way: If no
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matching button policy assigns a new value to allowAll then the values in the policy
stay unchanged. If the newly assigned values are either all true or all false, then
this new values is assigned to the policy state. If some matching button policies assign
true and other assign false, then false is accepted as new value in the policy state,
as this is the fail-safe behaviour. The parameter blockAll has the dual behaviour and
accepts true in case true and false is assigned for the same event.
As discussed earlier independent resource policies have a different policy state.
Therefore, if one policy allows a limited amount of tickets and another policy allows
all access by setting allowAll, then access is still limited by the first policy.
Local tickets have to be revoked after all handlers for the specific event have been
executed. The PhoneWrap event handler inserts a callback method into the HTML
message queue by calling setTimeout with 0 seconds. Once all handlers for this
event have been executed, JavaScript fetches the next element in the message queue
and executes PhoneWrap’s callback which sets the number of local tickets to 0.
The JavaScript function dispatchEvent can be used to generate an artificial event.
A malicious app could use it to simulate user interaction and generate an arbitrary
amount of tickets without real user interaction. To guarantee that tickets are only gen-
erated for real user interaction, PhoneWrap also wraps dispatchEvent. The wrapped
version first disables ticket generation, then generates the artificial event and re-enables
tickets after the event has been processed. The only other JavaScript API manipulating
event handlers is removeEventListener which deletes all the event handlers for one
DOM node. Even though the app could remove the PhoneWrap event handlers us-
ing this function, this would only generate fewer tickets, because button policies only
generate tickets, and prevent the functionality of the app. The security of the policy
enforcement is not threatened. In particular, the JavaScript code cannot extract the
PhoneWrap event handler and call it without user interaction.
4.3.2.1 Special input elements
Motivated by real world apps, the button policies have been extended by two behaviour
patterns which go beyond the formal specification of ITPs.
Some real world examples like “TrackMyVisit” make the user aware of the re-
source consumption by displaying a confirmation dialog. Pressing the “Emergency”
button first brings up a confirmation dialog and the message is only sent if the user
presses “Ok”. Since confirmation dialogs are not part of the DOM tree, PhoneWrap
does not receive events for the dialogs. To incorporate dialogs into policies, PhoneWrap
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instruments the dialog APIs and wraps the callback functions of each dialog. If a button
policy specifies a list of captions in the confirm parameter, PhoneWrap only reserves
the specified number of tickets for such an event, rather than granting them. If in the
subsequent dialog a button with one of the specified captions is pressed, the reserved
tickets are granted. If the user presses a dialog button not specified in the confirm
list, PhoneWrap deletes all reserved tickets. In this case, PhoneWrap can implement
flow-sensitive policies.
Other apps consume resources dependent on a user selection, for example, send
messages to each contact the user has marked in a list of checkboxes (see Section
4.5.3.8 for a real-world example). In this case, the consumption depends on the number
of selections. In PhoneWrap’s button policies, a UI element can be identified as a
checkbox which instructs PhoneWrap to grant tickets when the box is checked and
revoke the tickets when the check is removed.
4.3.3 Properties
To show that PhoneWrap enforces ITPs, the assumptions for the policy enforcement
need to be verified. Due to the lack of a formal execution model of JavaScript apps,
they are justified informally:
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Claim 4.3.1. The application code cannot change the state of the policy.
JavaScript’s scope protects the local variables of the policy function, including the
policy state, against access from outside the policy function.
Claim 4.3.2. All calls to the original function f are replaced by the wrapped version
wrappol( f ).
The reference f to the critical function is overwritten by the wrapped version in the
JavaScript environment. Every time the application code calls f , the wrapped version
is called instead. The PhoneWrap script is inserted at the top of the header of the main
HTML file. Therefore, it is executed before any other script and overwrites all API ref-
erences specified in the policy before the application code can store a local copy of the
original reference. APIs made available after the PhoneWrap script has been executed
are either discovered using the deviceready function or by the MutationObserver.
In both cases PhoneWrap registers the listener before any other listener is registered.
This ensures that PhoneWrap’s listener is executed before any other handler and that
the wrapping is executed before the application code can access the unwrapped API.
Claim 4.3.3. The application code cannot access the original API directly.
The original references are protected like the policy state. Due to JavaScript’s
dynamic scoping all calls to the original function are rerouted to the wrapped API, even
for internal calls in JavaScript libraries. Note, however, that only the APIs specified
in the policy are guarded. PhoneWrap must assume that all critical APIs are specified
there.
Claim 4.3.4. Tickets are only generated by the specified user interaction.
The only PhoneWrap method (apart form potentially the deny behaviour) which
increases the ticket count is the event handler. According to the HTML standard,
the only way to execute an event handler without user interaction is the function
dispatchEvent which is wrapped by PhoneWrap so it cannot generate tickets.
Furthermore, the PhoneWrap script is executed first and registers the first listener
at the root node. Each event is first passed to the root node and the JavaScript standard
specifies that event handlers are executed in the order of registration. Therefore, the
tickets for an event are generated before the application code potentially uses the tickets
for the functionality triggered by the event.
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Corollary 4.3.5. PhoneWrap implements an ITP and therefore enforces the bound
specified in Section 4.2 on the resource usage of the wrapped app.
PhoneWrap can inject multiple wrapper scripts into the same app if either the user
wants to guard multiple different resources or multiple parties (developer, distributor,
device admin, user, ...) have different policies for the same resource. In this situation,
multiple wrapper scripts are inserted into the DOM tree, each with it’s own policy
definition and policy scope. In case a critical API with multiple separate wrappers is
called, the original API is called only, if all policies allow access individually.
Since each wrapper is executed in its own function scope, the different wrappers
cannot access each others’ policy state. Due to this fact, the final decision whether to
execute the original API is independent of the order in which the policies are injected
into the app. In this way PhoneWrap, is modular. However, different injection orders
might result in different deny behaviour. If an outer policy is violated the resource
call is replaced by its deny behaviour. Since this might not call the wrapped function,
deeper nested policies are not evaluated and their deny behaviour is not activated.
4.4 Policy injection




The tool chain2 of PhoneWrap supports each of the 5 steps:
1. The script m10_unpack unpacks an app package downloaded directly from the
Google Play Store to access the JavaScript code.
2. The package analysis tool m20_analyse_apk extracts all necessary information
for the policy creation from the configuration files. This includes the accessed
resources (via the PhoneGap plugins and permissions) and the elements of the
user interface which might perform the resource consuming functionality.
3. Users not familiar with JavaScript can write the policy using PhoneWrap’s HTML
2Source code has been made available: github.com/DFranzen/PhoneWrap
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form m25_createPolicy.html shown in Figure 4.1. It provides the available
choices for each parameter and embeds the policy into full English sentences.
4. The script m30_policify automatically inserts the wrapper script and a pro-
vided policy into the main HTML folder and links it into the main DOM tree of
the app.
5. Finally, with m90_pack_install the app is packaged back into a standard An-
droid app package. Since PhoneWrap altered the source code, this new package
has to be re-signed after injection to be installed on an Android phone.
The only step that requires human action is the policy creation. The policy author
has to specify the guarded APIs and specify the UI elements for the button policies.
PhoneWrap assists with all tasks of this process. The analysis script m20_analyse_apk
compiles a list of plugins and permissions included in the app. For the app “Track-
MyVisit” from Section 3.1 this list contains the plugin org.apache.cordova.plugin.
SmsSendingPlugin. PhoneWrap does not infer the critical APIs for each plugin auto-
matically, but a table of critical APIs for the most common plugins is provided with the
PhoneWrap source code. In the example, the identified plugin provides the JavaScript
API smsplugin.send and the Java API SmsPlugin.SEND_SMS.
Figure 4.4 TMV - Policy Creation
(a) Instrumentation (b) Policy Verification
To choose the correct properties for the button policies, PhoneWrap instruments
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the original app to display the properties of each button during normal interaction (see
Figure 4.4a). To check the correctness of the button policies, the same instrumentation
can display each affected button in a red frame (see Figure 4.4b). Thanks to these
features, a PhoneWrap policy can be created for an app without knowledge of the
app’s source code or implementation details of the enforcement method.
Android app packages are signed by the developer of the app and this signature is
validated by Android during installation to preclude modification of the app by third
parties. Since PhoneWrap modifies the code the signature by the original developer is
invalidated. While packaging the injected app into an Android package, PhoneWrap
re-signs the app with the key of the policy injector. Assuming the original signature is
verified, the new signature vouches for the fact that the original signature was not vio-
lated before injection and that the policy was inserted. Instead of trusting the developer
of the app, now the trust lies with the user injecting the PhoneWrap policy as well as
their trust in the original developer. Sometimes, functionalities for interaction between
different apps depend on the signatures of the two apps. Therefore, it is advised to
re-sign apps that were signed with the same original key with the same policy key.
An automated script mall executes all scripts mentioned above in the correct order
to directly insert a given policy into the package downloaded from the app store.
4.5 Evaluation
The evaluation of PhoneWrap on real apps aims to answer the following questions:
1. Does PhoneWrap restrict the wrapped app’s resource consumption to the speci-
fied bounds?
2. Is the runtime overhead of the enforcement acceptable?
3. Is the policy specification fine-grained enough to describe the benign resource
behaviour of real-world apps?
4. Can the appropriate policy for an app be identified with the provided tools?
4.5.1 Enforcement tests
To evaluate question 1, the app in Figure 4.5 is crafted to circumvent PhoneWrap’s
enforcement. The critical resource in this experiment is the vibration feature, since the
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Figure 4.5 Experimental App















effect of resource access is noticeable immediately and the corresponding plugin offers
a JavaScript API as well as a Java API.
The UI of this app consists of 4 buttons each trying to access the resource in a
different way. The first button (green) calls the JavaScript API and serves as the control
test to ensure legitimate resource access is not prohibited by the injected policy. The
second button (yellow) uses the same method and represents standard non legitimate
access. The third button (orange) calls the Java API via the exec function and the
bottom button (red) sends an artificial click event to the green button. Each button
also changes the colour of the panel at the bottom (black in Figure 4.5) to simulate the
resource independent functionality. Furthermore, to represent resource access without
user-interaction, the app calls the vibration API scheduled every 30s.
The policy in Figure 4.5 guards the vibration APIs and grants 1 ticket for each click
on the green button (identified by its id “USE”). After policy injection, the vibration
of the yellow, orange and red buttons and the scheduled vibration are successfully
prohibited. The behaviour of the colour of the bottom panel is not affected by the
policy, showing that resource independent functionality is preserved. The behaviour of
the green button is unchanged which shows that the bounds are enforced as specified.
For a second experiment with the same app, the green button was greyed out (using
CSS classes) for the first 30s after launch. Messaging apps, for example, often grey
out the “Send” button before the user has entered the message text or recipient. The
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policy was amended to only generate tickets for green buttons. As expected, vibration
was denied during the initial greyed-out period but allowed after the button colour is
changed to green. This shows that PhoneWrap reacts correctly to changes in the UI.
To evaluate question 2, the runtime overhead of the enforcement, the APIs to start
and pause audio playback were chosen as the resource. They can be called in quick
succession and do not require user interaction. Therefore, they are suitable for auto-
mated tests. The app for this evaluation contains of only one button which starts and
pauses the playback of an audio file 1000 times as quickly as possible. As a result the
app returns the measured times for these 2000 API calls. This app was then injected
with a policy guarding the JavaScript APIs of the audio plugin and allows 2000 tickets
per button click.
Figure 4.6 Running times, 2000 API calls each
(a) JavaScript APIs
Test Original app Injected app
1 4598 ms 4823 ms
2 4500 ms 4540 ms
3 4527 ms 4719 ms
4 4599 ms 4558 ms
5 4616 ms 4883 ms
ø 4568 ms 4704 ms
(b) Java APIs via exec
Test Original app Injected app
1 5072 ms 5131 ms
2 5151 ms 5227 ms
3 5057 ms 5117 ms
4 5035 ms 5411 ms
5 5130 ms 5182 ms
ø 5089 ms 5213 ms
To eliminate noise, the app was executed 5 times with the resulting times in Figure
4.6a. The overall overhead amounts to 136ms on average. This corresponds to a 3%
runtime overhead of API calls or less than 1ms per API call.
The results of the same test with direct calls to the Java APIs via the exec bridge
are shown in Figure 4.6b. The overall overhead of 124ms is similar to the test with
JavaScript API calls. The longer runtimes in this test probably originate from the fact
that this test had to manage the parameters for the API calls manually and did so less
efficiently than the plugin code. Due to the longer overall time, the overhead reduced
to 2.4%. This also shows that other implementation details have a higher impact on
the overall runtime than PhoneWrap’s enforcement.
Apart from the instrumentation enforcing the policy, PhoneWrap also adds time to
the launch of the app to initialise the enforcement. The initialisation for the audio API
in JavaScript and Java took between 8 and 20ms. The interaction policies added about
3ms to the handling of each button event. In summary, the overhead of the enforcement
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method during these test does not significantly influence the performance of the app.
4.5.2 Real-world apps
To answer questions 3 and 4, PhoneWrap was tested on a set of real-world apps down-
loaded directly from the Google Play Store. In total, 8757 apps used for the evaluation
in [67] were available for download during November and December 2014.
Figure 4.7 Categories of SMS apps




c 1914 N/A Configuration file not as expected
total 8757
The analysis script could identify (see Figure 4.7) and parse the PhoneGap config-
uration file in 6843 (a + b, 78%) of these apps. The necessary information about the
used resources and the main source files could be extracted making policy creation and
injection possible. The 1443 apps in category b are written with PhoneGap prior to
version 2.0. Since the structure of these configuration files differs significantly from
the current version, PhoneWrap had to be slightly adapted for these apps. It now recog-
nises these versions automatically. The inspection of a small sample of the remaining
1914 apps (c) showed that they either use very early versions of the PhoneGap library,
where the plugin structure was not fixed yet, or include the PhoneGap library with-
out using the PhoneGap framework. In the first case the PhoneWrap wrapping script
can probably be used to guard the critical resource in a majority of the apps, but the
resource accessing APIs have to be identified in the code manually.
4.5.2.1 Real world evaluation setup
In this evaluation, the messaging service was chosen as resource, since it is used in
real-world apps with immediate and quantifiable effects on the privacy and assets (al-
lowance, phone bill) of the user. Apps accessing the messaging service can easily be
identified by filtering for the permission SEND_SMS. Concerning the implementation,
PhoneGap does not provide an official plugin to access the messaging service. Instead,
multiple different third party plugins are available. This way, PhoneWrap is exposed
4.5. Evaluation 75
to different plugin implementation techniques during this experiment. The candidate
apps chosen from the set of 6843 PhoneGap apps were evaluated on the test device
(Motorola Moto G, Android 5.0.2) by applying the following steps:
1. Manually explore the UI of the app, monitor sent messages in the log and note
the triggering user interaction sequences.
2. Instrument the app to identify the properties describing these interaction se-
quences.
3. Create a policy generating the exact amount of tickets needed to perform the
expected behaviour for each legitimate interaction.
4. Inject this policy into the original package and manually evaluate the behaviour
of the modified app.
The wrapper script used in this evaluation is amended to provide feedback about
the correctness of the policy enforcement: pop-up messages report every change of the
policy state as seen in Figure 4.8 and the deny behaviour replaces the resource request
by the pop-up message “Denied”. This way, each state change of the policy can be
verified against the model of ticket-based policies.
Figure 4.8 Policy status output
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4.5.2.2 Messaging in PhoneGap
Out of the 6843 eligible apps only 59 apps request the permission to send SMS. The
Android permission model prohibits all remaining apps to send SMS. The 59 apps split
into categories as shown in Figure 4.9. The apps in category a could not be examined,
Figure 4.9 Categories of apps with access to messaging service
Category #Apps Description Policy
a 16
not testable
(non-Latin alphabet or account required)
b 16 no message plugin recognised retract permission
c 13 no messages sent during UI experiments deny-all policy
d 4 send messages via intent deny-all policy
e 10 candidates individual policy
total 59
because their user interface is in non-Latin letters or they require an account which
could not be easily created. The behaviour of apps in this category is not known and,
hence, no policy could be created. A normal user of these apps could, however, de-
scribe the behaviour and create policies accordingly. Apps in category b do not include
a recognisable SMS plugin. They are either over-privileged or use a nontransparent
third party SMS plugin. The PhoneWrap tools can be used to unpack the app, remove
the SMS permission from the Android Manifest and repack the app. Since PhoneWrap
cannot guard the resource accesses individually, quantitative or interaction-dependent
policies cannot be fitted. Category c contains apps which did not send any messages
during the manual examination. Assuming the UI was examined sufficiently, the apps
should be fitted with a deny-all policy. In contrast to category b, the resource con-
suming APIs are known and the PhoneWrap deny-all policy described on page 52 can
be inserted. This way, PhoneWrap can define a more flexible counter-action should
the guarded API be accessed. The redaction of the permission used for category b
always terminates the app with a security violation. Category d contains 4 apps which
contain a messaging plugin, but all discovered messages were sent through intents to
the Android messaging app instead. This method requires the user to explicitly press
the “Send” button in the familiar messaging UI and the app itself does not require the
SMS sending permission. Thus, the apps in this category are certainly over-privileged
and PhoneWrap can deny all access as in category c to prevent additional resource
consumption in the background. This leaves 10 apps which actually use PhoneGap to
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send SMS and can be fitted with a meaningful quantitative policy.
In the categories a, c, d and e, 19 different message sending plugins were iden-
tified (see Figure 2.11 for details). For 12 of them the full source code is available
from which the resource consuming JavaScript and Java APIs were identified. For the
remaining 7 the JavaScript source code can be extracted from the app package and
the used part of the Java API can be reverse engineered. The Java part might contain
further API functions only accessible via exec, but such hidden APIs were not found
in any of the plugins with available source code. This increases the confidence that the
APIs for unknown plugins can be extracted from the app itself. Nevertheless, to defend
against hidden Java APIs, PhoneWrap could instead employ a white-list and deny all
unknown Java APIs. The 5 different SMS plugins included in the set of candidates
(category e) are all available in full source code.
4.5.2.3 Evaluation results
PhoneWrap was successfully applied to all 10 candidates. Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show
the functionalities and injected policies for each app. The expected behaviour was
easily identified by using the app for a few minutes. After policy injection, the allowed
behaviour was performed identically to the original app. The displayed state changes
show that the tickets are managed as specified in the policy.
Within the 10 apps, PhoneWrap was able to demonstrate most of its features: the
app Servicehours (10) demonstrates the need for the checkbox policy and several apps
(6-9) justify the confirm policies. In TrackMyVisit (9) the local tickets are necessary
to tighten the resource consumption bound. On the other hand, the policy for Service-
hours (10) needs non-local tickets, since the ticket generation and ticket consumption
are triggered by different events. The other apps (1-8) use all granted tickets immedi-
ately and, therefore, local and global tickets are equivalent. The policies below grant
local tickets as the fail-safe method.
The apps Tidegarden (5) and MAF (7) send charged premium messages. Before
such a message is sent, Android warns the user in a confirmation dialog (see Figure
4.13 right). This dialog is outside the scope of PhoneWrap, since PhoneWrap enforces
its policy on the application level. As a consequence, the system dialog is displayed
when the PhoneWrap policy grants the message and a ticket is used even if the user
cancels the Android dialog. If the PhoneWrap policy denies the message, the dialog is
suppressed as part of the API call.
In the app Glassmester (8), PhoneWrap was able to prohibit unwanted resource
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consumption. This app displays a confirmation dialog before the message is sent.
However, the message is sent even if the user presses the “Cancel” button! The in-
jected PhoneWrap policy grants the message only if the “OK” button is pressed. Thus,
PhoneWrap isolates a bug in a real world app.
Figure 4.10 App functionality
App no App functionality Resource consuming interaction
1
Manage the Insurance
(Read policy, Get a quote, Report Accident) Contacts → Text → SEND TEXT
2 Remote control appliances on a boat via SMS <Any device button> → <Any command button> → Send
3 Remote control cameras via SMS <Any device button> → <Any command button> → Send
4 Remote control devices via SMS <Any device button> → <Any command button> → Send
5 Display prayer texts for each day Tacka (cover) → Ge med SMS (Donate via SMS)
6 Remote control devices via SMS <Any envelope button> → Send
7 Inform about and support MAF Kjop flybensin (buy jetfuel) → <Any stage> → Gi (Donate) → Ok
8 Order and manage glass reparations Befaring (Inspection) → SMS → Ok
9 Create journey logs
Emergency OR
New Visit → Emergency
10 Business Search and Information Access Gear → INVITE FRIENDS → Envelope
Figure 4.11 Apps and their Policies
App (version, versionCode) Button Condition Tickets Policy features
1 com.GPAInsurance.myinsurance.apk(1.0, 2) Caption: “Send Text” 1
2 nu.fdp.Boatsteward.apk(1.5, 6) id: “btnSendTheMessage” 1
3 nu.fdp.optimaxx_gsm.apk(2.6, 26) id: “btnSendTheMessage” 1
4 nu.fdp.Sms_RC.apk(4.1, 19) Caption: “Send” 1
5 se.fjellandermedia.tidegarden.apk(3.1, 310)
Caption: “Ge med SMS”
id: “donateSMS” 1
6 nu.fdp.Sms_RC_Mini.apk(1.7, 8) src: (ends with) “/pict/send.png” 1 confirm: “Send”
7 no.idium.apps.maf.apk(1.0.1, 68) id: “stage_Gi” 1 confirm: “Ok”
8 no.idium.apps.apk(1.0, 52) class: “sms_small” 1 confirm: “OK”
9 myzealit.TMV.apk(2.2, 22) src: (ends with) “emergency_icon.png” 3 (local) confirm: “Yes”
10 com.ServiceHours.ServiceHours.apk(1.3.3, 8) name: “contactnumber” 1 (global) checkbox
4.5.3 Policies added to the real world apps
4.5.3.1 GPA Insurance
The app GPA Insurance (1) shows the easiest resource behaviour: the user can contact
the issuing company via SMS triggered by a button. After clicking on the speech-
bubble button in the “Contacts” menu, the app provides a “SEND TEXT” screen. The
user can enter the content of a message and send it via the red “SEND TEXT” button.
The PhoneWrap instrumentation reveals that the caption “Send Text” can be used to
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Figure 4.12 GPA Insurance
1 policy = {
2 mperms : 0,
3 buttons : [
4 {









14 guard_exec: [ "SmsPlugin.SendSMS" ],
15 deny: function(){alert("Policy: Denied")}
16 }
specify the activating button. The policy generates one local ticket for each click on
this button.
4.5.3.2 Tidegarden
The Swedish app “Tidegarden” (5) allows the user to send a message donation via the
button “Tacka” (“cover”). The user can select the organisation they want to donate to
and by clicking on “Ge med SMS” (Donate via SMS) a premium SMS for the specified
amount is sent. The policy generates 1 ticket for the button with the id “donateSMS”
and the caption “Ge med SMS”.
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Figure 4.13 Tidegarden
1 policy = {
2 mperms : 0,
3 buttons : [
4 {
5 cond: {







13 guard: [ "smsExport.sendMessage" ],
14 guard_exec: [ "Sms.sendMessage" ],
15 deny: function(){alert("Policy: Denied")}
16 }
4.5.3.3 Boatsteward, Optimaxx, Sms RC
The app Boatsteward (2) allows the user to specify a remote for boat appliances with
message receiving capabilities. Via the setup menu the user can specify the phone
numbers of up to 10 devices and 6 command texts per device. When the user selects a
device and a command the sending button appears which sends the specified command
to the device’s phone number. The send button does not have a caption but can be
identified by its id “btnSendTheMessage”:
The inspection of the HTML document of this app reveals that it uses JavaScript
to insert the PhoneGap framework script dynamically to make the code cross-platform
compatible. Since PhoneWrap listens for dynamically injected scripts via the Muta-
tionObserver standard, it can wrap the APIs as soon as the library is loaded.
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Figure 4.14 SMS Remote apps
1 policy = {
2 mperms : 0,
3 buttons : [
4 {






11 guard: [ "smsplugin.send" ],
12 guard_exec: [ "SmsPlugin.SEND_SMS" ],
13 deny: function(){alert("Policy: Denied")}
14 }
The app Optimaxx GSM (3) uses the same code with a slightly redesigned user
interface. The policy for Boatsteward can be reused directly for Optimaxx. For the app
Sms RC (4) the policy has to be slightly modified to describe the button by its caption
“Send” instead.
4.5.3.4 Sms RC Mini
App 6 is a completely revised version of the apps 2-4. It uses the same SMS plugin
but displays a separate envelope button to send the message for each task. The buttons
can be uniformly described by their icon path ending in “/pict/send.png”.
This app inserts the whole DOM tree dynamically except for the bare skeleton.
Since PhoneWrap’s listeners are registered at the DOM root, it can be attached to the
initial DOM tree, therefore detecting all added notes automatically. Additionally, the
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Figure 4.15 Sms RC Mini
1 policy = {
2 mperms : 0,
3 buttons : [
4 {







12 guard: [ "smsplugin.send" ],
13 guard_exec: [ "SmsPlugin.SEND_SMS" ],
14 deny: function(){alert("Policy: Denied")}
15 }
app also uses a confirmation dialog before the message is sent. Here, the confirm
feature of PhoneWrap is used to only allow tickets when the user clicks the confirming
“Send” button
4.5.3.5 MAF
The app MAF Norge (7) is the Norwegian app of the charity Mission Aviation Fellow-
ship which provide air support for remote areas in need all over the world. The app
sends premium SMS in the Menu “Kjop Flybensin” (Buy jet fuel) for each click on
“Gi”(give) to donate for their missions. The resource consuming button can be identi-
fied by its id “stage_Gi”. Again, the user needs to confirm the message by clicking the
“Ok” button in the subsequent dialog.
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Figure 4.16 Missions Aviation Fellowship
1 policy = {
2 mperms : 0,
3 buttons : [
4 {







12 guard_require: [ "cordova/plugin/sms.send" ],
13 guard_exec: [ "SmsPlugin.SendSMS" ],
14 deny: function(){alert("Policy: Denied")}
15 }
4.5.3.6 TrackMyVisit
The functionality of the app TrackMyVisit (9) has already been discussed in Section
3.1. After the user clicks the “Emergency” button on the main screen and confirms
with “Yes” the app sends a message to up to 3 specified contacts. The emergency
button can easily be identified by its icon ending in “images/emergency_icon.png”. A
second emergency button exists in the trip specific menu with the icon “images/emer-
gency_icon2.png”.
This app is an example where multiple tickets are generated per button click, in
this case, 3. It also illustrates the need for the local parameter. The app is granted
3 tickets, but depending on the setup, might not send all 3 messages. The remaining
tickets could then be used for hidden or unwanted behaviour in the background at a
later stage. To prevent that, PhoneWrap revokes the remaining local tickets after all
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Figure 4.17 TrackMyVisit
1 policy = {
2 mperms : 0,
3 buttons : [
4 {














19 guard: [ "smsplugin.send" ],
20 guard_exec: [ "SmsPlugin.SEND_SMS" ],
21 guard_require: [ "cordova/plugin/smssendingplugin.send"
],
22 deny: function(){alert("Policy: Denied")}
23 }
handlers for this event have been executed.
4.5.3.7 Glassmester
The Norwegian app Glassmester (8) allows a customer to send an SMS to the cus-
tomer service crew via the button sequence “Befaring” and “SMS”. The app shows a
confirmation dialog “Sende SMS?” (Send SMS?), where the user can select “Ok” or
“Avbryt” (Cancel). However, if the user selects cancel, the message is sent anyway.
This contradicts the expected behaviour. PhoneWrap restricts the app by specifying
the button with the class “sms_small” to generate tickets only when confirmed with
“Ok” in the following dialog. Through the injection of the policy the faulty behaviour
could be corrected.
4.5.3.8 Servicehours
The app Servicehours (10) can be recommended to friends via SMS by clicking on
the gear button in the top left corner and then selecting “Invite Friends”. The app
presents the user with a list of all contacts stored on the phone which the user can
select individually using provided checkboxes. With the checkbox policy, PhoneWrap
only allows the app to send one messages per selected friend. The policy identifies the
checkboxes by their property name which is set to contactnumber.
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Figure 4.18 Glassmester
1 policy = {
2 mperms : 0,
3 buttons : [
4 {







12 guard_require: [ "cordova/plugin/sms.send" ],
13 guard_exec: [ "SmsPlugin.SendSMS" ],
14 deny: function(){alert("Policy: Denied")}
15 }
This app demonstrates the necessity for the checkbox feature of PhoneWrap. It also
illustrates the need for global tickets: the click on the checkbox generates the tickets,
but the event handler of the envelope button uses them. The tickets have to stay valid
until the second button is pressed, which is after the event handler for the checkbox
has already finished.
4.6 Discussion
The system PhoneWrap injects quantitative policies into real world PhoneGap apps to
limit their resource consumption. To enforce those policies during runtime, PhoneWrap
wraps the resource consuming APIs and monitors how often they are called. If the app
exceeds the stated bound, a deny behaviour is executed instead of the resource access.
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Figure 4.19 Servicehours
1 policy = {
2 mperms : 0,
3 buttons : [
4 {






11 guard: [ "smsplugin.send" ],
12 guard_exec: [ "SmsPlugin.SEND_SMS" ],
13 guard_require: [ "cordova/plugin/smssendingplugin.send"
],
14 deny: function(){alert("Policy: Denied")}
15 }
Additionally, PhoneWrap listens for events on specific UI elements and allows the
resource access required by the triggered functionality. The system extracts all infor-
mation needed to write the fine-grained policies and can insert the policy into standard
app packages automatically. In tests with real apps PhoneWrap successfully injected
appropriate policies into 10 selected apps restricting the messaging behaviour. In one
case PhoneWrap was able to prevent the app from sending unexpected messages. From
the whole example set of ~8000 apps, PhoneWrap can extract all needed information
to create and inject a policy into 78% of the examined apps.
Some additional checks need to be implemented to make the wrapping impene-
trable: PhoneWrap, as presented here, trusts the integrity of the PhoneGap library.
An altered PhoneGap library could provide additional APIs to access native resources
which are not guarded by PhoneWrap. By checking the library included in the app
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against all known versions, for example by comparing their hashes, PhoneWrap can
make sure all provided APIs are guarded. The same is true for the PhoneGap plugins.
PhoneWrap needs to make sure that the Java classes packaged in the PhoneGap app
are genuinely implementing the expected API and not more. With a whitelist of known
plugin versions PhoneWrap can, for example, warn during policy injection if unknown
plugins are included. The required data is easily obtained from the plugins’ GitHub
repositories.
In PhoneWrap’s current version it is also not difficult for an app to discover that it
has been injected with a policy: the toString function and others return different val-
ues for the original method and the wrapped method as shown in Figure 4.20. Since
Figure 4.20 Before and After Policy Injection
(a) Without Policy
> navigator.notification.alert.toString():
1 function (message ,completeCallback , title , buttonLabel)
2 {
3 var_title = (title || "Alert");
4 var_buttonLabel = (buttonLabel || "OK");






2 return exec_guarded(orig ,this,arguments);
3 }
the original function cannot be extracted from this output, this fact does not compro-
mise the security of the system, although it might give an attacker the opportunity to
replace the resource by an equivalent one (e.g. by using a network service instead of
SMS to send out private data). It is possible to wrap the toString functions and other
methods to behave equivalently on original APIs and wrapped APIs. However, finding
and overwriting all such functions is tedious work and does not obviously add to the
security of the system.
A final modification to make PhoneWrap more usable is to integrate the informa-
tion about the APIs for each resource shown in Section 2.2.2 into the analysis script.
This way, PhoneWrap could recommend which resources and APIs should be guarded
based on the included plugins and permissions.
The injection of PhoneWrap is specific to Android. However, the wrapping script
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is not. Created policies will be enforced for all PhoneGap apps independent of the
operating system. With policies adapted to browser specific resource and injected by
existing browser plugins like UserScripts for Opera PhoneWrap could enforce ITPs
also for web applications on desktops.
Taking inspiration from the frameworks like PhoneGap, the Electron framework by
GitHub [44] provides a similar paradigm for Desktop computers. It packages HTML
and JavaScript code into native applications which execute the JavaScript code in a
platform built-in browser view. The plugins for this framework are provided similarly
to PhoneGap. With a few adjustments the PhoneWrap enforcement script could be
applied to such applications to guard the desktop specific resources of programs written
with the Electron framework.
Chapter 5
Type systems for JavaScript
JavaScript presents some unique challenges for static analysis as discussed in Chapter
2.1. Nevertheless, there have been approaches to capture its behaviour with type sys-
tems. This chapter presents an overview of these systems and discusses their methods,
their properties and individual advantages.
The aim of the discussion here is to survey common methods used in typing Java-
Script and to identify a suitable system to be augmented with amortised annotations by
the system AmorJiSe in Chapter 6.
5.1 Taxonomy of type systems
The results of a type system are expressed by the type judgement. For languages with
strong updates, like JavaScript, it can be written in the following form:
Γ 
 e : t|Γ′.
Here, e is the analysed expression; Γ is the type context which assigns types to the free
variables occurring in e; t is the type assigned to e and Γ′ is the new context reflecting
all changes to the types of the variables made during the evaluation of e.
Depending on the type system, the type judgement can have different properties.
The following sections illustrates some of these properties which are important for
resource analysis. The code in Figure 5.1 is used as an example throughout this section.
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Figure 5.1 Example program
1 function f(x) {
2 var o = {};
3 o.a = "hello";
4 if (x > 3) {
5 o.b = x;
6 }




Types can be used to validate different aspects of JavaScript programs including ab-
sence of runtime errors [9], absence of restricted dataflow [49] or inclusion in a subset
of the JavaScript language [28]. The shape of the resulting types depends on the aspect
a system was designed to analyse. For example, λJS [49] proposes a single type JS
expressing that the given expression is conform with a statically safe JavaScript sub-
set. The types in JST0 [9] are more expressive and describe the structure of values. The
latter is referred to as data types in the following. In the setting of session types [110]
a type even describes the interaction between multiple systems.
Data types for JavaScript are constructed from simple types (Bool, Int, String...)
and types for objects and functions. JavaScript objects map field names to values and
object types mirror this by mapping all known field names to their field’s type. Objects
are often notated as row types [field1 : t1, ...,fieldm : tm] indicating that an object contains
the fields field1, ...,fieldn and the value of the field fieldi has the type ti. In practice, an
object type only mentions a subset of the actually available fields of an object, since
a type has to over-approximate all possible traces through a program. Function types
O×tx → tret describe the structure of the function parameters tx and the return value tret.
The type O describes the structure of the implicit parameter this used in JavaScript to
access to object o in an object method o.m().
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Example data types for the code in Figure 5.1 can be provided as
f :[ ]×Int→ [a : String]
x :Int lines 2-8
o :[ ] line 2
[a : String] lines 3,7-8
[a : String,b : Int] line 5
The function type for f expects an empty object for the this parameter and an
integer for the parameter x. The function returns an object with at least the String
valued field a. The variable x has type Int throughout the whole program and o is an
object with the string field a set in line 3 and additionally the integer field b in line 5.
5.1.2 Soundness
A type system is considered sound if the property obtained as result of the analysis is
guaranteed for all possible executions of the analysed code. Structural soundness for
a data type system holds, if for all results Γ 
 e : t|Γ′ the type t describes the structure
of all possible values of e. The type [a : String,b : Int] for o in line 5 of Figure 5.1
is sound, because for any trace reaching this line, the object o contains at least the
String valued field a and the Int valued field b.
Even though some of the type systems discussed below do not have structural
soundness as their primary goal, they all provide this property.
Soundness of a system is usually demonstrated either by a formal proof or by the
evaluation of benchmarks. Formally proven sound systems provide some form of for-
mal semantics modelling the evaluation of the considered JavaScript subset. They
show that all possible values of any expression according to this model are correctly
described by the resulting type. To expand the guarantees made by the type system
onto real-world code, only the correspondence between the formal semantics and the
real-world language needs to be validated. Instead, other systems demonstrate sound-
ness by applying the system to a set of examples. The system is claimed sound if the
result of the analysis holds true for all examples. While testing-based evaluation is able
to validate systems which rely on relations between values too complicated to handle
with a formal proof, it only provides a guarantee of soundness for the tested cases and
the tested implementation.
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In contrast to sound type systems, some type systems are designed to estimate the
type unsoundly under certain conditions. In Figure 5.1, if the condition (x>3) is true in
most cases, the analysis can estimate it to be true for all practical cases and, as a result,
assume that the field b always exists. Such a type system is not sound as there exist
traces through the function body returning values for which the structure demonstrated
in the type does not apply. If sound analysis cannot get satisfying results, unsound
methods are a way to provide a result which is true for most practical cases.
5.1.3 Coverage
The full JavaScript language has many constructs and features, including built-in li-
braries like Math, Set or Regex and strongly connected libraries the DOM API which
provides the interaction between HTML and JavaScript. Most formal systems only
consider a core of the full language in a similar manner as originally proposed for Al-
gol by Reynolds [98]. Features not included in this core language are either translated,
handled by a practical implementation without formal proof or left for future work.
Translation is achieved by a desugar function, which maps non-covered features to
semantically equivalent expressions in the covered language. However, the replaced
expression is not guaranteed to be resource equivalent. In the example in Figure 5.1,
the nested field lookup line 7 can be desugared into the two lines
7a var tmp = o.a;
7b o.a = tmp + "world";
This translation is semantically equivalent, however, requires the temporary variable
tmp using additional memory space.
Since the desugaring method replaces an expression e by a semantically equivalent
expression desugar(e) the type judgement Γ 
 desugar(e) : t|Γ′ implies Γ 
 e : t|Γ′′
with a Γ′′ corresponding to Γ′ in some way for most type systems. Therefore, data
types obtained from a desugaring type system can usually be used equivalently to the
results of a type system covering the feature directly. However, resource analysis itself
can only use resource equivalent desugaring.
Figure 5.5 compares the JavaScript features covered by the existing systems. Desug-
aring methods are not considered here, since most of them can be adapted between
systems.
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5.1.4 Checking versus inference
Type systems can be designed for two different modes of operation. In the type asser-
tion Γ 
 e : t|Γ′, the expression e is given in both cases. For type checking the type t
and the type context Γ (and sometimes even Γ′) are provided and the purpose of the
type system is to validate whether the statement Γ 
 e : t|Γ′ holds. Statically typed
languages like C or Java provide types as part of the syntax of the program. For these
languages, type checking is sufficient. A type checking systems for an untyped lan-
guage like JavaScript requires extra annotation work by the user to provide those types.
For the code in Figure 5.1, a valid type checking question would be: “In the context
Γ = {x → Int}, does the object returned by the function body always include the field
a?” This assertion is formally written as Γ 
 body : [a : String]|Γ′. Since the typing
provided above can be type checked, the answer is “Yes”.
On the other hand, the type inference problem is to find a t and Γ′ (sometimes also
Γ) such that the statement Γ 
 e : t|Γ′ holds for the given expression e. Since type
inference is provided with less information, it is more complex than type checking.
With less effort for the user of the system, inference is preferable where possible.
Initiated by Mitchell [87] and further developed by Aiken and Wimmers [3], many type
inference systems reduce the inference problem to a constraint solving problem. For
example, in the JavaScript type inference system JST0 [9] the constraints are variations
of subtyping constraints like t < [a : (Int,•)] which expresses that the type variable t
has at least the read-write-able field a of type Int.
Between type checking and type inference there are various levels of systems which
require some annotations to infer the remaining information and infer the remaining
information. Some systems require, for example, the headers of all functions to be
annotated [21] while the type of all other expressions can be inferred automatically.
A special form of mixed checking and inference is gradual typing [109, 106].
It statically infers an incomplete typing from annotations and simple structural con-
straints. Types which cannot be inferred statically are then dynamically checked during
runtime.
5.1.5 Precision
In general, there are multiple possible types for almost all non-trivial expressions. For
example, the empty object [ ] is sound as the type for any object expression, since it
assumes nothing about the fields of the object. However, with the type o : [ ] for o in
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line 6 of Figure 5.1, the expression o.a + “ world” in line 7 cannot be typed, since
the type [ ] does not allow access to the field a. Therefore, a type system should aim to
provide as many sound details as possible.
Formally, consider a type t more precise than t ′ if the two sets
T = {v|v : t}
T ′ = {v|v : t ′}
of all values typed with t or t ′ are in the subset relation:
T ⊂ T ′.
Since this defines only a partial order, multiple most precise types might exist for any
expression e, but in the cases of the systems below, all considered expressions had a
unique most precise type.
5.2 Common techniques in JavaScript type systems
The different existing type systems for JavaScript have different goals and use different
methods to achieve them. Several common methods are used by multiple system. This
section summarises these common methods to present the established state of the art.
5.2.1 Object types
The important data structure in JavaScript are objects. Object types are usually repre-
sented as row types
[field1 : t1, ...,fieldm : tm]
resembling the object calculus by Abadi and Cardelli [1]. Row types consist of a list of
field names with their associated types. For example, the type [a : Int,b : String,c : [ ]]
describes an object which has the integer field a, the string field b and the field c which
is itself typed as object. To describe nested objects, two methods are common. The
first explicitly describes the type of the nested objects like the field c in this example.
In this case, recursive object types are modelled by an explicit recursive operator: a
recursive list with an integer head and a tail list can be typed as
tlist = μα.[head : Int,tail : α].
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The recursive operator μα describes that every α contained in the type stands itself
for the type tlist . The type tlist is equivalent to its unfolded type [head : Int,tail :
μα.[head : Int,tail : α]].
Another approach represents the types of nested objects by abstract references l.
These references are than mapped to types by the abstract heap or typing heap X . For
example, the abstract location llist could be mapped to
X(llist) = [head : Int,tail : llist ].
With the reflexive inclusion of llist this type describes the same list type as tlist . During
runtime, each abstract location l may describe multiple concrete heap locations.
The abstract heap simplifies the handling of aliasing. Consider the example in
Figure 5.2. Both variables x and y are lists and they are aliased in line 2. In the
Figure 5.2 Aliasing example
1 var x = {head:4};
2 var y = x;
explicit approach where both variables are typed as Γ(y) = Γ(x) = [head : Int] the
types are independent of each other and any change of x has to be reflected in the type
of y manually. In the abstract location approach they are both typed with the same
abstract location Γ(y) = Γ(x) = l with the value X(l) = [head : Int] in the abstract
heap. A change of the type of x changes the abstract heap X(l) which automatically
changes the type of y.
One weakness of row types is the fact that each field of the object has to be men-
tioned explicitly. However, JavaScript allows to access arbitrary fields of an object by
dynamically computed strings. The expression
var end = “il”;x[“ta” + end]
accesses the field x[tail] even though tail is not mentioned explicitly. If end de-
pends on user input, the value of “ta” + end is unavailable before execution and
cannot be considered in static analysis. In order to overcome this weakness, some
systems include a δ-field (similar to the template field [103]) in their row types:
[head : Int,tail : llist ,δ : [ ]]
This expresses that all fields not mentioned explicitly can be typed as [ ]. Since the
δ-field potentially describes a set of very different fields it has to over-approximate and
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is less precise than the explicitly mentioned fields. Guha et al. [48] take this idea one
step further by allowing patterns in the object field names to describe multiple fields
with each entrance.
5.2.2 Singleton and summary types
JavaScript’s strong updates also pose a significant challenge to type systems. With a
strong update the type of a variable can be changed, simply by assigning a different
value. This means each assignment can potentially change the type structure of the
assigned location. In JavaScript strong updates are common, since assignment to a
fresh field o.m of the object value o implicitly extends the type of o to contain the field
m. Static type analysis typically describes multiple concrete values by the same type
variable. Consequently, a strong update cannot update the type without generating false
information for other values. Consider the example in Figure 5.3, which constructs an
array of objects in a loop.




4 x[i] = {};
5 x[4].a = 3;
After the loop in line 5, the objects x[0] to x[4] are typically typed with the same
type variable, since they were created by the same expression. Therefore, strongly
updating the type of x[4] to contain the new field a with value 3 changes the type of
all those objects. This situation can be handled by a system involving singleton and
summary types [64, 52]. A summary type describes multiple values at the same time
and cannot be strongly updated. In contrast, a value can be typed with a singleton
type which describes only this specific value and allows strong updates. When the
singleton property of a type cannot be guaranteed anymore, e.g. when the variable
is used as parameter to a function or the constructor used for this variable is invoked
again, the singleton type has to be converted into a summary type. In this example, the
type for x[4] is modelled by the singleton type [ ] to allow the strong update in line 5.
The types for x[0] to x[3] are described by one summary type tarray = [].
Singleton types and summary types can refer to each other. For example a singleton
object can refer to a summary type as a field type. In the example above, replacing the
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last line by x[4].last = x[3], the type of x[4] would be a singleton type of the form
t4 = [last : tarray] which includes the summary type tarray.
The singleton / summary paradigm supports in particular the initialisation pattern:
it is a common assumption in analysis systems for JavaScript that the structure of
objects is mostly changed using extensions and deletions, directly after the creation of
the object, thought of as an initialisation phase. Afterwards, the structure of the object
can be assumed fixed. Therefore, an object can be typed with a singleton type until
the initialisation is completed and then be joined into the appropriate summary type.
However, this pattern was evaluated [101] on a set of benchmarks with the conclusion
that the initialisation phase is not easily identifiable in real-world JavaScript code.
5.2.3 Function types
The ECMA standard [61] stores a function value as JavaScript object with the prop-
erty __proto__ set to the special build-in object Function.prototype. Apart from
this property, the function object contains a few more internal properties to store the
function’s code, it’s expected parameters and scope. After a function f has been de-
fined, an expression like f.m=4 can extend the function object with additional fields as
any other object. This feature is, for example, used to present the API of the popular
jQuery library in a concise way.
Some type systems for JavaScript imitate this specification by typing functions
with object types. Other systems define separate function types to simplify the analysis
of function executions. This simplification, however, cannot type fields of functions
directly. In this case, the function object has to be desugared into a pure function and
an associated object which stores the extended fields.
Inside JavaScript function bodies, the variable this refers to the receiver of the
function call. The receiver of an object method o.m() is the owning object o, the re-
ceiver for calls as constructor new f() is a new empty object and for normal function
invocations f() the current global scope object acts as the receiver. The variable this
storing the receiver is an implicit parameter and the function type has to reflect its ex-
pected type. Most systems explicitly state the expected receiver type O in the function
type as O× tx → tret.
Since the behaviour of a function call differs depending on whether it is called as a
method, constructor or simple function, some systems choose to differentiate between
the three different kinds of function calls in the syntax or in the types. For exam-
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ple, Zhao [120] restricts the names of constructors to start with a capital letter, while
methods and simple functions start with a lower-case letter. Function in real-world
JavaScript code can be used in either role.
5.3 Typed JavaScript derivatives
The survey of type systems below only considers type systems for pure JavaScript. In
addition, there are a few derivations of the JavaScript Language which include types.
TypeScript [85] developed by Microsoft adds types to a language based on JavaScript.
It extends the syntax of the language by adding type annotations into function defini-
tions and other statements and provides additional features like classes and class inter-
faces which are compiled into common JavaScript programming patterns. TypeScript
in Version 1.8 can even emit code in ECMAScript 6 strict mode. During compila-
tion TypeScript checks all available (provided and easily inferable) types and issues
warnings for type mismatches. The resulting typing is not complete, meaning it al-
lows untyped values as long as they are not violating other type constraints. All type
information is eliminated during compilation to create compatible JavaScript code.
Google’s alternative, AtScript [45], is a system extending TypeScript, besides other
features, with generated runtime type assertions which dynamically check the types of
typed values during runtime where static checking is not possible. Like TypeScript,
the resulting types are not complete and its goals value flexibility and usefulness over
soundness. In 2015 AtScript was announced defunct and some features merged into
TypeScript.
GoriallaScript [32] is another extension of JavaScript, which checks available type
information during compilation into JavaScript. It restricts the polymorphic operators
like the + operator to type-safe behaviour. In addition to the basic JavaScript types
GorillaScript allows to define finite types by arrays containing all possible values of
the new type. A value can then be dynamically checked during runtime against the
defined types, similar to the typeof operator in JavaScript
The language asm.js [89] is a subset of JavaScript which, when compiled by so
called ahead-of-time compilers, provides guarantees for the runtime values, can elimi-
nate JavaScript’s dynamic type checks and optimises the memory behaviour. The goal
is to imitate behaviour of compiled languages as C and improve the performance of
JavaScript programs.
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5.4 A survey of type systems for JavaScript
This section discusses the details of existing type systems. The abstract evaluation
systems TAJS [64] and JSAI [69] are also considered, since their abstract domain is
reasonably close to the structure of object types. Other systems (e.g. separation logic)
can provide similar information as output, but the translation into the desired type
structure would require a considerable amount of work. Those systems are instead
mentioned in Chapter 2.3.2.
The results of the survey are summarised in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. Figure 5.4a shows
which systems built upon each other considering reuse of semantics, type syntax or
implementation. The properties which are interesting for extending a system with
AmorJiSe are summarised in Figure 5.4b and Figure 5.5 summarises the subset of the
syntax covered by the systems directly.
The optimal candidate to build AmorJiSe upon is a formally proven, sound system
for type inference with an implementation.
The three candidates fulfilling all requirements are JST0 , its extension by Zhao and
RAC. RAC analyses a lambda calculus with JavaScript-similar object behaviour. JST0
instead analyses JavaScript directly and specifically represent object extensions in a
simple and controllable way. Since object extension might require additional heap re-
sources, this explicit presentation is beneficial during resource analysis. Consequently,
the amortised system AmorJiSe is built closely resembling JST0 . The TeJaS system has
a similar notation and properties. However the soundness of such a modular systems
is an open problem. A proven instance of this system could also be used as underlying
system. The analysis of implicit type checks, as performed by Kashyap [71], does not
interfere with AmorJiSe’s analysis and could be used to increase the precision of the
chosen underlying system further.
The following sections discuss the details of the existing systems. For each, it will
briefly describe the methods, the covered part of the language, the soundness result,
the required annotations and the state of the implementation.
5.4.1 Type system by Thiemann (’05)
The first attempt at a type system [114] by Thieman presents a static type system for
a core of JavaScript with the goal to highlight potentially unintended type coercion.
Typed programs are guaranteed to be free from calls to non-function values, arithmetic
operations applied to non-numeric values, reading from non-existing variables and ac-
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cessed fields of null values.
The object types are row types with δ-fields. Additionally, the object types can
express wrappers around simple types like integers or strings. This way, the result of
the expression x=4;x.m=5 can be typed as Ob ject(Int)[m : Int] to describe a wrapper
object around an integer which has been extended with the field m. Function types
are handled using a dedicated type Function(this : τ;ρ → τ′). The parameters ρ are
modelled as a row type which allows for variadicity. To increase the precision, sum
types Int+[] describe values which are either Int or an object.
The formal JavaScript subset is given as small-step operational semantics. It con-
siders functions including the handling of constructors and methods, but omits function
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statements in favour of function expressions and requires local variables to be defined
at the beginning of the function body. The object operations are modelled including ob-
ject literals and read, write and extend operations for objects in the form of computed
access e1[e2]. Static access e1.m is not handled, but instead identified as equivalent
to the computed access e1[”m”]. Considering statements, the core language includes
while-loops and if clauses.
The main result of [114] is the type soundness which is proven via reduction and
progress. The implementation for the type checking algorithm was stated to be on the
way, but to the best of my knowledge, has not been published. The author has since
contributed to other type systems considered below [52, 65, 64, 115]. Type inference
is not considered in this system.
This system handles many important features of the JavaScript language and em-
ploys a promising method to express simple types coerced into objects, which is unique
to this system. The formally proven soundness makes this system interesting to extend,
but as underlying system for AmorJiSe the missing inference would lessen the advan-
tage of the automatic inference of the amortised annotations.
5.4.2 JST0
Anderson and Drossopoulou developed the system JST0 [8, 9]. Its goal is to prove the
absence of runtime errors for typed expressions.
JST0 uses recursive row types for objects and adds the markers ◦/• to the type of
each field. The marker definite • describes that this field is guaranteed to exist in this
object with the given type, whereas the potential marker ◦ asserts that the field will
have the given type if it gets added to the object in the future. Hence, potential fields
can be written to but not read. Using those markers, JST0 is able to express a controlled
subset of strong updates.
The language covered includes only the variable x in addition to this and allows
read operations and weak updates for variables (except for strong object extensions).
The authors claim that additional variables can be simulated, but the simulation is not
as straight forward as claimed (see the remark in Section 7.1.6). Furthermore, JST0 sup-
ports objects with read, write and implicit extension operations, function expressions,
calls to functions, object methods and constructors and a conditional expression. Other
features like loops, local variable definitions, function statements and object literals are
omitted. The formal definition of this language is given as big-step operational seman-
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tics.
The proof for the type soundness is given, but is unfortunately not correct, as shown
in Chapter 7 along with a fix. A type inference algorithm is provided and partly proven
sound in relation to a big-step operational semantics. The inference is realised by
generating subtyping constraints. From the transitive closure of those subtyping con-
straints the solution can be extracted efficiently. The implementation of the inference
algorithm extends the formal core language with a few more features of JavaScript
without a formal soundness proof. As evaluation the implementation was successfully
tested on a few crafted example programs.
With a formally proven soundness theorem (given the proposed fix) and inference
this system is a good candidate as underlying system for AmorJiSe. The controlled
handling of strong updates provides exactly the right information needed for the object
model. For this reason, AmorJiSe in the following chapter is modelled after JST0 .
5.4.2.1 Type system by Zhao (’10)
In two papers [119, 120], Zhao presents a system, which builds upon JST0 . The purpose
of this system is to infer the structure of objects. In comparison to JST0 , this system can
also track which object fields are removed using JavaScript’s delete operator.
In addition to the ◦/• mechanics of JST0 this system uses singleton / summary
object types. The added set of strings M in the function type (O,M), t → t ′ describes
the fields that are added to the type O during the execution of the function body. This
increases the precision of the object types in comparison to JST0 . In the follow-up
paper [120] object types are instead represented as t/C where t is a type variable and
C is a set of constraints on the type variables. The list type could for example be
described as
tlist/{tlist(head)≤ String, tlist(tail)≤ tlist}
where tlist is a type variable. The constraint sets C are simplified and checked for con-
sistency after each modification to decrease the size and complexity. For each function
call the system freshly instantiates the type variables in function types to handle the
functions polymorphically without analysing the function body multiple times. Only
mutually recursive functions have to be analysed strictly monomorphically.
The formal language of Zhao covers slightly less than JST0 . Nested expressions are
replaced by assignments to local variables and the syntax of constructors is artificially
differentiated from object methods. Normal function calls are excluded in favour of
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method calls. The language allows for the definition of local variables without hoisting.
The inference algorithm and the soundness proof are analogue to JST0 . Since this
work only considers the type inference algorithm it avoids the flaw in the type checking
of JST0 . A prototype implementation is available.
Some extensions made in this system can be used to extend JST0 as the underlying
system for AmorJiSe. However, the types derived by this system are not explicit but
rather expressed as type variables with constraints. To validate a property of a type, the
authors add the property to the constraint set of the type variable and verify the con-
sistency of the constraints set. This method is not efficient in the context of AmorJiSe,
since the system often has to read the type of a field from an object.
5.4.3 RAC
The system RAC [115, 52] stands for Recency-Aware Calculus and is defined by Thie-
mann and Heidegger. RAC is a type system for a lambda calculus with objects which
guarantees that a typed expression will not result in a runtime error.
The recency types implement the singleton / summary type paradigm in the way
that the most recent object created by a constructor expression is always typed as a
singleton type. Object types use abstract locations in a typing heap, which is split into a
singleton heap and a summary heap. The static analysis assumes the code contains the
explicit demotion operator  to merge a singleton type into the corresponding summery
type before the same constructor is used again. If, for example, a new object is created
using the new operator at the code location l1
1 let f=λx.(newl1) in
2 f(42)
then the singleton type stored at the abstract singleton location l1 has to be explicitly
demoted and merged into the summary type at this location before the function f is
called.
1 let f=λx.(newl1) in
2 l1; f(42)
In a pre-processing step the system automatically injects all needed demotion operators
into the code.
Function types
f : (Σ, t) L→ (Σ′, t ′)
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track the side-effects on the types of the outside scope. Σ documents the requirements
on the singleton heap of the call side and Σ′ summarises the effects on the single-
ton heap after execution of f. The set L specifies which abstract locations need to
be demoted before the call. In the above example f is typed as ([ ],Int)
{l1}→ ([l1 →
[ ]],ob j(@l1)) to force demotion of the singleton location l1 before execution and to
ensure this location is typed as empty object after execution. This function does not
have requirements on the call-site singleton heap.
The similarities of the analysed call-by-value lambda calculus to JavaScript arise
from the inclusion of first-class functions, prototypal inheritance and objects with read,
write operations and the explicit extension of objects. Computed read and write op-
erations e1[e2] are not handled. In contrast to JavaScript, RAC relies on let bindings
instead of variable assignments, does not analyse nested expressions and does not have
constructor functions. Instead, it uses an universal object constructor new equivalently
to the empty object literal {} in JavaScript. A transformation of the missing features is
not provided. The language is defined by small-step operational semantic rules, which
also uses an explicit singleton and summary heap to reflect the split in the type heap.
Each singleton type location is mapped to exactly one concrete singleton heap loca-
tion, while summary type locations are mapped to a set of concrete locations in the
summary heap.
The soundness of the type system is formally proven in the technical report. A type
inference algorithm and an implementation is provided based on constraints on upper
and lower type bounds.
As underlying type system for AmorJiSe, the language considered in this system
is too far from JavaScript. However, the recency paradigm as implemented here could
increase the precision of the system JST0 .
5.4.4 TAJS
The system TAJS by Thiemann, Andreasen, Møller, Jensen [64, 65, 62, 10] presents
an abstract interpretation based system which infers the structure of runtime values for
JavaScript.
TAJS builds a control flow graph consisting of nodes for each subexpression and
edges for control flow between the expressions. TAJS, furthermore, defines abstract
states which over-approximate the runtime state at each node in the graph. To describe
the state modification of each node, transition functions are defined describing the rela-
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tion between the abstract state before and after execution for each JavaScript construct.
The analysis computes the fixpoint of all transition function across the graph.
Functions are handled context sensitively by computing a fixpoint of the function
body separately for each function call. TAJS is further extended with determinacy
analysis [10], such that the values of constant expressions are propagated through the
graph. This information is used to decide on loop unrolling and thus increase precision.
TAJS introduces a method called unevalize to analyse dynamic code execution
by JavaScript’s eval and similar. It takes common programming patterns using eval
and translates them into equivalent code using for example the method JSON.parse
which deserialises an JavaScript object from code without side-effects.
The required transition functions are presented for all commands of the bytecode
language used in real-world interpreters and includes handling of functions, variables
and objects including read, possibly extending write and delete operations. As state-
ments, TAJS considers function invocation, including constructor calls, if-clauses and
error handling. In addition, the transition functions are provided for a collection of
built-in functions like the browser specific functions and the DOM API.
In earlier versions of TAJS the authors argue informally that the reachable state
space is limited enough to guarantee termination of the fixpoint iteration. The eval-
uation of a prototype implementation of TAJS returns sound results in a manageable
execution time. In the later version the fixpoint computation is restricted to 1000 itera-
tions. If the fixpoint is not reached by this point, the current abstract state is used as an
potentially unsound approximation of the fixpoint. Unfortunately, additional sound-
ness bugs in connection with the handling of try-catch-finally clauses were found
in TAJS [69] which are attributed to the lack of formal specification of the handled
language.
The large language covered by this system makes it interesting as underlying sys-
tem, especially the unevalize translation. Functions are analysed in a context-sensitive
way, including variadicity and polymorphism, and the DOM library is vital to analyse
mobile apps. However, the only informal soundness argumentation and the potentially
unsound approximation are a disadvantage. Using this system as the underlying sys-
tem for AmorJiSe would also mean that AmorJiSe has to analyse the same intermediate
representation, which makes it more difficult to recognise the API calls.
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5.4.5 λJS
The system λJS by Guha, Saftoiu and Krishnamurthi [49] defines big-step semantic
rules for a core JavaScript. An example type system certifies the absence of commu-
nication via the function XMLHttpRequest. While this type system does not describe
the necessary information about the data structure of values, the semantics of λJS is the
basis for multiple other systems.
The core system’s features are chosen to cover full JavaScript language via a desugar
function. It includes the object operations for read, write, extend and delete. Proto-
types and errors are handled and a simplified model of the scope chain is included. The
formal language handles references, but in contrast to JavaScript they are created and
dereferenced using explicit operators. λJS includes simple function expressions, which
are used to desugar function statements, object methods and constructors as function
objects similar to the ECMA standard. Considering statements, λJS includes while
loops, if clauses and break with labels. All other language constructs are trans-
lated into the core calculus. The authors claim to even desugar the non-static scope
behaviour into the lexically scoped core language by making the lookup procedure ex-
plicit. Unfortunately, the translation increases the size of expressions by an average
factor of 200.
The semantics itself is proven sound with the result that well-formed expressions
do not get stuck but evaluate either to a value or to an error. The completeness of the
desugar process is evaluated by translating a set of real-world benchmarks into the core
language and the implementation is available for download.
In conclusion, the language λJS is suitable for AmorJiSe, even though the resource
effect of the desugar method would impose additional work. However, this work does
not provide a suitable type system.
5.4.5.1 λS
The calculus λS [50] by Guha, Saftoiu and Krishnamurthi translates JavaScript into a
core language inspired by λJS. The type system defined on this core language certifies
the absence of runtime errors.
λS employs so called tags which resemble dynamic types. During runtime, the tag
of a value can be validated using a tagcheck which results in a tagerr if the tag
does not apply to the value. The analysis uses a flow analysis to insert non-failing
tagchecks into the source code. This additional information obtained by these checks
108 Chapter 5. Type systems for JavaScript
can than be used to infer precise types for the code. The system analyses each function
body in isolation to make the system scalable. This method comes with the loss of
inter-procedural precision. The types incorporate reference types and abstract heaps to
handle aliasing and strong updates correctly even through function calls. Types can be
combined into union types to increase the precision and coverage. The function types
ignore the receiver this and handle method and constructor invocations with receiver
by desugaring.
The core language λS includes function expressions and function calls, references
with an explicit reference and dereference operator, if clauses and the break statement
with labels. The translation from JavaScript into the core language is not provided in
the paper but the implementation is available.
The core system is formally proven correct via progress and preservation. The
location of tagchecks can be inferred automatically, but the inference of the types is
not considered. An implementation based on a monotone framework [73] is provided
and example programs have been analysed within a few seconds.
Since λS is proven sound, especially its reference types could be used in an data
type system underlying AmorJiSe. However, type inference is missing and the covered
language is less than covered in the system by Thiemann (’05).
5.4.5.2 DJS
The system DJS [21] introduced by Chugh, Herman and Jhala presents dependent
refinement types for JavaScript. The authors adjust their system D to JavaScript to
obtain the language D!. On this language the type system DJS is defined.
The main characteristics of DJS is the refinement notation. A type {v | p(v)} is
defined as the set of all values v satisfying the property p. Syntactic sugar is provided
to express simple types like String or Int, but more expressive types can be specified,
for example, the type falsy combining all values which evaluate to false when coerced
to Boolean. The property p can depend on other values in the current abstract heap
which makes this notation powerful.
In order to track prototype relations without state explosion, the heap is modelled
as a shallow and a deep heap. The shallow heap stores precise information about the
prototype chains of crucial types. Less crucial types can be estimated in the deep heap
which only summarises all fields contained in the prototype chain without storing the
whole chain itself. This keeps the complexity of long prototype chains manageable.
DJS also uses singleton / summary types to handle strong updates. Summary types can
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be thawed and frozen to allow temporary modifications of their structure. Functions
are modelled with a dedicated function type and aliasing is handled by reference types.
The considered core language D! is based on λJS and includes prototypes, strong
updates, higher-order functions, arrays, Boolean operations, but prohibits implicit co-
ercion. A purely syntactical desugar process is provided which translates the uncov-
ered language features into D!. DJS is even able to analyse some common patterns
using eval by translating them into controllable JavaScript features such as the JSON
library.
A type checking algorithm generates subtyping relations from given types and uses
an SMT solver to validate them. The type checking is only proven sound by reference
to the soundness proof for System D. Types for local expressions can mostly be in-
ferred, but type annotations for function types are required including types for the
accessed part of the scope chain. The annotation overhead on example programs con-
stitutes about 70%. The provided implementation, which was used for experiments, is
based on the parser for λJS.
The advantage of this system as underlying system for AmorJiSe is the handling of
the scope chain. The needed annotations and missing formal soundness proof make it
less useful for this purpose.
5.4.5.3 TeJaS
Lerner et al. present the system TeJaS [74]. Rather than a type system on its own,
it is a framework to implement type systems for JavaScript. It is distilled from the
similarities between various other specialised systems and the semantics is adapted
from λJS. The focus of the framework lies on the modularity: Different parts can be
implemented independently and combined to construct different systems.
The authors identify the 7 essential parts of a type system: type and kind syntax,
environments, kind checker, type checker, subtyping, decorator (weaving types into
expressions) and the desugar method. TeJaS provides a default implementation for
each part which can be extended or redefined by each type system instance. The de-
fault types include basic types like Int, String (modelled as regular expressions),
objects (abstract references into a typing heap with prototypes), functions (modelled
as objects) as well as unions and intersections of these basic types. Like JST0 , this sys-
tem defines a state for each object field, but TeJaS is more expressive than JST0 . Apart
from the definite ! (equivalent to • in JST0 ) and potential ? (equivalent to ◦ in JST0 ),
the value Absent expresses that the field is definitely not present in the object directly,
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^ expresses that the field is present somewhere in the prototype chain and the value
Hidden prevents access completely.
The type system in TeJaS is defined relative to λJS. Therefore, it covers the same
language with objects, including prototypes, function expressions, error handling and
the limited control flow operations, including if clauses and labelled break state-
ments.
With regards to the soundness of the base system, the authors argue that the sound-
ness proof of the basic system with the default implementations should be equivalently
to the systems it was distilled from. However, they admit that the soundness of the
modular system, even when assuming soundness of all modules, is an open problem.
Instead, they mention the use even of potentially unsound modules as opportunity to
capture the dynamic features of JavaScript better. The paper discusses several exam-
ple type systems implemented with the framework which have been proven sound in
previous work.
Type inference for the system in general is proven undecidable. But in the dis-
cussed instances inference is possible in reasonable time. Type checking uses all pro-
vided annotations bidirectionally to benefit from the combined power of inference and
type checking. Syntactic sugar for the annotations is presented to represent common
programming patterns concisely and a dynamic companion analysis estimates type
annotations to reduce the annotation work. An implementation of the framework is
provided along with the implemented instances of type systems using the framework.
This system uses a similar object extension modelling as JST0 , but additionally mod-
els prototype links. A custom type system instantiated from TeJaS sounds promising
as more expressive underlying type system than JST0 . However, the soundness theorem
would need to be proven formally.
5.4.6 JuS
Gardner, Naudziuniene and Smith introduce the symbolic execution system JuS (Java-
Script under scrutiny) [41]. It propagates logic formulas through abstract states. The
system aims to produce corner cases of the program which invalidate a specified prop-
erty.
The program logic used in JuS is adopted from the separation logic introduced by
Gardner et al. [42]. The logic statements cluster information into so called StoreLet
which roughly describes a part of the scope chain with the information about the vari-
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ables and fields which are definitely not defined in the scope, maybe defined or defi-
nitely assigned a specific value. Nested and recursive objects are stored as references
to handle aliasing correctly. The StoreLet abstraction contains information about the
object structure and can be translated into object types with little effort.
The language covered contains String, numeric and Boolean constants, object lit-
erals, read and write access to objects and simple functions which can be called as
constructors or methods. Function statements are not defined. Concerning statements,
JuS includes the if clause, while loops and the with block.
JuS aims for soundness and the results are meant as a guarantee of the proven
property. However, the soundness theorem is not formally specified and neither is
a proof. The system uses a mix between checking and inference to infer as much
information as possible, but loop invariants need to be inserted as annotations in any
case. An implementation is provided online as part of the JSCert project.
JuS presents an interesting extension of the scope handling, which AmorJiSe could
take advantage of. However, to be used with AmorJiSe directly, the needed annotations
and the missing formal soundness theorem are a disadvantage.
5.4.7 JSAI
Kashyap et al. present the system JSAI [69, 70] which aims to provide a formal frame-
work to implement static analysis for real-world JavaScript code. The focus of JSAI
is on configurability: the abstract domain for values is implemented as module which
can be swapped easily and the merge operator to combine several concrete states into
one abstract state can be defined separately. This enables JSAI to implement a range
of sensitivities like context-sensitivity, flow-sensitivity, object-sensitivity and their k-
bounded finite versions. In total, the papers evaluate 56 different strategies for sensi-
tivity themselves.
The static analysis is based on an abstract interpretation state machine, which com-
bines different methods for the different parts of the abstract state. They employ type-
analysis, pointer analysis, string analysis, constant propagation and control-flow anal-
ysis in a manner that each analysis can benefit from the result of the other. The used
object types consists of 2 row types. The first row stores ordinary object fields while the
second row tracks the types of class-specific fields, for example, the length property
of arrays and the local scope object of functions. This way, JSAI can analyse ambiva-
lent operations of objects modelling more complex classes with more precision.
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The language covered by JSAI is an intermediate language called notJS which is
not designed as a pure core language but implements more complex features directly.
The execution of notJS is implemented and checked against benchmarks compara-
ble to evaluations of other real-world JavaScript implementations. The intermediate
language includes basic values as well as objects with field read, write, extend and
deletion, function expressions, calls and constructors as well as while and for loops,
conditionals and jump to model further control-flow. Error-handling is also included.
Functions and arrays are handled as objects in correlation to the JavaScript standard.
In an effort to transfer their results to real-world JavaScript, the authors present a trans-
lation from JavaScript into nonJS.
The whole system is modelled formally and annotations in the code are not re-
quired. However, neither the soundness property nor the proof are provided in the
paper. The same is true for the translation from JavaScript into notJS. The implemen-
tation and further material is available.
As underlying system for AmorJiSe, JSAI has many advantages. It handles real-
world JavaScript with many different analysis methods and handles more language
constructs directly. Like in the case of TeJaS, a custom instance of this system with
a formal model would be a good candidate to increase the precision and coverage of
AmorJiSe. The resource equivalence of the translation between JavaScript and notJS
has to be proven separately.
5.4.7.1 Type system by Kashyap et al. (’13)
Kashyap et al. use JSAI to implement a refinement based system [71] to increase
precision of static analyses using the information obtained from type checks contained
in the JavaScript syntax.
In addition to obvious type checks using the JavaScript operator typeof, this work
identifies several implicit type checks in JavaScript programs. An accessed object
is neither null nor undefined, only functions can be called and a value which is
converted by JavaScript has to be primitive (neither object nor function).
The types used in this system are primitive types (num,bool,str,null,undefined), ob-
ject types and function-objects. Those basic types can be combined as union types.
The type null∪ObjTypes, for example, specifies values which are either null or an
object. From explicit and implicit checks contained in a program, the system derives
conditions on the type variables. For example, isPrim(t) describes that t is one of
the primitive types and the constraint typeof(t)=”function” specifies the type t as a
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function type.
The abstract states of this system are kept very simple with the purpose of demon-
strating the power of the implicit constraints rather than a complicated type system. As
such it rather meant as an addition to an already existing type system than a type sys-
tem by itself. The covered language is not specified explicitly but the examples include
operations on objects including read, write, extend and delete, if clauses, higher-order
functions as methods and simple functions. Like JSAI, this extension does not handle
eval and similar dynamic JavaScript features.
The authors claim soundness for the system and argue informally that all necessary
conditions are fulfilled. The formal soundness proof or the formal soundness theorem
are not included. The implementation uses the JSAI framework to infer the abstract
values without code annotations and has been used on standard benchmark suits, real-
world applications from open-source projects and machine generated code.
The presented method in this system is meant as an addition to an existing type
system. It could also be added to increase the precision of the AmorJiSe system. To be
considered as an underlying type system itself, the considered language and soundness




This chapter introduces the system AmorJiSe which extends types for JavaScript with
amortised annotations. While the original types describe the structure of the values,
the amortised annotations describe resource units reserved to be used in computations
with the typed values. AmorJiSe automatically infers those annotations and this way
describes the maximal resource consumption of the typed expression.1
The following sections show the basic techniques of amortised systems and present
AmorJiSe with its types, its properties, an inference algorithm and the annotated se-
mantics for JavaScript which models the resource consumption of JavaScript expres-
sions. The analysed language covers the subset of JavaScript which manipulates ob-
jects and is later extended with the handling of function expressions.
The main result of this chapter is the proof of soundness for the amortised type sys-
tem. It guarantees that the resource consumption of the analysed expression, according
to the annotated evaluation, is less than the derived bound.
6.1 Terminology
AmorJiSe is a type system which derives a bound on the maximal resource usage of
the analysed code. The language constructs and critical APIs of an expression are
assumed to consume resource units according to the resource model. Each resource
access is accounted for from the number of available resource units.
AmorJiSe requires data types for each expression as input, which describe the
structure of the evaluated value of the typed expression. The derived amortised an-
1A preliminary version of this system has been published at the International Symposium for Sym-
bolic Computation in Software Science (SCSS, 2014) [39].
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notations inside the amortised types symbolise a number of reserved resource units.
Reserved units are already accounted for in the overall resource consumption, but they
can be used in a later stage to call a resource consuming API. Units reserved in a typed
value are associated with this value. Amortised annotations in the function type and
the types of the parameters of functions describe the resource units required to execute
the function.
Within the following definitions and discussions all amortised annotations are dis-
played in blue to differentiate them from the underlying type system and its judge-
ments.
6.2 Overview
Amortised analysis tracks the number of resource units used or reserved during execu-
tion of a statement or expression. Each resource access needs to be accounted for either
from the supply of globally available resource units or from the resources previously
reserved. Reserved resource units are similar to the tickets in the PhoneWrap system,
but can be stored alongside the data structures of values to describe data-dependent
resource bounds.
To describe the global resource requirement of an expression, the amortised type
judgement states the number of resource units globally available before and after the
evaluation of an expression. The judgement
Γ,n 
 e : t|Γ′,n′
states that in the context Γ the expression e can be executed with n available resource
units and after execution n′ resource units remain available. For example, if an expres-
sion e consumes 2 resource units and is executed with n = 5 available resource units,
after the evaluation n′ = 3 resource units remain available.
With these annotations in the type judgement the system can express constant
bounds. As discussed previously, this does not cover the behaviour of modern Java-
Script apps as the resource consumption generally highly depends on the size of vari-
ables and inputs. The power of amortised types comes from the injection of amortised
annotations into recursive data types. Each amortised type t+ = (t,n) is a pair of a data
type t and a number of reserved resource units n stored with a value of this type. In
recursive types, like the list type tlist = μα.[head : (Int,n1),tail : (α,n2)], the anno-
tations n1 and n2 state the number of reserved resource units for each element in the
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recursive structure. This results in a total number of reserved units dependent on the
size of the data structure. For example, a list of type tlist with length 4
(1,n1) (•,n2) (2,n1) (•,n2) (3,n1) (•,n2) (4,n1) (null,n2)
stores 4 · (n1 +n2) reserved resource units in total. By using such a type as the param-
eter for a function, AmorJiSe can describe the resource consumption of the function
dependent on the size of the input without using dependent types. After inferring types
for all functions of a program, similar bounds can be derived from the result as en-
forced by the dynamic analysis PhoneWrap.
During type checking Γ,n 
 e : t|Γ′,n′ the typing context Γ stores annotated types
for all variables. Therefore, the total number of resource units available to an expres-
sion e is the number of globally available resource units n in addition to the sum of all
reserved resource units stored in the variable types in Γ. This total number of resource
units available is called the potential of the typing state (Γ,n). Since the amortised an-
notations in recursive types describe the number of units per element, the total potential
also depends on the values of the variables during runtime. Even though those runtime
values are not available during analysis, the soundness property of amortised analy-
sis ensures that during analysis the potential is correctly decreased for each resource
access and never increased, independent of the actual runtime value.
The basic information used by AmorJiSe to determine the resource consumption
of an expression is provided by the resource model, which describes the resource con-
sumption of language constructs and API functions. The resource consumption of
each language construct, e.g. of each function calls or each object extensions, are each
modelled by a constant. The resource behaviour of the API functions are described by
their function type in the initial typing context Γ0. This way, referring to Chapter 2.2,
AmorJiSe can analyse API activated and language activated resources.
So far, amortised types have mostly been studied for functional languages. Java-
Script is an imperative language and its side effects present an extra challenge to amor-
tised types. In order to provide an overview of the challenges faced while implement-
ing amortised types for JavaScript, consider the uploaded pictures as resource in the
fictitious app “ Pick-Up” with the following code examples. The API function UPLOAD
serves as an example for a resource consuming function.
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Example 6.2.1.
1 function upload_list(list) {






The function upload_list takes a linked list of pictures as input and uploads each
picture individually. Since upload_list is recursively called for each element in the
list, the resource consumption of the original call depends on the length of the input
list. Assume the underlying data type for the parameter list is the type
tlist : μα[value : String,next : α].
It describes that the linked list is implemented as an object with the fields value stor-
ing the location of the picture as string and next which recursively stores the list’s
continuation of the same list type. According to this, AmorJiSe derives an amortised
type
t+list : μα.[value : (String,1/1),next : (α,0/0)].
The amortised annotations R/W determine that R resource units are reserved for a
field. The second annotation W indicates how many resource units a value has to
provide to be assigned to this field. Here, the field value stores 1 resource unit and
each value assigned to value has to provide 1 resource unit. The full type for the
function upload_list
t+upload_list : μα.[]×μα.[value : (String,1/1),next : (α,0/0)],0 → Int,0
contains the types tlist and Int as types for the parameter and the result. The addi-
tional implicit parameter this is typed as empty object with μα.[], since upload_list
is not called as method. The annotation 0 on the parameter side state that the function
does not require any constant number of reserved resource units to be called and the
annotation on the result side states that no reserved resource units are returned by the
function call.
The reserved resource units provided to upload_list via its parameter list are
consumed by the function body. Therefore, a function call to upload_list has to
update the amortised types of the parameters at the call site.
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Example 6.2.2.
1 var x = {value: "1.jpg", next: null};
2 upload_list(x)
Assume the variable x has a type
tx = μα.[value : (String,2/2),next : (α,0/0)]
before line 2. After line 2 it is reduced to
t ′x = μα.[value : (String,1/2),next : (α,0/0)],
so that the reserved resource units consumed by the function cannot be reused. Due to
the remaining annotation (1/2), the remaining list has enough reserved resource units
to call upload_list or a similar function once more.
AmorJiSe manages this reduction of the annotations by a sharing relation
t ↪→ t ′ ⊕ t ′′.
This constraint splits the type t into two structurally equivalent types, where the re-
served resource units previously contained in t are now distributed between the two
types t ′ and t ′′. Therefore, an invariant of this relation is that the potential Σv : t of an
arbitrary typed value v is equal to the sum of the potentials Σv : t ′+Σv : t ′′. After the
split, the type t ′ is used to perform the computation, in this case the function call, while
the type t ′′ is stored back into the context Γ for future use of the variable x.
Aliasing poses additional challenges:
Example 6.2.3.
1 var x = {value: "a.jpg", next: null};
2 var y = x;
3 x.next ={value: "b.jpg", next: null};
4 upload_list(y)
The variables x and y in this example are both objects with the data type μα.[value :
String,next : α]. Line 2 aliases the variables x and y resulting in the following mem-
ory layout:
a.jpg • b.jpg nullxy
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Line 1 and 3 of this example populate the list through x, but line 4 accesses the
list via the alias y. The amortised type system has to make sure that the resource units
reserved by the amortised annotations are
1. stored in the data structure while writing to x,
2. accessible through y,
3. after the consumption not accessible through x anymore.
For this reason, the second annotation N, called the capacity, tracks the sum of resource
units associated with all aliases of the stored value. When writing to a value, enough
resource units need to be provided to satisfy all units associated with the aliases. For
example, the type for the field value of x in line 1 is value:(String,1/1). Accord-
ing to the annotation /1, each assignment to value, e.g. in line 1, requires 1 resource
unit. This accounts for the resource unit reserved with the element “a.jpg” according
to the annotation 1/. In the assignment in line 2 the associated resource unit is trans-
ferred to y, once again using the sharing relation, to make it available for the resource
consumption in line 4. This results in the following types:
x →μα[value : (String,0/1),next : (α,0/0)]
y →μα[value : (String,1/1),next : (α,0/0)]
The annotation 1/1 in the type for y ensure that the resource units can be used via
y but not through x with the annotation 0/1. However, assigning to x still requires 1
resource unit to be provided. Accordingly, line 3 consumes 1 resource unit to cover the
resource unit associated with the alias y. This results in the following memory layout
and associated resource units:





These annotations allow y to be used as the parameter for upload_list in line 4. The
call consumes the reserved resource units associated with y and reduces the type to
y →μα[value : (String,0/1),next : (α,0/0)]
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The analysis has to ensure that for a set of aliases {x,y,...} with the annotations
(nx/Nx),(ny/Ny), ... each capacity is bigger than the sum of resource units stored with












One extreme case of aliases are loops in a data structure. They present a difficult
problem for amortised systems. Take, for example, a recursive list represented as
above as μα.[value : (String,1/1),next : (α,0/0)]. The type of the field value
has 1 reserved resource unit associated with it, which means the total number of units
contained in the list is equal to its length. The expression list.next=list assigns
the head of the list as the successor of the head and creates a loop. If the loop contains
a positive number of reserved resource units, the loop now stores an infinite amount
of resources in total. The typing rules prohibit this case automatically by indirectly
requiring that the remaining amortised annotations nested within the potential loop are
all 0. This way, code producing a loop can be typed, but they cannot carry reserved
resource units in the recursive part of the type.
The example considered so far used objects equivalent to classes in other program-
ming languages with a static set of fields. JavaScript, however, can manipulate the
set of fields dynamically during runtime. Assignment to an unassigned field extends
an object to contain this new field. Together with aliasing, this poses an additional
challenge:
Example 6.2.4.
1 var x = {next:null};
2 var y = x;
3 y.value = "a.jpg";
4 x.next = {value:"b.jpg",next:null};
5 upload_list(y)
In comparison to Example 6.2.3, here the value field is added to the list object via
y. Since upload_list is called with the parameter y in line 5, y must by typed with
at least the annotation 1/1. This information is needed during the assignment to x in
line 4 to account for the reserved resource unit stored with the path y.next.value.
However, the simple type
t0 = μα.[next : (α,0/0)]
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does not capture any information about value and the type
t0 = μα.[value : (String,1/1),next : (α,0/0)]
wrongly claims that the field value is already assigned. Following the approach in
JST0 [9], AmorJiSe marks existing fields in object types with the marker • as definite
and adds potential fields with the marker ◦. Definite (•) fields are guaranteed part of
the value and can therefore be written to and read. Potential (◦) fields, in contrast,
might be added to the object later. Consequently, they can be written, but not read.
Inserting these markers yields the type
t = μα.[value : ((String,1/1),◦),next : ((α,0/0),•)]
for x in line 1. It states that the value stored at x can be extended by a field value with
the annotation 1/1. Like the annotation in Example 6.2.3 this potential annotation 1/1
is split in line 2 to reflect that the potentially associated resource unit can only be used
via the alias y. This way, AmorJiSe manages controlled object extensions.
Finally, the evaluation relation has to be resource-aware to proof the bounds result-




It describes that in the heap H and scope χ the expression e can be evaluated with n
provided resource units and after execution n′ resource units are still available.
In summary, AmorJiSe takes existing data types and inserts amortised annotations
into the following 4 different locations.
1. AmorJiSe extends each type with numeric annotations:
t+ := (t,n/N).
The first annotation n describes how many resource units are reserved with a
value typed with t+ and N describes how many units have to be reserved when
writing to a value typed as t+ to cover the resources reserved with aliases.




The first annotation n describes how many resource units the execution of the
expression e to e′ requires. The second annotation n′ asserts that n′ of those units
will be returned and can be reused after this execution. However, during the
evaluation of e, these returned units might have been used temporarily.
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3. It annotates the typing relation similar to the evaluation relation:
Γ,n 
 e : t|Γ′,n′.
This certifies that in the context Γ with n resource units the expression e evaluates
to a value of type t with the resulting context Γ′ and n′ units which can be reused
after the execution. Additional annotations are embedded into the types in the
contexts Γ and Γ′ as described above.
4. It annotates each function type:
O× t,n → t ′,n′.
The annotations assert that each call to the function requires n resource units and
n′ resource units become free after the function execution has finished. Addi-
tionally, the parameter types O, t and t ′ include annotations as described above.
AmorJiSe infers minimal values for all annotations contained in the types and the
typing judgement. To achieve this, it assumes that data types for the analysed code
are provided. Into those data types AmorJiSe inserts annotation variables to promote





n′i over the annotation variables. The solution for this constraint system results in
a valid amortised typing and final resource bounds for the execution of the code can be
extracted from them.
6.3 The AmorJiSe system
The following section formally presents the type system AmorJiSe with all needed
notations and properties. The main result is the type soundness: the resource bounds
derived from the resulting types limit the resource usage of the formal evaluation of
the typed expression. An inference algorithm to automatically obtain the amortised
annotations for a given typing is also presented below.
6.3.1 Basic Definitions
Let there be a set Addresses of valid addresses ι, a set VarNames of valid variable
names var and a set FieldNames of valid names m for object fields. Furthermore, let
there be a set Types of all possible types which, in the following discussion, will be
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instantiated differently for the underlying type system and for AmorJiSe. To prevent
ambiguity, assume N= {0,1,2, ...}.
Definition 6.3.1. The set Values contains the following kinds of valid values:
Bool ={true,false}
Int ={−21023, ...,21023}∪{NaN}
Fun ={function f (var){e} | f ∈ VarNames,e is an expression}
Obj ={ m1 : v1, ...,mk : vk | k ∈ N,m1..k ∈ FieldNames,v1..k ∈ Values}
Values =Bool∪ Int∪Addresses∪Fun
Definition 6.3.2. The object value o = m1 : v1, ...,mk : vk ∈ Obj represents a map,
mapping each field name m ∈ FieldNames to a value v ∈ Values:
o(m) =
⎧⎨
⎩vi if m = miUdf otherwise
Definition 6.3.3.
1. A heap H is a map Addresses → Obj∪{Udf} mapping each heap address to
a value or the special value Udf which indicates that an address has not been
assigned yet.
2. A scope χ is a map VarNames → Values∪{Udf} mapping each variable name
to its current value.
3. A pair (χ,H) is called a runtime state
4. A context Γ is a map VarNames → Types∪{None} mapping each variable name
to its current type or None if its type is unknown.
Definition 6.3.4.
For a map M and a value v the standard operators are defined as follows:
1. M(m) returns the value mapped from m by M






3. v[α/v′] replaces all unbound occurrences of α in v by v′.
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6.3.2 Data types
AmorJiSe builds upon existing data types for JavaScript. Candidates for the underlying
system have been discussed in the previous chapter. AmorJiSe assumes that the under-
lying system describes the data structures of the analysed expressions. In particular, for
an expression e consider all evaluations He′ ,χe′ ,e′  H ′e′ ,χ′e′ ,ve′ of subexpressions e′
which occur in the derivation of the evaluation H,χ,e  H ′,χ′,v. AmorJiSe assumes
the underlying system provides
• a type te′ for each such e′ (including e itself)
• contexts Γe′ ,Γ′e′ providing types for the variables occurring in each runtime state
(χe′ ,He′) and (χ′e′ ,H
′
e′)
such that Γe′ 
 e′ : te′ : Γ′e′ .
Definition 6.3.5. Let there be a set ObjectTypes of object types O with the following
properties.
1. An object type O maps each m ∈ FieldNames to a pair (t, ft) of a type t and a
field state ft ∈ {◦,•}. An object type O mapping the field names m1, ...,mk (and
all other m to (Udf ,◦)) is in the following represented as
μα.[m1 : (t1,ψ1), ...,mk : (tk,ψk)]
with k ∈ N,m1..k ∈ FieldNames, t1..k ∈ Types∪{α}
2. For each object type O
(a) the operator Dom(O) returns all fields m mapped by O to a pair other than
(Udf ,◦)
(b) the read operator O(m) returns the pair (ti[α/O],ψi) with m = mi
The μα operator in front of the object type enables the specification of recursive
object types, which introduces infinite types into the data type system. Each field in
an object type O is marked via its field state ψ as either • or ◦. The field state has the
following intuition. A field which is marked as • has been assigned and can therefore
be read or written. If a field O(m) is marked as ◦, the object O does not contain the
field m but can be extended by this field in the future. Therefore, the field m can only
be written. If the underlying system does not include the markers ◦/•, this information
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can usually be inferred from the existing fields by marking all present fields in an object
type as • and all remaining accessed fields as ◦.
The object types of AmorJiSe do not use any δ field (see Section 5.2.1) in the
row types themselves, but the object field lookup O(m) could easily be extended to
internally map unknown fields to a δ-field.
Definition 6.3.6. Let there be a set FunctionTypes of function types G, represented as
O× tx → tret with
1. the object type O for the receiver this
2. the type tx for the parameter x
3. the type tret for the value returned by the function body
Definition 6.3.7. For the underlying type system, the set Types - in the following called
data types - is defined as follows
Types = {Int,Bool}∪ObjectTypes∪FunctionTypes
As primitive types, the rules presented here only consider Int and Bool, but adding
further terminal types does not pose an additional challenge.
The precision of the data types influences the results of AmorJiSe. Consider for
example heap space as a resource in the following example
1 o={value:42};
2 o.value=1;
Line 2 only overwrites the value field of the object o. Therefore, line 2 does not
allocate any heap space. Its actual resource consumption is 0. The object o prior to the
overwrite operation can be typed with either of the data types
t◦ = [value : (Int,◦)]
t• = [value : (Int,•)].
In any case the writing operation (line 2) makes the field value definite in the resulting
type for o:
t ′ = [value : (Int,•)]
. However, with the type t◦ no guarantee is given that the field is present in the object
o before line 2. Assigning to value might be an object extension which consumes an
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additional heap cell. Therefore, AmorJiSe has to assume a resource consumption of 1
unit, which is a correct but imprecise bound for the resource consumption. In contrast,
the type t• guarantees that the field value is already present in o and AmorJiSe can
infer that no additional resources are consumed. The more precise data type t• leads to
a more precise description of the resource consumption of this example.
6.3.3 JavaScript Syntax
Figure 6.1 shows the subset of JavaScript covered by AmorJiSe. It constitutes a core
language focused on the object behaviour of JavaScript which differentiates JavaScript
from other languages. For simplicity, this core language only contains integer and
Boolean constants, but additional primitive constants can be defined analogously. Con-
cerning functions, AmorJiSe only considers non-nested function statements. Function
expressions and nested function statements can be handled similarly. All functions
can be called as constructor, function or method as usual in JavaScript. As variables,
AmorJiSe only considers this and the parameter x. However, the type context and
scope defined later are powerful enough to also represent the JavaScript variable def-
inition using the varkeyword. As control structures, only the conditional expression
e1?et : e f is considered. The if-statement can be handled equivalently. Loops are
discussed as an extension later in Section 6.7 and 6.8.
6.3.4 Resource model
The resource model in AmorJiSe describes how the analysed resource is accessed.
The model consists of two parts, outlining the resource costs for API activated and
language activated resources (see Section 2.2) separately. The API activated resources
are modelled by defining the resource consumption of the APIs in the initial context.
They are specified using the standard function types, which will be presented in more
detail below. Using this part of the model, each resource model defined for PhoneWrap
can be directly translated into a AmorJiSe model. For example, the resource model
describing the message service given by
1 guard : ["smsplugin.send"]
can be described by setting
Γ0(smsplugin.send) = (((O× tx,1 → tret,0),0/0),•)












lhs = e (assignment)





in the initial context Γ0 with the appropriate types O, tx, tret for the parameters and
return value. It describes the resource consumption behaviour with the annotations 1
and 0 as well as the fact that it is available to be called (•) and does not carry any
resources (0/0).
Language activated resources in the model are specified via the consumption con-
stants:
Definition 6.3.8. • For each language construct r let there be a consumption con-
stants cr describing the resource consumption of one execution of r. For exam-
ple, the constant c(VARW) describes the resource usage of a write operation to a
variable.
• For the field write operation let there be two consumption resources c(MEMW)(true)
and c(MEMW)( f alse) describing the resource consumption of a write operation to
a pre-existing field (true) or of a write operation to a new field ( f alse) of an
object. Assume c(MEMW)( f alse)≥ c(MEMW)(true) for these constants.
Every syntax construct in the language has been given a separate consumption con-
stant. This is the most precise resource model one can achieve on the syntactic level.
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Constants for constructs which are not important for a particular resource model can
be set to 0.
The constant c(MEMW) describing the resource consumption of a field write to an
object has a special role: in JavaScript a write operation to an object field could either
be an overwrite operation or an object extension. These two operations cannot be dis-
tinguished syntactically, but might consume different resources, e.g., heap space. For
this reason, there exists one constant c(MEMW)(true) which is used when the assigned
field was available before the assignment and a second constant c(MEMW)( f alse) which
is used otherwise. For the soundness proof later, the assumption c(MEMW)( f alse) ≥
c(MEMW)(true) is required. The assumption is reasonable, since over-writing an ex-
isting field usually is at most as expensive as creating a new field by writing to a
non-existing field.
These constants are used in the typing rules for AmorJiSe as well as in the anno-
tated operational semantics.
Example 6.3.9. For the usual resource models most of the constants cr are set to 0.
For example, to define a resource model where each newly created field of an object
consumes one resource unit, the constants are set as cmemW ( f alse) = 1 and cr = 0 for
all other constants r.
6.3.5 Operational semantics





which reduces e to a value v from the set Values∪{Udf}. The evaluation relation states
that in the heap H and scope χ the expression e is evaluated to the value v resulting
in the new heap H ′ and the new scope χ′. Furthermore, it specifies that the evaluation
can be performed with n available resource units, of which n′ are returned after the
execution to be reused. The annotation n′ can be used to specify the behaviour of
reusable resource kinds like open file handles or memory space.
6.3.5.1 Evaluation rules
The semantics of the core language is defined via the big step evaluation rules in Figure
6.2. In addition, the resource model assumes the evaluation relation f ,H,χ n−→
n′
v,H ′,χ′
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provides appropriate function values v for all function names f defined in the resource
model as Γ( f ) = (((O× tx,n → tret,n′),n f /Nf ),•).
Note that in these rules the consumption constant is always added to the resource
requirements of the rule. Therefore the resource units are always required before the
whole expression is evaluated. In some cases, tighter bounds could be computed
by allowing the resource units required to be generated by the evaluation of a sub-
expression. For example, in the rule (S-VARW) the assignment is executed after the
right-hand-side expression e is evaluated. Therefore, the evaluation of e could gener-





χ′ = χ1[var → v]




All evaluations computed with the original rule S-val are also valid computations
with this alternative rule. However, the alternative rule could in some cases evaluate
an expression var = e with less required resource units, if n′e ≥ ne. The consistent
placement of the constants in the requirement of the full expression, as chosen in the
rules in Figure 6.2, simplifies the soundness proof while generating correct bounds for
real world JavaScript behaviour.
The rules use the resource addition operator (n,n′) = (n1,n′1)  (n2,n
′
2) to compute
the resource behaviour of the sequential execution of two expressions e1;e2. It is de-
fined in the following way:
Definition 6.3.10. Given annotation pairs (n1,n′1) and (n2,n
′
2) define the resource ad-








n1 −n′1 +n2 if n′1 < n2
n′ = n− (n1 −n′1 +n2 −n′2)
Figure 6.3 illustrates examples for the two cases of this definition. In the first case
e1 returns more resource units n′1 then e2 requires n2. Therefore, e2 is executed with the
resources returned by e1 and the concatenation e1;e2 can be executed with n1 provided
resource units. In the second case (n′1 < n2) the expression e2 requires more resource
6.3. The AmorJiSe system 131





































H ′ = H2[ι → H2(ι)[m → v]]
















(n,n′) = (n1,n′1)  (n2,n
′
2)
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(b) n′1 < n2
units than e1 returns. Therefore n2 −n′1 resource units are required in addition to the
n1 units required by the first expression.
All annotations n,n′ in the evaluation rules are implicitly assumed to be non-
negative. The addition operator n,n′ = (n1,n′1)  (n2,n
′
2) respects this invariant:
Lemma 6.3.11. Assume n1,n′1,n2,n
′
2 ≥ 0 and (n,n′) = (n1,n′1)  (n2,n′2). Then it holds
n,n′ ≥ 0
Proof. According to the definition of the resource addition there are two different
cases:
Case n′1 ≥ n2: In this case it holds n = n1 ≥ 0 directly. For n′ consider:
n′ = n−n1 +n′1 −n2 +n′2
= n1 −n1 +n′1 −n2 +n′2
= n′1 −n2 +n′2
≥ n2 −n2 +n′2
= n′2 ≥ 0
Case n′1 ≤ n2: In this case n and n′ can be computed as
n = n1 −n′1 +n2
≥ n1 −n2 +n2
= n1 ≥ 0
n′ = (n1 −n′1 +n2)−n1 +n′1 −n2 +n′2
= n′2 ≥ 0
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Figure 6.4 Types syntax
t ::= O | G | Int | Bool | α | None (pre-type)
t+ ::= (t,n/N) (full type)
O ::= μα.M | M (object)
M ::= [(m : tm)∗] (memberlist)
tm ::= (t+,ψ) (membertype)
ψ ::= • | ◦ (Field state)
G ::= O+× t+,n → t+,n (functions)
where n,N ∈ N≥0 and m ranges over strings
Lemma 6.3.12. Given an evaluation e,H,χ n−→
n′
v,H ′,χ′ the annotations n,n′ are unique.
Proof. The proof is an induction on the length of the derivation of e,H,χ n−→
n′
v,H ′,χ′.
The derivation is of length 1 if e is constant (S-VAL) or a variable (S-VARR). In both
cases, the annotations are uniquely determined as (c(VAL),0) or (c(VARR),0). In all
other cases, the induction hypothesis applies to all subexpressions. Either the final
annotation for e is directly determined by the annotation of one of its subexpressions
or is calculated from multiple subexpression annotations via the  operator which is
deterministic. This proves the claim.
6.3.6 Types
6.3.6.1 Definition
Figure 6.4 defines the syntax of AmorJiSe’s types and, therefore, the set Types for
AmorJiSe. A full type t+ consists of a pre-type t and an amortised annotation n/N. A
pre-type t is either a basic type (here only Int or Bool, but extendable, for example, to
String), an annotated object O or an annotated function G. Furthermore, AmorJiSe
considers the types None to indicate a type which should not be accessed and α to
represent recursion in object types.
Object types O = μα.M consist of a recursive binder μα and a row type M. Each
free occurrence of α within the row type M is a placeholder for the whole type O. The
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row type M is represented as a list of fields with their full types and markers ◦/•. Field
lookup always unfolds a recursive object type before returning the field-type:





+[α/O], ft) if O = μα.[...,m : (t+, ft), ...]
((None,0/0),◦) otherwise
Function types G consist of a full object type O+ = (O,n/N) describing the type of
the expected receiver value this, and full types t+ for the parameter x and the return
value. Furthermore, the function type describes the resource requirement n for the
function and the resource units returned by the function n′.
Intuitively, the only difference between the amortised types of AmorJiSe and the
data types of the underlying system are the amortised annotations n/N. They consist of
two parts with the following intuitive meaning: Reading from a value with annotation
n/N can retrieve up to n reserved resource units and writing to it consumes N units
to account for the units which can be read from this value later through all available
aliases.
To speak about the different parts of a type (t,n/N) the projections extract the





In general, to avoid notational clutter, identify marked types (t,ψ) with the con-





and for typed values identify
v : (t+,ψ) = v : t+
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During type inference, AmorJiSe converts the data types into amortised types by
inserting annotation variables into all necessary places. The following notations use
the operator T (e) to obtain the data type of the expression e with injected annotation
variables.
Definition 6.3.15. Given an expression e and its data type t let T (e) be defined as




μα.[m1 : (t1,ψ1), ...,mk : (tk,ψk)]+ = μα.[m1 : (t1+,ψ1), ...,mk : (tk+,ψk)]
O× tx → t ′+ = O+× tx+,n1 → t ′+,n2
In each case the inserted annotation variables ni are assumed to be fresh variables.
In some rules a type-lookup via T (·) has to be specified by more than the expres-
sion e. For example, while reading the type for a variable x from the context Γ, three
different types are available for the variable x: the type of x in the context before the
variable is read, the type of x in Γ after the variable is read and the type of the resulting
value Γ(x) used for the subsequent computation. To differentiate between those three
types, the typing rules use the notation T (e,1),T (e,2),T (e,3), which each produce
an annotated type t+ for a valid type t for the expression e with distinct annotation
variables. The specific semantics of each annotated type will be clear from the typ-
ing rule. As in the example, the three types T (e,1),T (e,2),T (e,3) might be based
on the same data type in the underlying system. Reading x might result in the types
T (x,1) = (Int,n1/N1), T (x,2) = (Int,n2/N2) and T (x,3) = (Int,n3/N3) all based
on the underlying type tx = Int. However, the annotations are different. In this case,
the data type T (e), here Int, is copied three times and different annotations inserted
into each copy.
6.3.6.2 Typing context
Definition 6.3.16. Extending Definition 6.3.3 a type context Γ in AmorJiSe is a map
VarNames → (Types∪{None})×{◦,•}, which maps variable names var to a full type
t+ and a marker ψ.
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Variables in JavaScript can be declared with the var statement. JavaScript parses
each scope block of the code in two passes. The first pass executes only var statements
and injects the declared variables into a fresh scope frame. The second pass executes
the whole block in this initialised scope frame, which means all declared variables can
be assigned. If a declared variable is read before a value is assigned, JavaScript returns
the value undefined which might potentially lead to unexpected behaviour.
The AmorJiSe context Γ mimics this behaviour and allows to store uninitialised
variables marked as potential with ◦. Once a variable marked with ◦ has been assigned,
AmorJiSe changes the mark to • and records that this variable can be read. This has
the additional advantage that contexts can be treated equivalent to object types just as
JavaScript scope frames are treated as an ordinary object by the ECMA standard [61,
Section 9.2]. This way, it is very easy to extend AmorJiSe with JavaScript’s var key-
word and the with statement, which inserts an arbitrary object into the scope chain.
6.3.6.3 Type judgement
The main judgement of AmorJiSe is
Γ,n 
 e : T (e)|Γ′,n′
with n,n′ ∈ N≥0. It expresses that in the typing context Γ given n resource units the
expression e is given the full type T (e), the context after the evaluation of e is Γ′ and
n′ resource units are available after the evaluation.
Intuitively, the validity of Γ,n 
 e : T (e)|Γ′,n′ directly implies all judgements of
the form Γ,n+ k 
 e : T (e)|Γ′,n′+ k for k ∈N. If an expression can be evaluated with
n resource units, additional resource units k are simply ignored by the expression. This
claim can be formally proven via induction on the typing rules provided in Figure 6.5.
This proof is omitted here since it does not add to the desired properties of the system.
Note that the opposite with k ∈ −N might not be true, even if n,n′ > 0, as the
expression might need some resource units temporarily and free them afterwards.
Consider, for example, the resource of open file handles. An expression could open
one file, write data into it and then close the file properly. This expression would
need one resource unit to be executed and would return this resource unit after the
execution. Therefore, Γ,1 
 e : T (e)|Γ′,1 holds true for this expression e, but not
Γ,0 
 e : T (e)|Γ′,0.
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6.3.6.4 Full types versus pre-types
The type T (e) in the judgement above is a full type of the form (t,ne/Ne) instead of the
simple pre-type t. In the typing judgement with this full type Γ,n 
 e : (t,ne/Ne))|Γ′,n′
the annotation ne is redundant since Γ,n 
 e : (t,0/N))|Γ′,n′+ne expresses the same
number of available resource units. However, the annotation Ne is necessary: if e
evaluates to a reference into the heap, every following assignment to this reference
needs to provide enough resource units to satisfy the resource units retrievable through
the aliases of this heap location.
For example, in the expression e :y.value=”a.jpg” (see Example 6.2.4) the subex-
pression e′ :y.value evaluates to a reference into the heap. The type for e′ is returned
by the type judgement as (Int,0/1) which determines that the assignment consumes
one resource to cover the resource units stored in the type of the variable y. For this
reason, the return type in the typing judgement is a full type rather than a pre-type.
For consistency and conciseness of the presentation of the typing rules, AmorJiSe
also represents the function types O+× t+,n → t+n′ with full types O+, t+.
6.3.6.5 Paths
Typed object values represent infinite trees which can be traversed along paths con-
taining field names:
Definition 6.3.17.
1. For a full type t0 let a type path be a finite sequence m1,m2, ...,mk such that
mi ∈ Dom(ti−1t) and ti−1t(mi) = (ti,ψi) for all i = 1,2, ...,k. Furthermore,
extend the type lookup to t(p) = (tk,ψk) and define P (t) as the set of all valid
paths for the type t.
2. For a typed value v0 : t0 a heap path is a finite sequence of field names m1,m2, ...,mk
such that
mi ∈ Dom(H(vi−1))∩Dom(ti−1t)
ti−1t(mi) = (ti,ψi) for i = 1,2, ...,k
vi = H(vi−1)(mi) for i = 1,2, ...,k.
Let the notation v(p) = vk be the extension of the object value lookup operator
and PH(v : t) the set of all heap paths for the typed value v : t in the heap H.
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3. Let the notations x.m1. · · · .mk or this.m1. · · · .mk describe the paths m1, ...,mk
starting at the values χ(x) or χ(this) and v.m1.m2. · · · .mk describe a path start-
ing at the result v of the last computation.
4. Given a Heap H, and the typed value v : t resulting from the last computation,
the lookup for paths extends the existing maps Γ,χ in the intuitive way:
Γt(”v”) = (t,•)
Γt(p.m) = tpt(m) where Γt(p) = (tp,ψp)
χH,v(”v”) = v
χH,v(p.m) = H(χH,v(p))(m)
If the values for H and v : t are unambiguous, the map Γt is abbreviated as Γ and
χH,v is abbreviated as χ.
Definition 6.3.18. Given a path p, an heap H and a typed value v : t;
1. The set of continuing paths is defined as
Reach(p) = {p′|p is a prefix of p′ and χH,v(p) = Udf}
2. The set of aliasing paths is defined as
Alias(p) = {p′|χH,v(p) = ι = χH,v(p′)}
Lemma 6.3.19. For two path p′ ∈ Alias(p) it holds Reach(p) = Reach(p′).
Proof. The fact p′ ∈ Alias(p) implies χ(p′) = ι = χ(p). The definition of χH,v implies
that χ(p′,m1, ...,mk) = χ(p,m1, ...,mk) and, in particular, χ(p′,m1, ...,mk) = Udf iff
χ(p,m1, ...,mk) = Udf .
6.3.6.6 Annotation constraints
The typing rules derive a set of constraints on the annotations n and N. The basic
constraints are linear constraints of the form
n1 + ...+nk ≤ n′1 + ...+n′k′ + c.
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Additionally, AmorJiSe uses higher level constraints as presented in the following sec-
tions. They are used as a concise way to compare the nested annotations inside the
compared types with each other. Each of these higher level constraints can be trans-
lated into a set of linear constraints containing one annotation from each compared
type.
In general these types (e.g. in the case of recursive object types or functions) are
infinite trees, where each node includes an annotation. The trees are, however, finitely
represented using the recursion operator μ and, therefore, only include finitely many
different annotations. Thus, the size of the resulting set of linear constraints resulting
from a higher level constraint is bounded by the number of possible combinations of
these annotations. Each of these sets is, therefore, finite.
Algorithmically a higher level constraint is translated by traversing the infinite trees
while adding the correct linear constraint for each visited note in the tree. If the same
set of notes is compared a second time the traversal of this branch of the tree is termi-
nated, since all following notes have already been compared as well.
Sharing
If an operation creates a new alias for a value, AmorJiSe needs to make sure the
reserved resource units are shared between the new aliases. The sharing relation
t1 ↪→ t2 ⊕ t3. This relation is of particular need when reading variable types from the
context. After the read, the variable is still available in the context, but the value re-
turned by the expression also accesses the same data structure. Therefore, the sum of
all resource units stored in the context before the read has to be split into the context
type after the read plus the type of the return value.
The sharing relation has the form t1 ↪→ t2 ⊕ t3 and requires that the tree types t1, t2
and t3 have the same set P of type paths. A given sharing relation is translated into the
set of constraints:
C (t1 ↪→ t2 ⊕ t3) =
⋃
p∈P
{t1(p)n = t2(p)n + t3(p)n,t1(p)N = t2(p)N = t3(p)N}
Structured annotation constraints
AmorJiSe introduces the four structured constraints
t n≤n t ′, t n≤N t ′, t N≤n t ′ and t N≤N t ′.
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For given η,η′ ∈ {n,N} the constraint t η≤η′ t ′ asserts that the annotation tη and all
nested η annotations in t are less than the corresponding η′ annotations in t ′. For exam-
ple, while writing to the memory, AmorJiSe must ensure that all nested n annotations
in the type t ′ for the new value suffice for the capacity N in the type t of the overwritten
memory location. This is expressed as t N≤n t ′. A given constrain t η≤η′ t ′ translates
into the following linear constraints:
C (t η≤η′ t ′) =
⋃
p∈P (t ′)
{t(p)η ≤ t ′(p)η′}
The following constraints are defined analogously:
• t η≥η′ t ′ generates the same constraints as t ′ η′≤η t.
• t η=η′ t ′ generates the same constraints as t η≤η′ t ′ and t η≥η′ t ′.
• The relation t ≤ t ′ generates the constraints as t n≥n t ′ and t N=N t ′. This ensures
that at least as many resources can be read from the subtype as from the super-
type and the resources written to the supertype suffice to satisfy the subtypes
requirements.
• Equally, t = t ′ produces all constraints which are produced by t ≤ t ′ and t ′ ≤ t.
• Contexts are equivalent to object types and therefore the same constraints can
be defined. Specifically, for contexts Γ,Γ1,Γ2 the constraint Γ η=η ↓ (Γ1,Γ2)
generates the constraints Γ η≤η Γ1 and Γ η≤η Γ2. The constraint Γ η=η ↑ (Γ1,Γ2)
is defined equivalently with ≥.
Empty types
In the rules for writing to objects the constraint t0 is required, which sets all the n
annotations in the type t to 0. This means this type does not contain any reserved
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6.3.6.7 Typing rules
The typing rules are presented in Figure 6.5. Given a candidate for a full typing, these
rules can be used to verify the constraints for the given annotations. For type inference
purposes, they can generate linear constraints on the annotations from known data
types. A solution for these constraints then constructs a valid full typing.
The constraints in the rules (T-MEMW•) deserve a little extra thought. The rule
deals with the assignment to object fields e1.m = e2 and has to handle a complex set of













































Before the assignment, e1 and e2 each have a set of aliases. After the assignment,
e1.m is also an alias of e2. This imposes the following constraints on the amortised
annotations after the assignment:
• The succeeding code might read the value of e2 through the field m of any alias
of e1. Therefore, the type T (e2) for the expression e2 must provide enough
reserved resource units to cover the resource units reserved for all those aliases.
This yields the constraint T (e2) n≥N tm.
• The code might modify the value of e2 through any alias of e2. Therefore, the
capacity N of all aliases of e2 has to include the reserved resource units of the
aliases of e1. This is expressed as T (e2) N≥N tm.
• Writing to the aliases of e1 needs to provide enough resource units to cover the
reserved units in all aliases of e2. This is expressed by tm N≥N T (e2).
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Figure 6.5 Typing rules
T (c) = (tc,0/0)
Γ,n+N + c(VAL) 
 c : (T (c),N/N)|Γ,n
(T-VAL) c ∈ Z∪{true,false}
Γ(var) = (T (var,1),•)
Γ′ = Γ[var → (T (var,2),•)]
T (var,1) ↪→ T (var,2)⊕T (var,3)
Γ,n+ c(VARR) 
 var : T (var,3)|Γ′,n
(T-VARR)
Γ,n 
 e : T (e,1)|Γ1,n′
Γ1(x) = (T (var),ψvar)
Γ′ = Γ1[var → (T (var),•)]
T (e,1) ↪→ T (e,2)⊕T (var = e)
T (e,2)≤ T (var)
Γ,n+ c(VARW) 
 var = e : T (var = e)|Γ′,n′
(T-VARW)
Γ,n 
 e : T (e)|Γ′,n′
T (e)(m) = (T (e.m),•)
Γ,n+ c(MEMR) 
 e.m : T (e.m)|Γ′,n′
(T-MEMR)
Γ,n 
 e : T (e)|Γ2,n′
Γ2(var) = (T (var,1),•)
(var = e′) is not a subexpr. of e
T (var,1)(m) = (tm,ψm)
Γ′ = Γ2[var → (T (var,2),•)]
T (var,2)(m) = (t ′m,•)
t ′m = tm
T (var,2) = T (var,1)
T (var.m = e)0 T (var.m = e) N=N T (e)
T (e) N=N tm, tm N=N t ′m
T (e) n=N T (e)
Γ,n+ c(MEMW)(ψm = •)+ c(VARR) 
 var.m = e : T (var.m = e)|Γ′,n′
(T-MEMW◦)
Γ,n 
 e1 : T (e1)|Γ1,n′
Γ1,n′ 
 e2 : T (e2)|Γ′,n′′
−





T (e1.m = e2)0
T (e2) N=N tm
T (e2) n=N T (e2)
Γ,n+ c(VARW)(true) 
 e1.m = e2 : T (e1.m = e2)|Γ′,n′′
(T-MEMW•)
Γ,n 
 eb : T (eb)|Γ1,n′
Γ1,n′ 
 et : T (et)|Γt ,nt
Γ1,n′ 
 e f : T (e f )|Γ f ,n f
T (et)≤ T (eb?et : e f ) T (e f )≤ T (eb?et : e f )
Γ′ N=N ↑ (Γ f ,Γt) Γ′ n=n ↓ (Γt ,Γ f )
n′′ = min(nt ,n f )
Γ,n+ c(COND) 
 eb?et : e f : T (eb?et : e f )|Γ′,n′′
(T-COND)
Γ,n 
 e1 : T (e1)|Γ1,n′
Γ1,n′ 
 e2 : T (e2)|Γ′,n′′
T (e1;e2) = T (e2)
Γ,n+ c(SEQ) 
 e1;e2 : T (e1;e2)|Γ′,n′′
(T-SEQ)
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The rule (T-MEMW◦) combines the last two constraints to T (e2) N=N tm. Further-
more, these constraints result in the following chain:
T (e2) n≤N T (e2) N=N tm N≤n T (e2)
which can only be true if T (e2) n=N T (e2) N=N tm. In turn, this means all reserved
resource units in the type T (e2) are now only available through the aliases of e1. There-
fore, the value returned by the expression e1.m = e2 cannot contain any reserved re-
source units anymore, which is expressed by T (e1.m = e2)0.
The equivalent consideration leads to the constraints in (T-MEMW◦) in addition to
the constraints for the update of the type for the field m.
6.4 Properties
The following section discusses the formal properties of AmorJiSe with the goal of
proving the soundness theorem. Objects are of the greatest interest, as they represent
the recursive data structures and are unique to JavaScript. Without loss of generality,
the following definitions assume that for a typed object {m1 : v1, ...,mk : vk,mk+1 :
vk+1, ...} : μα.[m1 : (t1,ψ1), ...,mk : (tk,ψk),m′1 : (t ′1,◦), ...] the shared fields m1, ...,mk
are mentioned in the same order in the value and the type. With the additional disjunct
fields {mi+1, ...}∩ {m′1, ...} = {}, the value contains fields mk+1, ... not described by
the type and the type mentions fields m′1, ... marked as ◦, which are not contained in
the value.
6.4.1 Definitions
The upcoming soundness statement for AmorJiSe (Theorem 6.4.10) intuitively states
that, for every expression e, the resources reserved for the expression via the inferred
types are enough to execute e. Formally this number of available resource units is
defined as potential. It depends on the annotations inside the types and the structure of
the typed value.
Definition 6.4.1. 1. Given a typed value v : t in the heap H, the total resource po-
tential ΣHv : t is defined as:
ΣHv : t = ∑
p∈PH(v:t)
t(p)n
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2. In extension, the potential of a whole environment (Γ,H,χ) is defined as:
ΣHχ : Γ = ∑
x∈Dom(Γ)∩Dom(χ)
ΣHχ(x) : Γ(x)
The analysis discusses two different kinds of states: pre-states (H,χ,Γ,n) are the
inputs for the typing/evaluation relation and post-states (H,χ,Γ,n,v : t) are the output
of the relations. The potential of either of those is defined as the sum of the potential
of its parts:
N (H,χ,Γ,n) = ΣHχ : Γ+n
N (H,χ,Γ,n,v : t) = ΣHχ : Γ+n+ΣHv : t
Lemma 6.4.2. Due to the definition and the domain N for the annotations n, the po-
tential ΣHv : t is always non-negative. This property extends to ΣHχ : Γ, N (H,χ,Γ,n)
and N (H,χ,Γ,n,v : t).
Definition 6.4.3. 1. A type t is called sufficient for the set of types {t1, ..., tk}, if for
all type paths p ∈ P (t) it holds: t(p)N ≥ ∑
i=1...k
ti(p)n.
2. Given a state H,χ,Γ, potentially a typed value v : t and a heap path p call the
type Γ(p) sufficient, if Γ(p) is sufficient for the set of all alias types {Γ(p′)|p′ ∈
Alias(p)}. This is written as Γ,H,χ 
 Γ(p).
3. Furthermore, the context Γ is called sufficient for H,χ and potentially v : t, if for
all heap paths p the type Γ(p) is sufficient. This is denoted as Γ,H,χ 
 Γ
Intuitively, the capacity of a sufficient type is at least as big as the sum of all re-
served units in the alias types. Therefore, it fulfils the desired property of the capacity
N.
Lemma 6.4.4. If Γ(p) is sufficient, then for every p′ ∈ Reach(p) the type Γ(p′) is also
sufficient.
Proof. This follows from Definition 6.4.3, since the set P (Γ(p′)) is only a sub-set of
P (Γ(p)).
Remark 6.4.5. There are two things to notice about this notation:
1. If two paths p and p′ are aliased, the fact that Γ is sufficient requires both paths
p and p′ to be sufficient.
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2. The notion of sufficient does not depend on the field state of the fields in the
object types. As shown in example 6.2.4 (page 121), if an object is extended
via one alias all other aliases need be be up-to-date with the capacity of this
new field. Since AmorJiSe does not track all possible aliases of all values, the
information about the capacity needs to be synchronised between the aliases
during alias creation. This is achieved via the capacity of potential (◦) fields
which in turn is taken into consideration for the definition of sufficient.
To remain sufficient while creating new aliases it is important that the splitting
relation does indeed split the potential between the two output types:
Lemma 6.4.6. For full types t, t1, t2 and a value v in a given heap H, if t ↪→ t1⊕ t2 then
ΣHv : t = ΣHv : t1 +ΣHv : t2.
Proof. Remember that the sharing relation requires P (t) = P (t1) = P (t2). The same
relation between the heap paths PH(v : t) = PH(v : t1) = PH(v : t2) follows from the
definition of heap paths (Definition 6.3.17).

















= ΣHv : t1 +ΣHv : t2
6.4.2 Heap loops
One interesting case is the potential of loops in data-structures in the heap. If an object
value o stored at a heap address ι has a reference to ι directly as the value of one of
its members or indirectly through multiple members, this heap contains a loop. If such
a loop is typed with an annotated recursive object type O, there exists infinite many
heap paths for the object o. The potential of this value sums up over all those paths and
sums up the annotations contained in O infinitely often. If one of these annotations is
positive, the potential becomes infinite itself.
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If the heap loop is provided as the input heap configuration, the analysis correctly
infers values for all annotations in O and the following soundness result states that
the resource requirement is the potential of the input values. If one of the annotations
contained in the type of the loop is positive this potential is infinite. The result is
therefore trivial: “The expression executes with at most infinite resource units”. In the
other case, all annotations inside the type of the loop are 0, the potential of the loop is
0 itself and irrelevant for the resource consumption.
The situation is more complicated if a heap loop gets created during runtime. For
example, if an object is assigned its own heap address as one of the fields. The follow-
ing lemma guarantees that such loops typed with a sufficient type have a potential of 0
under certain conditions, which will be fulfilled in the proof later.
Lemma 6.4.7. Assume a state H,χ,Γ and an address ι with H(ι) = Udf . Let the
address v = ι as value be typed with the sufficient type t with t N=n t and let there be
a non trivial path pι ∈ PH(v) with χH(pι) = ι. Then, for any path p ∈ Reach(ι) and
any p′ ∈ Alias(p) it holds Γ(p′)n = 0. This implies ∑
p′∈Alias(ι)
Γ(p′, p′′)n = 0 and
ΣHv : t = 0.
ΣHv : t = 0 and ∑
p′∈Alias(ι)
Γ(p′, p′′)n = 0 for any concatenated path p′, p′′.
Proof. Choose a path p ∈ Reach(ι). By the assumptions, the concatenated path p1 =
pι, p is an alias to p itself p ∈ Alias(p1).




Due to t n=N t it holds t(p1)N = t(p1)n and due to p1 ∈ Alias(p1), t(p1)n can be




Since all t(p′)n ≥ 0 this is equivalent with t(p′)n = 0 for all p′ ∈ Alias(p1)− p1.
The same construction can be repeated for p2 = pι · p1, proving t(p1)n = 0.
The other two claims follow, since the claimed terms are composed of summands
of the form t(p′)n = 0.
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6.4.3 Soundness
The soundness of AmorJiSe relates the evaluation and the typing relation. To prove
soundness, AmorJiSe assumes the soundness of the underlying system, which ex-
presses that the type of a typed object v : O describe the object value v correctly. This
is expressed by the agreement relation:
Definition 6.4.8. Given a state H,χ,Γ, a value v agrees with its type t, written as
H,χ,Γ 
 v : t, if for all paths p from v:
• t(p) = Int ⇒ χH(v) ∈ Int
• t(p) = Bool ⇒ v(p) ∈ Bool
• t(p) = μα.[m1 : (t1,ψ1), ...,mk : (tk,ψk)]⇒∀i = 1...k
ψi = •⇒ mi ∈ Dom(H(v(p)))
Furthermore, in a given heap H a stack χ agrees with the context Γ, written as H,χ,Γ
,
if for all variables var ∈ Dom(Γ)
Γ(var) = (t,•)⇒ var ∈ Dom(χ)∧H,χ,Γ 
 χ(var) : Γ(var)
Γ(var) = (t,◦)∧ var ∈ Dom(χ)⇒ H,χ,Γ 
 χ(var) : Γ(var)
Theorem 6.4.9. (Assumption) Given an expression e, which can be typed and evalu-








Then the value v can be typed as t
H,χ,Γ 
v : t
and the post-state agrees
H ′,χ′,Γ′ 
.
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In the soundness theorem for AmorJiSe this is extended by the properties of the
annotations:
Theorem 6.4.10. Given an expression e, which can be typed and evaluated in a match-











The potential in the pre-state N (H,χ,Γ,nT ) is enough to execute e:
N (H,χ,Γ,nT )≥ nS.
The potential is reduced by at least as much as the execution of e consumed resource
units:
N (H,χ,Γ,nT )−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,nT ,v : t)≥ nS −n′S





Proof. This claim is proven by induction on the length of the derivation of the eval-
uation relation e,H,χ nS−−→
n′S
v,H ′,χ′. Since all rules of both the evaluation relation and
the type checking relation are syntax-driven, the induction step distinguishes one case
for each evaluation rule. In each case, the handled evaluation rule matches exactly one
typing rule, except for the rule (T-MEMW). In this exception the proof is performed in
the two sub-cases for the typing rules (T-MEMW◦) and (T-MEMW•).
Case (S-VAL): In this basic case it holds nS = c(VAL),n′S = 0 as well as nt =
n+N + c(VAL),n′t = n. That directly results in
N (H,χ,Γ,nT )≥ c(VAL) = nS
and
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N (H,χ,Γ,nT ) = ΣHχ : Γ+(n+N + c(VAL))
= ΣHχ : Γ+n+ c(VAL) +ΣHc : (T (c),N/N)
= N (H,χ,Γ,n′T ,c : (T (c),N/N))+ c(VAL)
implies
N (H,χ,Γ,nT )−N (H,χ,Γ,n′T ,c : (T (c),N/N)) = c(VAL) = nS −n′S
The resulting environment H,χ,Γ is sufficient due to the precondition. The only
path reachable from the path ”v” is ”v” and since the value c is not stored in the heap
H, it does not have any other aliasing paths. Therefore, H,χ,Γ 
 v : t follows from
Γ(”v”)n = N ≤ N = Γ(”v”)N .
Case (S-VARR): In this case there are 2 cases for var ∈ {x,this}. Without loss
of generality, the following assumes var = x. The rules in this case provide the values
nS = c(VARR),n′S = 0 and nT = n+ c(VARR) ≥ c(VARR). The claim
N (H,χ,Γ,nT )≥ nT ≥ c(VARR) = nS
holds immediately. Due to Lemma 6.4.6 and T (x,1) ↪→ T (x,2)⊕T (x,3), it holds
ΣHχ(x) : T (x,1) = ΣHχ(x) : T (x,2)+ΣHχ(x) : T (x,3)
This implies
ΣHχ : Γ = ΣHχ(this) : Γ(this)+ΣHχ(x) : Γ(x)
= ΣHχ(this) : Γ′(this)+ΣHχ(x) : T (x,1)
= ΣHχ(this) : Γ′(this)+ΣHχ(x) : T (x,1)
= ΣHχ(this) : Γ′(this)+ΣHχ(x) : T (x,2)+ΣHχ(x) : T (x,3)
= ΣHχ(this) : Γ′(this)+ΣHχ(x) : Γ′(x)+ΣHχ(x) : T (x,3)
= ΣHχ : Γ′+ΣHχ(x) : T (x,3)
and leads to
N (H,χ,Γ,nT )−N (H,χ,Γ′,n′T ,χ(x) : T (x,3))
=N (H,χ,Γ,nT )−ΣHχ : Γ′ −n′T −ΣHχ(x) : T (x,3)
=N (H,χ,Γ,nT )−ΣHχ : Γ−n′T
=ΣHχ : Γ+nT −ΣHχ : Γ−n′T
=c(VARR) = nS −n′S
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It remains to show the sufficiencies. By the precondition H,χ,Γ 
 Γ all paths
are sufficient in the previous environment. In the new environment the type Γ′(x)
was changed from T (x,1) to T (x,2). Since they are related via the sharing relation,
T (x,1) and T (x,2) have the same structure and are equal in all nested capacities N.
Now consider a path p in the new environment H,χ,Γ′ which does not start with v.
Therefore, p exists in the old environment H,χ,Γ and its set of alias paths in this
environment is P = {p′|H(p′) = H(p)}. This set splits into
Px = {x.p′|H(x.p′) = H(p)} and
Pthis = {this.p′|H(this.p′) = H(p)}.
Since v is a new alias of x, in the new environment H,χ,Γ′ the path p has the new
set of alias paths P′ = P∪{v.p′|x.p′ ∈ Px}. For each x.p′ ∈ P′ by the definition of the




















This constitutes the sufficiency of Γ(p) and H,χ,Γ′ 
Γ′ as a whole. Since Γ′(v.p)N =
Γ′(x.p)N the sufficiency H,χ,Γ′ 
 v : t is equivalent.
Case (S-VARW): Without loss of generality, this case considers var = x. The
induction hypothesis on the subexpression e yields
N (H,χ,Γ,n) ≥ ne (6.1)
N (H,χ,Γ,n)−N (H ′,χ1,Γ1,n′,v : T (e,1)) ≥ ne −n′e (6.2)
which results in




Furthermore, the sharing relation T (e,1) ↪→ T (e,2)⊕T (x= e) implies
ΣHv : T (e,1) = ΣHv : T (e,2)+ΣHv : T (x= e) (6.3)
and by the subtyping T (e,2)≤ T (x) it holds
ΣH ′v : T (e,2)≥ ΣH ′v : T (x) (6.4)
This combines to
N (H,χ,Γ,nT )−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′T ,v : T (x= e))
=N (H,χ,Γ,n+ c(VARW))−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′,v : T (x= e))
=N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(VARW)−ΣH ′χ′ : Γ′ −ΣH ′v : T (x= e)−n′
=N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(VARW)−ΣH ′χ′(this) : Γ′(this)−ΣH ′χ′(x) : Γ′(x)
−ΣH ′v : T (x= e)−n′
=N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(VARW)−ΣH ′χ1(this) : Γ1(this)−ΣH ′v : T (x)
−ΣH ′v : T (x= e)−n′
6.4≥N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(VARW)−ΣH ′χ1(this) : Γ1(this)−ΣH ′v : T (e,2)
−ΣH ′v : T (x= e)−n′
6.3
=N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(VARW)−ΣH ′χ1(this) : Γ1(this)−ΣH ′v : T (e,1)−n′
≥N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(VARW)−ΣH ′χ1 : Γ1 −ΣH ′v : T (e,1)−n′
≥N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(VARW)−N (H ′,χ1,Γ1,n′,v : T (e,1))
6.2≥nS −n′S
The induction hypothesis guarantees that all types in the old state H ′,χ1,Γ1,v :
T (e,1) are sufficient. Now consider a path p in the new state H ′,χ′,Γ′,v : T (x = e).
In general, Alias(p) contains a number of paths v.m1. · · · .mk in the new state. For each
such path it also contains the path x.m1. · · · .mk in the new state. All other alias paths
are as in the old state with the same type and value. The path v.m1. · · · .mk is also a valid
path in the old state. By the sharing relation, it is clear that the potential of v.m1. · · · .mk
in the old state is the same as the summed up potential of the paths v.m1. · · · .mk and
x.m1. · · · .mk in the new state.
Now consider two cases: Either the value of the path p was equal in the old state,
then the sum of potential of all aliases is the same in old and new state (with the
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split of the potential of all paths v. · · · ), or the value of the path p has changed by
the assignment. Then p is clearly of the form x.m1. · · · .mk, since no other path was
changed. In that case, due to the assignment, the path p has the same alias paths as
v.m1. · · · .mk and due to T (e,2)≤ T (x) also the same capacity. Since v.m1. · · · .mk has
already been established as sufficient, p has to be sufficient, too.
Case (S-MEMR): The induction hypothesis in this case yields:
N (H,χ,Γ,n)≥ ne
N (H,χ,Γ,n)−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′, ι : T (e))≥ ne −n′e
Furthermore, with the auxiliary type (te.m,•) = T (e)(m), by the definition of the
potential it holds
N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′, ι : T (e)) =N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′,H ′(ι) : T (e)))
≥N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′,H ′(ι)(m) : te.m)
This yields the claimed inequalities:
N (H,χ,Γ,nT + c(MEMR))
=N (H,χ,Γ,nT )+ c(MEMR)
IH≥ne + c(MEMR) = nS
N (H,χ,Γ,nT )−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′T ,H ′(ι)(m) : T (e.m))
=N (H,χ,Γ,n+ c(MEMR))−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′,H ′(ι)(m) : te.m)
=N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(MEMR)−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′,H ′(ι)(m) : te.m)
≥N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(MEMR)−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′, ι : T (e))
IH≥ne + c(MEMR)−n′e = nS −n′S
The sufficiency H ′,χ′,Γ′ 
 Γ′ is given by the induction hypothesis and H ′,χ′,Γ′ 

H ′(ι)(m) : T (e)(m) follows from H ′,χ′,Γ′ 
 ι : T (e) since the paths from v =
H ′(ι)(m) are equivalent to the subset Reach(v.m) of the paths from ι : T (e).
Case (S-SEQ): In this case the induction hypothesis applies directly to the sub-
expression e1. One result of this hypothesis is H1,χ1,Γ1 
 Γ1 and thus the induction
hypothesis applies for e2. Therefore, H ′,χ′,Γ′ 
 Γ′ and H ′,χ′,Γ′ 
 v2 : T (e2) fol-
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lows by induction immediately and the following inequalities can be assumed:
N (H,χ,Γ,n) ≥n1
N (H,χ,Γ,n)−N (H1,χ1,Γ1,n′,v1 : T (e1)) ≥n1 −n′1
N (H1,χ1,Γ1,n′) ≥n2
N (H1,χ1,Γ1,n′)−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′′,v2 : T (e2)) ≥n2 −n′2
For n there are the following 2 cases:
Case n′1 ≥ n2: It holds n = n1 and from the induction hypothesis it follows N (H,χ,Γ,n)≥
n1 = n.
Case n′1 < n2: It holds n = n1 − n′1 + n2. Furthermore, due to the definition of
potential, the potential of v1 : T (e1) is non-negative. From that it follows:
N (H,χ,Γ,n)
=N (H,χ,Γ,n)−N (H1,χ1,Γ1,n′)+N (H1,χ1,Γ1,n′)
≥N (H,χ,Γ,n)−N (H1,χ1,Γ1,n′,v1 : T (e1))+N (H1,χ1,Γ1,n′)
≥n1 −n′1 +n2 = n
In both cases ΣHv1 : T (e1)≥ 0 and therefore
N (H,χ,Γ,nT )
=N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(SEQ)
≥n+ c(SEQ) = ns
N (H,χ,Γ,nT )−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′T ,v2 : T (e1;e2))
=N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(SEQ)−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′′,v2 : T (e2))
≥N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(SEQ)−ΣHv1 : T (e1)−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′′,v2 : T (e2))
=N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(SEQ)−N (H1,χ1,Γ1,n′,v1 : T (e1))
+N (H1,χ1,Γ1,n′)−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′′,v2 : T (e2))
IV≥n1 −n′1 +n2 −n′2 + c(SEQ)
=n−n′+ c(SEQ) = nS −n′S
Case (S-CONDTRUE): By the induction hypothesis, H ′,χ′,Γ′ is sufficient. There-
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fore, the induction hypothesis applies to et resulting in the following bounds:
N (H,χ,Γ,n) ≥n′
N (H,χ,Γ,n)−N (H1,χ1,Γ1,n′,true : T (eb)) ≥n1 −n′1
N (H1,χ1,Γ1,n′) ≥n2
N (H1,χ1,Γ1,n′)−N (H ′,χ′,Γt ,nt ,v : T (et)) ≥n2 −n′2
As ΣHtrue : T (eb) = 0 it holds that
N (H1,χ1,Γ1,n′,true : T (eb)) = N (H1,χ1,Γ1,n′).
With those preconditions the same derivation as in the case S-SEQ derives
N (H,χ,Γ,n) ≥n
N (H,χ,Γ,n)−N (H ′,χ′,Γt ,nt ,v : T (et)) ≥n−n′
It holds n′ ≤ nt as it is computed as n′ = min(nt ,n f ). From Γ′ n=n ↓ (Γt ,Γ f ) follows
ΣH ′χ′ : Γ′ ≤ ΣH ′χ′ : Γt and from T (et)≤ T (eb?et : e f ) follows ΣH ′v : T (eb?et : e f )≤
ΣH ′v : T (et). Combining this yields
N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′,v : T (eb?et : e f ))
=ΣH ′χ′ : Γ′+ΣH ′v : T (eb?et : e f )+n′
≤ΣH ′χ′ : Γt +ΣH ′v : T (et)+nt
=N (H ′,χ′,Γt ,nt ,v : T (et))
Therefore,
N (H,χ,Γ,nT )−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,nT ,v : T (eb?et : e f ))
=N (H,χ,Γ,n+ c(COND))−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′,v : T (eb?et : e f ))
≥N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(COND)−N (H ′,χ′,Γt ,nt ,v : T (et))
≥n+ c(COND)−n = nS −n′S
The induction hypothesis also ensures that H ′,χ′,Γt are sufficient. Due to the require-
ments Γ′ N=N ↑ (Γ f ,Γt) and Γ′ n= n ↓ (Γt ,Γ f ) this immediately proves Γt(p)n ≥
Γ′(p)n and Γt(p)N ≤ Γ′(p)N for every path p. Hence, H ′,χ′,Γ′ 
 Γ′ holds.
Equivalently, H ′,χ′,Γ′ 
 v : T (eb?et : e f ) follows from the sufficiency H ′,χ′,Γt 
:
v : T (et) in the induction hypothesis and T (et)≤ eb?et : e f .
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Case (S-CONDFALSE): is analogous to (S-CONDTRUE)
Case (S-MEMW◦): Without loss of generality this case assumes var = x.
















Furthermore, since the rule (T-MEMW) requires that (x= e′) is not a subexpression
of e it holds that χ(x) = χ′(x).
In this case the induction hypothesis on e states:
N (H,χ,Γ,n) ≥n2 (6.5)
N (H,χ,Γ,n)−N (H2,χ′,Γ2,n′,v : T (e)) ≥n2 −n′2 (6.6)
The typing rule states
Γ2(x) = (T (x,1),•) and
T (x,1)(m) = (tm,ψm)
The agreement H2,χ′,Γ2 
 follows from the soundness of the underlying system im-
plies
H2,χ′,Γ2 
 H2(ι) : T (x,1). (6.7)
Now assume ψm = •, then 6.7 implies that m ∈ Dom(H2(ι)) and
c(MEMW)(ψm = •) = c(MEMW)(true) = c(MEMW)(m ∈ Dom(H2(ι))) (6.8)
In the opposite case ψm = ◦ the definition (6.3.8) of the constants c(MEMW) implies
c(MEMW)(ψm = •) = c(MEMW)(false)≥ c(MEMW)(m ∈ Dom(H2(ι))). (6.9)
Combining 6.8 and 6.9 yields in any case
c(MEMW)(ψm = •)≥ c(MEMW)(m ∈ Dom(H2(ι))). (6.10)
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Now the first claimed inequality follows directly:
N (H,χ,Γ,nT )
=N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(MEMW)(ψm = •)+ c(VARR)
6.10≥ N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(MEMW)(m ∈ Dom(H2(ι)))+ c(VARR)
6.5≥n2 + c(MEMW)(m ∈ Dom(H2(ι)))+ c(VARR)
=nS
For the second inequality, the preconditions
Γ2(var) = (T (var,1),•)
Γ′ = Γ2[var → (T (var,2),•)]
T (var,1) = T (var,2)
imply that the contexts Γ2 and Γ′ have the same type paths and for each such path p it
holds
Γ2(p) = Γ′(p) (6.11)
Now consider the heap paths I =
⋃
p∈Alias(ι)
Reach(p) in H ′. Since H ′ and H2 only
differ in ι, all other paths p ∈ Ī in H ′ also exist in H2 and it holds
∀p ∈ Ī : χ′H2(p) = χ′H ′(p) (6.12)
All paths in H2 which have been changed in comparison to H ′ are aliases of
paths from v. So consider a path p = v.m1. · · · .mk in H2. If there is no prefix p′ =




H2(ι′) = H ′(ι′)∀ι′ = ι (6.14)
by the induction on the length of p
χ′H2(v.m1. · · · .mi,mi+1) =H2(χ′H2(v.m1. · · · .mi))[mi+1]
IH
=H2(χ′H ′(x.m.m1. · · · .mi))[mi+1]
6.14
= H ′(χ′H ′(x.m.m1. · · · .mi))[mi+1]
=χ′H ′(x.m.m1. · · · .mi.mi+1)
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it follows
χ′H2(v.m1. · · · .mk) = χ′H ′(x.m.m1. · · · .mk) (6.15)
In the typing context it holds






Since Γ′(x) = T (x,2), the sufficiency of Γ′ (shown below) implies that this capacity
T (x,2)(m,m1, ...,mk)N is bigger than the sum of the annotations in all alias paths
Alias(x.m.m1. · · · .mk). The set {p′,m,m1, ...,mk|p′ ∈ Alias(x) = Alias(ι)} is certainly
a subset of this alias set:




If otherwise there is a prefix v.m1. · · · .mk′ of p with χ′H2(v.m1. · · · .mk′) = ι, then the
preconditions of Lemma 6.4.7 are provided for the address ι resulting in
Γ2(v.m1. · · · .mk)n ≥ 0 Lem 6.4.7= ∑
p′∈Alias(ι)
Γ′(p′)(m,m1, ...,mk)n (6.18)
From 6.17 and 6.18 this inequality holds true for all paths p of the form v.m1. · · · .mk
in H2. Summing up over all paths m1, ...,mk ∈ Reach(ι) with line 6.15 this results in
∑
m1,...,mk












⇔ΣH2v : T (e) ≥∑
p∈I
Γ′(p)n (6.19)
With this, consider the potential
N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′,x.m : T (x.m = e))
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=ΣH ′χ′ : Γ′+n′+ΣH ′x.m : T (x.m = e)
T (x.m = e)0 implies ΣH ′x.m : T (x.m = e) = 0










Γ′ is equivalent to Γ2 regarding annotations
6.19≤ ∑
p∈Ī




Γ2(p)n +ΣH2v : T (e)+n
′
=N (H2,χ′,Γ2,n′,v : T (e)) (6.20)
Now the claimed inequality can be derived from the inequality for the subexpres-
sions:
N (H,χ,Γ,nT )−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′T ,v : T (x.m = e))
=N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(MEMW)(ψm = •)+ c(VARR)−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′,v : T (x.m = e))
6.20≥ N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(MEMW)(ψm = •)+ c(VARR)−N (H2,χ′,Γ2,n′,v : T (e))
6.6≥n2 + c(MEMW)(ψm = •)+ c(VARR)−n′2 = nS −n′S
The sufficiency H ′,χ′,Γ′ 
 v : T (var.m = e) is equivalent to H ′,χ′,Γ′ 
 v : tm
due to T (var.m = e) N=N T (e) N=N tm. Since Γ′(x.m) = tm and χ′H ′(x.m) = v this is
contained in H ′,χ′,Γ′ 
.
It remains to show the sufficiency H ′,χ′,Γ′ 
 . Since H ′ and H2 only differ in
ι.m, all paths which do not have an alias path passing though ι.m are sufficient by the
induction hypothesis on e. Furthermore, assume a path p has an alias passing through
ι.m but does not pass through ι.m itself. In this case, in H2 the path p has a non-trivial
prefix being an alias to v and forms a loop in the heap. From Lemma 6.4.7 it follows
that Γ2(p)n = 0. The same argument prohibits annotated loops within v: if a pair of
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This implies Γ2(v.p)n = 0 and Γ2(v.p′)n = 0.







p′ ∈ AliasH ′(p)
p′ through ι.m
Γ2(p′)n
Every such path p′ can be written as p1 · p2 with χ′H ′(p1) = H ′(ι).m and p1 is the
shortest such path (i.e. no prefix of p1 also visits H ′(ι).m). The remaining path p2 is a
path in v. All positively annotated paths in v have no aliases. Therefore, all important













The last equality holds, since in the rules aliases are only created by the sharing re-
lation, which requires each alias to have the same capacities. The capacities are not
changed later on.
This is exactly the definition of "p is sufficient" for all p that were not already
sufficient from H2.
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Case S-memW•: The same argumentation as in the case S-SEQ leads to bounds:
N (H,χ,Γ,n) ≥n1
N (H,χ,Γ,n)−N (H1,χ1,Γ1,n′, ι : T (e1)) ≥n1 −n′1
N (H1,χ1,Γ1,n′) ≥n2
N (H1,χ1,Γ1,n′)−N (H2,χ′,Γ′,n′′,v : T (e2)) ≥n2 −n′2
N (H,χ,Γ,n) ≥n
N (H,χ,Γ,n)−N (H2,χ′,Γ′,n′′,v : T (e2)) ≥n−n′ (6.21)
The same argumentation as in the case S-MEMW◦ applies and directly implies the
first claimed inequality
N (H,χ,Γ,nT )≥ nS
The equivalent split of the set of heap paths into I, Ī and I′ results in
N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′,v : T (e1.m = e2))
≤N (H2,χ′,Γ′,n′,v : T (e2)) (6.22)
which results in the second claimed inequality:
N (H,χ,Γ,nT )−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′T ,v : T (e1.m = e2))
=N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(MEMW)(true)−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′,v : T (e1.m = e2))
6.22≥ N (H,χ,Γ,n)+ c(MEMW)(true)−N (H2,χ′,Γ′,n′,v : T (e2))
6.21≥ n+ c(MEMW)(m ∈ Dom(H2(ι)))−n′ = nS −n′S
With the same preconditions as in the case S-MEMW◦ the sufficiency is equivalent.
6.5 Type inference
The type inference algorithm infers the amortised types by performing the following
steps.
1. The data types are computed by the underlying system. Depending on the un-
derlying system this step might require additional code annotations.
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2. The data types are promoted to amortised types by recursively injecting an-
notation variables. Where the typing rules use multiple copies of a data type
T (e,1),T (e,2)... this data type needs to be copied.
3. The typing rules of AmorJiSe are applied and the resulting constraints on the re-
source annotation variables are collected into a set of linear constraints. This
also includes the implicit constraints n ≥ 0 for every annotation variable n.
Since the structures of the data types are known, all higher level constraints
(t n≤N t, t ↪→ t ⊕ t, ...) can be translated into linear constraints.
4. The resulting set of constraints is solved as a Linear Programming Problem
(LPP) with conventional solvers.
5. The bounds on the resource consumption of the whole program are extracted
from the inferred annotation values of the initial context and the type of the
functions.
The type lookup T (·) used in inference, in addition to inserting annotation vari-
ables into the data types of the underlying system, also ensures that all contained
types are unrolled on the highest level. For example, the list data type μα.[value :
(Int,•),next : (α,•)] is expanded into
μβ.[value : ((Int,n1/N1),•),next : ((
μα.[value : ((Int,n3/N3),•),next : ((α,n4/N4),•)]
,n2/N2),•)]
Type unrolling does not change the soundness of a type. The different annotation
variables for the head n1/N1,n2/N2 and the recursive end n3/N3,n4,N4 enable an ex-
pression to use the reserved resource units in the head without effecting all fields in the
recursive structure. This way more programs are typeable.
The inference procedure is comparable to the type inference presented in previous
work on amortised type systems [58] by Hofmann et al. The method proposed in this
work infers the amortised annotations for a class-based object-oriented programming
language similar to Java called RAJA. The big difference between the RAJA inference
and AmorJiSe is the object type representation. While AmorJiSe uses one individual
object expression for each object value, RAJA types multiple expressions with the
same class. To differentiate between different resource properties of values types with
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the same class, Hofmann et al. have to introduce views which assign a specific set of
annotations to a value typed with a class.
Comparing the procedure, the RAJA inference can skip the first step, since the data
types are supplied as part of language’s syntax. The second step is solved implicitly,
by defining the  operator. It returns the appropriate resource annotations for each
class-view combination and its fields. Since the annotation variables are represented
implicitly using this operator, they are not injected into the types. RAJA then gen-
erates constraints equivalent to the third step of AmorJiSe, including the higher level
constraints (see Section 6.3.6.6) on infinite trees. They are, however, complicated due
to the view notation. These constraints are solved similarly converted into arithmetic
inequalities and solved by conventional LPP solving methods.
6.5.1 Annotation domain
Each annotation is interpreted as the amount of reserved resource units stored with a
typed value. Intuitively, the annotations are therefore thought to be integers. However,
Integer Linear Programming Problems (ILPP) are NP-hard, whereas a real-valued so-
lution to the existing Linear Programming Problem can be computed in polynomial
time. To profit from the better complexity, AmorJiSe allows annotation values in R.
In the resource model this has the following interpretation. A resource unit can
be split into arbitrary pieces and each piece stored in different data structures during
execution. To access the resource a full unit is recombined from the pieces available in
the data structures at the point of access and used to pay for the access. Even though
the unit is potentially split and transported via different data structures only full units
are used to legitimate resource access. Since the soundness only states that the sum of
resource units stored in the values is bigger than the number of resource accesses, this
method is sound independent of the splitting of the units. Also note that the solution
found with the LPP algorithm is always smaller than the solution found by an ILPP
algorithm, since the minimal ILPP solution also is a solution for the LPP algorithm.
On the other hand smaller LPP solutions might exists which contain non-integers.
A second consideration is the inclusion of ∞ as annotation. If one of the annotations
in the data-structures in the initial typing context needs to be infinite in the minimal
solution for the LPP, then the resulting overall resource bound is infinite as well. This
situation is equivalent to the solver not being able to compute a finite bound. Therefore,
allowing infinity as value for the annotations contained in the value types does not add
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expressivity.
On the other hand, it is possible to allow infinity as annotation in a function type. If
an input handler function (assuming it is not otherwise called) is typed with an infinite
annotations as requirement, the overall bound is finite, but the interaction-dependent
part of the bound is infinite as soon as the associated input event occurred at least once.
Therefore, allowing annotations inside the function types to be ∞ results in certain
situations in an improvement of the precision of the bound: the bound expresses which
user interactions make the consumption potentially infinite and provides a finite bound
for the cast these interactions do not occur. This, however, depends on the ability of
the used LPP solver to derive ∞ as value for the variables, which are not contained in
the objective function.
6.5.2 Deriving bounds
Given the result Γ,n 
 e : t|Γ′,n′ the bound on the resource consumption of the expres-
sion e consists of 3 parts:
1. The annotations n,n′ describe the constant resource consumption.
2. The potential ∑H χ : Γ describes the data-dependent resource consumption, if e
is executed with the inputs stored in H,χ.
3. The function types in Γ′ describe the interaction-dependent resource consump-
tion: If for example e registers a function f as handler for the event click and
Γ′( f ) = (((O× t,n → t ′,n′),n f /Nf ),ψ f ) then each click event has a resource
consumption of (n,n′).
6.6 Extensions
The core language and type system discussed so far is not very expressive. This section
increases the flexibility of the annotations and adds rules for functions.
6.6.1 Exchange rule
The system shown above tracks the resource consumption of a typed expression via
the annotations n,n′ of the typing judgement. Additionally it uses the annotations in-
jected into the types to express resource units dependent on the size of data structures.
164 Chapter 6. The system AmorJiSe
However, in the rules presented above the two different kinds of annotations are sep-
arate. The type judgement annotations “pay” for resource accesses but the amortised
annotations cannot be transferred into the type judgement. This separation simplifies
the proof of Theorem 6.4.10. The following rule allows to swap resource units from
the amortised annotations into the typing judgement annotations and therefore makes
the reserved resource units usable.
Γ,n 
 e : (t,nt/Nt)|Γ′,n′
0 ≤ r ≤ nt
Γ,n 
 e : (t,nt − r/Nt)|Γ′,n′+ r
(T-SWAP)
Theorem 6.6.1. The rule (T-SWAP) preserves Theorem 6.4.10
Proof. The proof extends the induction step of 6.4.10
Case (T-SWAP): For the potential it holds:
N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′,v : (t,nt/Nt)) = N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,n′+ r,v : (t,nt − r/Nt))
The required inequalities follow directly from the induction hypothesis. For the suffi-
ciency of Γ′, consider a path p in the state H,χ,Γ,v : (t,nt/Nt). Due to the induction





The only difference between Γ(t,nt/Nt)(·) and Γ(t,nt−r/Nt)(·) is the annotation of the































Since this is true for arbitrary p, this constitutes to H ′,χ′,Γ′ 
 Γ′.
The sufficiency of v in H,χ,Γ,v : (t,nt/Nt) is provided by the induction hypothesis
and provides the sufficiency of any path p ∈ Reach(v) in H,χ,Γ,v : (t,nt − r/Nt) as























The difference between the rule (T-SWAP) and the other rules of AmorJiSe is that
(T-SWAP) is not syntax directed, but makes the rule application non-deterministic in
two ways: The derivation has to guess when the rule (T-SWAP) is applied and the value
of the parameter r for each application. This non-determinacy makes type checking
without provided type derivation more difficult. The complexity of type inference,
however, does not increase significantly. Applying the new rule twice can be collapsed
into one application by adding the r values of the two applications. Therefore, type
inference applies the rule (T-SWAP) exactly once after the application of every other
rule. This results in one extra variable (the parameter r) and two additional linear
constraints for each applied syntax-driven rule. In the worst case this doubles the size
of the LPP.
The same result could be achieved by incorporating the rule (T-SWAP) into each of
the rules provided above. However, this would blow up the representation of the rules.
6.6.2 Functions
As functions do not interfere with the object structures of the types in AmorJiSe, they
have been omitted from the core system described above and are added in the fol-
lowing. This extension handles non-nested, potentially recursive, first order functions.
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Method calls can be handled similarly as shown in Section 6.7.1. The syntax of a pro-
gram with functions consists of a list of function definitions and a main expression e
as before.
P ::=F∗;e (Program)
F ::=function f (x){e} (FuncDecl)
Function values are noted as v = function f (x)e f , where f is the function name, x the
function argument and e f the function body expression. Similar to the restriction to
one variable x in the JavaScript syntax above, function definition here are restricted to
one argument named x for simplicity reasons.
In JavaScript function statements are interpreted in a first pass: before an expres-
sion is evaluated, its source code is scanned for functions and the function definition for
each function is added to the scope. This makes it possible to define mutually recursive
functions. AmorJiSe assumes that the function declarations precede the main expres-
sion e. This automatically enforces this first pass behaviour. A program not in this
shape can be translated without change in behaviour by reordering the source code.
Furthermore, AmorJiSe restricts functions to non-nested function declarations. This
ensures that all functions are executed in the same scope and simplifies the presenta-
tion and the soundness proof significantly. Programs with nested function declarations
can be flattened by encoding the scope of each local variable into the variable name.
6.6.2.1 Typing rules
Figure 6.6 and 6.7 introduce the rules to handle functions in AmorJiSe: the rules (S-
PROGRAM) / (T-PROGRAM) handle function statements and the rules (S-FUNX) / (T-
FUNX) handle function calls.
During evaluation, the definition of the functions is stored in the scope χ, such that
the rule (T-FUNX) can lookup the function body. The typing rules equivalently store
the type for function f as Γ( f ). Although this adds to Dom(χ) and Dom(Γ) this does not
invalidate the proof of Theorem 6.4.10. Since the added values are only functions, they
only add trivial paths and since they are always typed with the amortised annotation
0/0, they can be ignored for the computation of the potential.
During the analysis of a function definition, the bodies of the functions are analysed
in the context Γi, which only contains the types of the functions (from ΓF ) and the
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Figure 6.6 Evaluation rules - Functions
Fi = function fi(x){ei}













χ( f ) = function(x){e f }
χ f = { fi → χ1( fi)∀functions fi,x → ve,this → {}}












parameters for this specific function. Therefore, the typing context, the function body
is typed in, does not depend on the calling context, which simplifies the soundness
proof for the function call.
The existing type relations extend for function types in the intuitive way. The
constraints G1 η≤η′ G2 produce for function types G = O× tx,n → tret,n′ the linear
constraints n1 = n2 and n′1 = n
′
2 as well as all constraints generated by tx1 η=η′ tx2,
O η=η′ O and tret1 η=η′ tret2. The sharing relation G1 ↪→ G2⊕G3 also produces equality
constraints for all three involved types and the potential is defined as ΣHv : G = 0.
6.6.2.2 Soundness
For the soundness statement, first the agreement relation has to be extended.
Definition 6.6.2. Given a state H,χ,Γ, a value v agrees with its type t written as
H,χ,Γ 
 v : t, if - in addition to the requirements in Definition 6.4.8 - for every path p
with t(p) = O× tx,n f → tret,n′f provided
• Γ f = [x → tx,this → O]
• any χ,H with H,χ,Γ 
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Figure 6.7 Typing rules - Functions
Fi = function fi(x)ei
ΓF = Γ[ fi → (T ( fi),•)∀i = 1..k]
T ( fi) = ((Oi × ti,ni → t ′i ,n′i),0/0)
Γi = ΓF [x → ti,this → Oi]
Γi,ni 
 ei : T (ei)|Γ′i,n′i
Γ1,n 
 e : T (e)|Γ′,n′
Γ,n+ k · c(FUND) 
 F1; ...;Fk;e : T (e)|Γ′,n′
(T-PROGRAM)
Γ,n 
 e : T (e)|Γ1,ne
Γ1( f ) = O× tx,n f → tret,n′f
O does not contain • fields
O0 T (e)≤ tx T (e) N=N tx
tret ≤ T ( f (e))
ne ≥ n f n′ = ne −n f +n′f
Γ,n+ c(FUNX) 
 f (e) : T ( f (e))|Γ1,n′
(T-FUNX)
• H ′,χ′,Γ 
 vret : tret
• n f ≥ nS
• n f −n′f ≥ nS −n′S
Theorem 6.6.3. The rules (T-PROGRAM), (T-FUNX), (S-PROGRAM) and (S-FUNX)
preserve Theorem 6.4.10 with the additional invariant:
For every function f with
χ( f ) = function f (x){e}
Γ( f ) = O× tx,n f → tret,n′f
the body e can be typed as:
Γ f ,n f 
 e : tret|Γ′,n′f
with Γ f = { fi → Γ( fi),x → tx,this → O}
Proof. This proof extends the induction step of Theorem 6.4.10. The assumption (The-
orem 6.4.9) applies with the amended agreement relation. Since the rules of the orig-
inal proof do not effect the functions stored in Γ or χ, they trivially fulfil the new
invariant.
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Case (S-PROGRAM): Due to the preconditions of the soundness theorem it is
given that Γ is sufficient for H,χ. This relation obviously extends to Γ1 and H,χ1, since
each Gi is sufficient with the annotation 0/0 and no aliases nor fields. The potential
inequality can be proven using the induction hypothesis:
N (H,χ,Γ,n+ k · c(FUND))
=N (H,χ1,Γ1,n)+ k · c(FUND)
≥nS + k · c(FUND)
N (H,χ,Γ,n+ k · c(FUND))−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,v : te,n′)
=N (H,χ1,Γ1,n)−N (H ′,χ′,Γ′,v : te,n′)+ k · c(FUND)
≥nS −n′S + k · c(FUND)
The sufficiency of Γ′ for H ′,χ′ follows directly from the induction hypothesis.
Furthermore, note that rule (T-PROGRAM) explicitly requires the function invariant
to be true for each function in the resulting environment H ′,χ′,Γ′.
Case (S-FUNX):
Due to the induction hypothesis on e the following holds:
N (H,χ,Γ,n) ≥n1 (6.23)
N (H,χ,Γ,n)+N (H1,χ1,Γ1,ne,ve : T (e)) ≥n1 +n′1 (6.24)
From the soundness of the underlying system it follows that ve agrees with T (e).
Since O0 and T (e) ≤ tx it is clear that the values χ f (x) = ve and χ f (this) = {} agree
with the types O and tx. Construct the context Γ f = { fi → Γ( f ),x → tx, this → O}
which fulfils the agreement relation H1,χ f ,Γ f 
. From the function invariant it follows
that Γ f ,n f 
 e f : tret|Γ′f ,n′f and by the induction hypothesis it follows
N (H1,χ f ,Γ f ,n f )≥ n2 (6.25)
To prove the needed properties about the types Γ1(x) and Γ1(this) in the resulting
heap H ′ they are carried through the execution of the function body. For this reason,
with fresh variables this0 and x0 construct the following extended states:
Γ+ = Γ f [xo → Γ1(x),thiso → Γ1(this)]
Γ′+ = Γ
′
f [xo → Γ1(x),thiso → Γ1(this)]
χ+ = χ f [xo → χ1(x),thiso → χ1(this)]
χ′+ = χ
′[xo → χ1(x),thiso → χ1(this)]
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which fulfil the agreement relation H1,χ+,Γ+ 
 due to H1,χ f ,Γ f 
 and H1,χ1,Γ1 
.
Since the expression e f does not access the variables xo,thiso it is clear that
Γ+,n f 





are equivalent to the evaluation in Γ f ,χ f . With these typing relations and the evaluation
of e f the induction hypothesis results in
N (H1,χ+,Γ+,n f )≥ n2 (6.26)
N (H1,χ+,Γ+,n f )−N (H ′,χ′+,Γ′+,n′f ,v : tret)≥ n2 −n′2 (6.27)
By construction, the relationship between the original state and the extended state is
the following:
ΣH1χ+ : Γ+ = ΣH1χ f : Γ f +ΣH1χ1 : Γ1 (6.28)
ΣH ′χ′+ : Γ
′
+ = ΣH ′χ
′ : Γ′f +ΣH ′χ1 : Γ1 (6.29)
Since χ f (this) = {} it is clear that ΣH1χ f (this) : Γ f (this) = 0 and therefore
ΣH1χ f : Γ f = ΣH1ve : tx
T (e)≤tx≤ ΣH1ve : T (e). So
ΣH1χ f : Γ f −ΣH1ve : T (e)≤ 0 (6.30)
From this and the constraint
ne ≥ n f (6.31)
in the typing rule it follows:
N (H1,χ1,Γ1,ne,ve : T (e)) (6.32)
=ΣH1χ1 : Γ1+ne +ΣH1ve : T (e) (6.33)
6.31,6.30
≥ ΣH1χ1 : Γ1 +n f +ΣH1χ f : Γ f (6.34)
≥n f +ΣH1χ f : Γ f = N (H1,χ f ,Γ f ,n f ) (6.35)
The typing rule has the constraint
n′ = ne −n f +n′f (6.36)
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Now the inequalities can be shown. The first inequality is shown in cases again: If
n′1 ≥ n2 then n = n1 and it holds
N (H,χ,Γ,n+ c(FUNX))
6.23≥ n1 + c(FUNX)
=n+ c(FUNX) = nS
In the other case n′1 ≤ n2 it holds n = n1 −n′1 +n2:
N (H,χ,Γ,n+ c(FUNX))
6.32≥ N (H,χ,Γ,n+ c(FUNX))−N (H1,χ1,Γ1,ne,ve : T (e))+N (H1,χ f ,Γ f ,n f )
6.25,6.24
≥ n1 −n′1 +n2 + c(FUNX)
=n+ c(FUNX) = nS
The second inequality can be proven as follows:
N (H,χ,Γ,n+ c(FUNX))−N (H ′,χ1,Γ1,n′,v : tret)
=N (H,χ,Γ,n+ c(FUNX))−ΣH ′χ1 : Γ1 −n′ −ΣH ′v : tret
≥N (H,χ,Γ,n+ c(FUNX))−ΣH ′χ1 : Γ1 −n′ −ΣH ′v : tret −ΣH ′χ′ : Γ′f
6.36
= N (H,χ,Γ,n+ c(FUNX))−ΣH ′χ1 : Γ1 −ne +n f −n′f −ΣH ′v : tret −ΣH ′χ′ : Γ′f
6.30≥ N (H,χ,Γ,n+ c(FUNX))−ΣH ′χ1 : Γ1 −ne +n f −n′f −ΣH ′v : tret −ΣH ′χ′ : Γ′f
−ΣH1ve : T (e)+ΣH1χ f : Γ f
=N (H,χ,Γ,n+ c(FUNX))−ΣH ′χ1 : Γ1 −ne +n f −n′f −ΣH ′v : tret −ΣH ′χ′ : Γ′f
−ΣH1ve : T (e)+ΣH1χ f : Γ f −ΣH1χ1 : Γ1 +ΣH1χ1 : Γ1
6.28,6.29
= N (H,χ,Γ,n+ c(FUNX))−ΣH1χ1 : Γ1 −ne +n f −n′f −ΣH ′v : tret −ΣH ′χ′+ : Γ′+
−ΣH1ve : T (e)+ΣH1χ+ : Γ+
=N (H,χ,Γ,n+ c(FUNX))−N (H1,χ1,Γ1,ne,ve : T (e))
+N (H1,χ+,Γ+,n f )−N (H ′,χ′+,Γ′+,n′f ,v : tret)
6.24,6.27
≥ n1 + c(FUNX)−n′1 +n2 −n′2 = n+ c(FUNX)−n′
The claimed inequalities follow directly from tx ≤ T ( f (e)) and the implied ΣH ′v :
T ( f (e))≤ ΣH ′v : tx.
Now it remains to show that the final state is sufficient: The induction hypothesis
applies to e and implies that Γ1 is sufficient for H1. Now, the sufficiency has to be
extended to the state the function body is executed in. Since the functions f1, ..., fk
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of the analysed program cannot be overwritten, we know that the obtained type O×
txn f → tret,n′f still fits the function body e. Under this circumstance, the function
invariant established that in the context Γ f = ΓP[x → tx,this → O] the function body
e f can be typed as tret. This context Γ f is sufficient for the state H1,χ f : this only has
to be shown for the paths x,this. The sufficiency for the remaining paths then follows
from Lemma 6.4.4. For the path x the value ve and type tx is known and tx is sufficient
since T (e) is sufficient due to the induction hypothesis on e and T (e) ≤ tx. From the
requirement “O contains no • fields”, it follows that the object type O agrees with the
empty object value {}. The only valid heap path for {} is this. Due to O0, this type
O is trivially sufficient for this value. O might still contain additional ◦ fields, which
are assigned to in the function body.
Altogether this shows that Γ f is sufficient for χ f ,H1. The induction hypothesis
is applicable on e f and the state H1,χ f ,Γ f . Now choose new variables xouter and
thisouter, which are not accessed in e f and the extended state (H1, χ̄ f , Γ̄ f ) defined
with
χ̄ f = χ f [xouter → χ1(x),thisouter → χ1(this)] and
Γ̄ f = Γ f [xouter → Γ1(x),thisouter → Γ1(this)]
Since e f does not access thisouter nor xouter the results from the preconditions can
be extended to




Γ̄ f ,n f 
 e f : tret|Γ̄′f ,n′f
where
χ̄′ = χ′[xouter → χ1(x),thisouter → χ1(this)] and
Γ̄′f = Γ
′
f [xouter → Γ1(x),thisouter → Γ1(this)]
This establishes, by the induction hypothesis on e f , that in the state H ′,χ1 the types
Γ1(x) and Γ1(this) are still sufficient for the paths x and this. Therefore, Γ1 is
sufficient for the state H ′,χ1 as required.
The sufficiency H ′,χ′,Γ′ 
 v : tx follows from the induction hypothesis on e f and
extends to H ′,χ′,Γ′ 
 v : T ( f (e)) due to tx ≤ T ( f (e)).
Remark 6.6.4. Variance of the capacity
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The proof case (T-MEMW◦) requires that all aliases of a type have the same ca-
pabilities. This restricts the typing rules in several cases: the rule (T-SWAP) cannot
reduce the capacity of the resulting type (i.e. (t,nt − r/Nt − r)) even though the sum of
resource units stored with t has clearly been reduced and the rule (T-FUNX) requires
T (e) N=N tx, instead of the expected T (e) N≤N tx.
The additional restrictions on the capacities means that in certain cases the capac-
ities and maybe even the reserved resource units included in types need to be over-
approximated to allow a value to be passed as an argument or assigned to variable.
Via a chain of related types, this could increase the capacities of multiple types. The
ultimately leads to a bigger than necessary bound in the result. Therefore, a proof for
the case (T-MEMW◦) without the requirement on the capacities could make the bounds
more precise.
6.6.2.3 Differences to JavaScript
The difference between JavaScript handling and the function execution rule (S-FUNX)
is that simple functions in JavaScript are called with the this variable set to the global
scope object. Since AmorJiSe does not deal with scope interactions, this is set to be
the empty object instead.
The decision not to concentrate on the handling of the scope in JavaScript is a
real restriction, but is necessary to keep the rule manageable: In JavaScript functions
usually have access to all variables defined in their own function scope (including
the parameters), in addition to all variables accessible in the outer scope in which
the function was defined in. To allow access to the outer scope in AmorJiSe would
mean that the consumption of the function on the outer scope has to be monitored. To
understand the difficulty of this consider the following example program.
1 function f1(x) {
2 var y = 5;






In this example, assume the function CONSUME requires a first parameter with the
type (Int,1/1). The function f1 defines the variable y and then returns the function
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f2. Since f2 is defined inside the scope of f1, it has access to the variable y and can
use it as the parameter for CONSUME. In line 7, f1 is called and returns a pointer to the
newly created function f2. This new pointer is stored in the local variable f. When f
is called later, it uses a resource unit stored with the variable y. At that time, y is not
in scope anymore and AmorJiSe cannot reduce the annotations in the type of y.
Handling scopes in AmorJiSe is a challenge orthogonal to the main focus of Amor-
JiSe on the object structure of JavaScript. JavaScript functions have access to the scope
of the defining context. With the previously discussed method of abstract locations for
object types, the abstract location of the defining scope could simply be included in the
function type and its type validated during the analysis of each function call. An easier
approach is to set all annotations in the outer scope to 0 using the constraint t0 in the
rule (T-PROGRAM). This way the function body has access to the values of the outer
scope without access to the reserved resource units stored in the types.
6.7 Implementation
The type inference algorithm discussed in Section 6.5 has been implemented2 in Haskell
using ghc in version 7.10.4. The implementation performs the following steps:
1. Parse the JavaScript code using the library Language.JavaScript.Parser (Ver-
sion 0.5.14.7).
2. Infer the underlying types according to a re-implementation of the type system
JST0 by Anderson.
3. Apply the AmorJiSe typing rules and collect the annotation constraints.
4. Solve the resulting linear programming problem using the Gnu Linear Program-
ming Kit with its Haskell interface glpk-hs (Version: 0.3.5)
The objective function of the constructed LPP has to describe the potential of the
initial environment. However, the LPP is constructed without knowledge of the run-
time environment H,χ and without knowledge of the interaction sequence at runtime.
For this reason, instead of the potential ΣHv : t, the implementation uses a type po-
tential ΣΓt, defined recursively as the sum of all annotations n occurring in the type t.
2Source code and instructions to run the system has been made available: github.com/DFranzen/
AmorJiSe, a the docker image dfranzen/amorjise is available on hub.docker.com
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Using this, for a type judgement Γ,n 




In addition to the constantly required resource units, this minimises the resource units
required by each function f defined in the program P to account for the interaction
during runtime. Here, the potential cost of a function is weighted by a factor of 2
in comparison to the constant resource requirement n. This way, if there is a choice
between the constant or interaction-dependent requirement, the constant requirement
is preferred. This, however, does not effect the soundness of the bound, but is merely
a heuristic to improve the quality of the resulting bound. Other objective functions
might take different annotations into account and put different weights on the different
annotations.
6.7.1 Extensions
The language analysed by the implementation is more expressive than the formal core
handled by the theory above. At the highest level, the implementation handles expres-
sions separate from statements and introduces statement types. Expressions are typed
with the type provided above, while statements can be typed as none or Return(t)
where t is an expression type to indicate that this statement returns a value of this type.
The typing rules for the discussed expression (including (T-SWAP) and function
calls) are implemented as shown above. Additionally, the implementation extends the
analysis of expressions with the following typing rules without formal proof:
The basic values of the analysed language have been extended by string and object
literals via the rule (T-STRINGLIT) and (T-OBJLIT).
Γ,n+N + cstrD 
 ”...” : (String,N/N)|Γ,n
(T-STRINGLIT)
Γ,n 
 (e1, ...,ek) : (t1, ..., tk)|Γ′,n′
ti ≤ T (e)(mi)
∀m ∈ {m1, ...,mk}T (e)(m) n≤N T (e)(m)
T (e)n = N = T (e)N
Γ,n+ cob jD + k · cmemW +N 




The function handling has been extended to higher order functions, by allowing
the called expression in e(·) to be an arbitrary expression e f rather than just a function
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name f . Additionally, the rule (FUNX) can type function calls with multiple parame-
ters:
Γ,n 
 e f : (T (e f ),0/0)|Γ1,ne
T (e f ) = O× (t1, ..., tk),n f → tret,n′f
Γ1,ne 
 (e1, ...,ek) : (T (e1), ...,T (ek))|Γ2,n2
O0 (T (e1), ...,T (ek))≤ (t1, ..., tk)
tret ≤ T (e f (e1, ...,ek))
n f ≤ n2 n′ = n2 −n f +n′f
Γ,n+ c f unX 
 e f (e1, ...,ek) : T (e f (e1, ...,ek))|Γ2,n′
(T-FUNX)
This rule does not analyse polymorphic functions or variadicity. Instead, it restricts the
function call to the exact number of parameters mentioned in the function definition.
In addition to normal function calls, the implementation includes specialised rules
for method call:
Γ,n 
 e : (T (e),0/0)|Γ1,ne
T (e)[m] = ((O× (t1, ..., tk),n f → tret,n′f ,0/0),•)
Γ1,ne 
 (e1, ...,ek) : (T (e1), ...,T (ek))|Γ2,n2
T (e)≤ O (T (e1), ...,T (ek))≤ (t1, ..., tk)
tret ≤ T (e.m(e1, ...,ek))
n f ≤ n2 n′ = n2 −n f +n′f
Γ,n+ c f unX 
 e.m(e1, ...,ek) : T (e.m(e1, ...,ek))|Γ2,n′
(T-MEMX)
The constructor call is handled just like a function call, since the receiver O of a
function call is initialised without • fields. That means the constructor can be called
with an empty object as this. During runtime the value {} for this is provided by
JavaScript.
Γ,n 
 e f (e) : t|Γ′,n′
Γ,n+ cnew 
 newe f (e) : t|Γ′,n′
(T-NEWX)
The only difference of this rule to actual JavaScript behaviour is that in constructor
calls which do not explicitly return a value, the value of this is returned. The rule
(T-NEWX) does not capture this.
The syntax used for the functions here does not differentiate between the different
kinds of function calls in JavaScript and allows the same function to be used in different
roles throughout the code.
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As last addition to the expression set, the implementation handles various operators
in a rudimentary way. Standard arithmetic and logical operators require the operands
to be of type Int or Bool and the (overloaded) plus operator requires both operands to
be of equal data type.
The implementation also adds separate statement types T+ = (T,n/N). Only two
kinds of statement pre-type T are considered: none or Return(t) for any expression
type t. The subtyping for those types is defined by the two rules
Return(t)≤none
t ≤ t ′ ⇒ Return(t)≤ Return(t ′)
Subtyping for full statement types T+ is equivalent to expression types and the same
holds true for the other type relations and constraints.
For the formal notation write the typing judgement for statements as Γ,n  s :
T |Γ′,n′. The implementation corresponds to typing rules as follows. Again they as-
sume that the underlying system provides sound data-types for all parts of the analysed
statement and only infer the constraints on the annotation variables. The implementa-
tion of the underlying system uses similar techniques to the expression typing to infer
the types of the statements.
Any expression can also be typed as statements with the empty statement type:
Γ,n 
 e : t|Γ′,n′
Γ,n  e : none|Γ′,n′
(T-STMT)
The return statement is typed with a return type containing the expression type of
the returned expression.
Γ,n 
 e : t|Γ′,n′
Γ,n  return e : Return(t)|Γ′,n′
(T-RETURN)
Equivalent to the rule for the conditional operator e1?e2 : e3, the implementation
includes a rule for the if statement.
Γ,n 
 eb : T (eb)|Γ1,n′
Γ1,n′  st : T (st)|Γt ,nt
Γ1,n′  s f : T (s f )|Γ f ,n f
T (st)≤ T (if...) T (s f )≤ T (if...)
Γ′ N=N ↑ (Γ f ,Γt) Γ′ n=n ↓ (Γt ,Γ f )
n′′ = min(nt ,n f )
Γ,n+ c(COND)  if(eb){st} else {s f } : T (if(eb){st} else {s f })|Γ′,n′′
(T-IF)
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Statement concatenation is typed with the following rule:
Γ,n  s1 : T (s1)|Γ1,n′
Γ1,n′  s2 : T (s2)|Γ2,n′′
T (s1)≤ T (s1;s2) T (s2)≤ T (s1;s2)
Γ,n+ c(SEQ)  s1;s2 : T (s2)|Γ′,n′′
(T-STMTSEQ)
The rule (T-PROGRAM) handling function definitions is split in the implementa-
tion. The rule (T-FUNSTMT) analyses function statements and (T-FUNEXPR) handles
function expressions. The difference is mainly the mandatory function name in the
function statement and the function type of the returned function value of the function
expression.
T ( f ) = ((O× (t1, ..., tk),n f → tret,n′f ),0/0)
Γ f = Γ[ f → (T ( f ),•),this → O,(x1, ...,xk) → (t1, ..., tk)]
Γ f ,n f  e : T (e)|Γ1,n′f
tret =
⎧⎨
⎩none if T (e) = nonet if T (e) = return(t)
Γ,n+ c(FUND) 
 function[ f ](x1, ...,xk){e} : T ( f )|Γ′,n
(T-FUNEXPR)
T ( f ) = ((O× (t1, ..., tk),n f → tret,n′f ),0/0)
Γ f = Γ[ f → (T ( f ),•),this → O,(x1, ...,xk) → (t1, ..., tk)]
Γ f ,n f  e : T (e)|Γ1,n′f
tret =
⎧⎨
⎩none if T (e) = nonet if T (e) = return(t)
Γ,n+ c(FUND)  function f (x1, ...,xk){e} : none|Γ′,n
(T-FUNSTMT)
The type of the function body has been adopted to return values marked with the
return keyword instead of the last computed value. Another improvement is the abil-
ity to type nested functions. However, the scope chain has not been addressed. Nested
function bodies can only access the variables defined within their own scope.
Finally, the analysed language is extended by the var keyword, which creates a new
variable in the given context. To analyse these, the implementation emulates the three
pass parsing of the JavaScript standard. In the first two passes over the source code
only the initial typing context Γ0 is populated with declared variables and functions
using the rules (T-FUNSTMT) similar to (T-FUNEXPR) and the rule (T-VARD). This
behaviour is equivalent to the runtime scope population in JavaScript. The third pass
6.7. Implementation 179
actually analyses the given statement in this initial heap. Since the var keyword of a
variable declaration var x= e has already been analysed, in this third pass the variable
declaration is treated as assignment x= e instead. The semantics of the implementation
requires variables to be declared in the scope they are used in and terminates with
a warning, if an undeclared variable is assigned or read. The three pass procedure
is repeated before every function body is analysed to discover variables local to its
function scope.
The implementation uses equivalent rules to expand the type inference for the un-
derlying type system JST0 . To convert the rules, the annotations are deleted and appro-
priate subtyping relations are inserted.
The layout of the analysis code is modular, such that a new rule can be added by
supplying three functions. The first function receives an expression or statement as
input and returns true, if the implemented rule applies; the second function breaks the
expression into the relevant parts while the third function receives these parts and a
typing environment and returns the type and the resulting changes to the environment.
In this way new rules can be added easily.
6.7.2 Evaluation
The implementation has been tested on example code to verify the correct implemen-
tation of each rule.3 Additionally, consider a simpler version of the Example 6.2.1:




For this example the resource model has been created to reflect the resource consump-
tion of the API function UPLOAD:
1 "UPLOAD":(<(μ.({}) ,0/0) ,((Int ,0/0))×(Int ,0/0) ,0>,0/0)•,
With this type in the initial context, the analysis




3The test cases are part of the published implementation and can be run via the command ti_test
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2 T(function upload_list)
3 (<(μβ_11.({}) ,0/0)×((μβ_13.({"value":(Int ,0/0)•,"next":(μβ_16.({"
value":(Int ,0/0)•,"next":(β_16 ,1/1)•,}) ,1/1)•,}) ,0/1)),1->(
NONE ,0/0) ,0>,0/0)
4 whole program: 0 -> (NONE ,0/0) ,0
It reveals that the parameter type for the function upload_list is an unfolding of
the expected type
μα.[value : ((Int,0/0),•),next : ((α,1/1),•)].
The annotations (1/1) show that one resource unit is required for each element in the
list. For this example the LPP contained 146 linear constraints.
In general, the size of the generated LPP is difficult to estimate. Each applied
rule generates a small number of linear or higher level constraints. However each
higher level constraint is translated into a number of linear constraints potentially cubic
in the size of the compared types. The relation between the size of the source code
and the size of the resulting types is not clear. The rules for the if statement and
the conditional operator (e_bool?e_true:e_false) compare whole typing contexts
which results in linear constraints for all types in the typing context. This adds another
unknown parameter to the size of the LPP.
Before this implementation can be applied to real world code, further constructs
of the JavaScript language have to be added. To evaluate which constructs are most
often missing, the parser and case-distinction was applied to the source code from the
available 8000 PhoneGap apps. The test reported the loops and the array syntax used
in most applications, but not analysed by AmorJiSe. Loops can be handled with a rule
like the following:
Γ,n 
 e : T (e1)|Γ1,n1
Γ1,n1  e2 : T (e2)|Γ2,n2
Γ2 ≤ Γ
n2 ≥ n
T (e2)≤ T (while (e1){e2})
Γ,n+ cwhile  while (e1){e2} : T (while (e1){e2})|Γ1,n1
(T-WHILE)
The analysis of Arrays could be handled similar to objects. The array type only needs a
way to represent an arbitrary number of elements. For this, the δ field could potentially
be adopted for amortised annotations.
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During the conducted evaluation, a missing case in the JavaScript parser library
was found and reported. It is fixed in the newest version.
6.8 Discussion
This chapter presented the formal type system AmorJiSe, which can be used to infer
a bound on the resource consumption of JavaScript code. The system covers a core
of JavaScript which is focused on the JavaScript specific object behaviour. The object
types incorporate markers to allow controlled strong updates of object values by ex-
tension. For this core language, AmorJiSe automatically infers amortised annotations
for provided data types. With those annotations, a bound for the resource behaviour
can be inferred for the given JavaScript code, which can be data-dependent on the size
of the input data and interaction dependent on the number of triggered events. Further-
more, the system has been implemented and extended in Haskell and applied to small
examples.
AmorJiSe is formally proven sound in the sense that no execution can exceed the
resulting bound on the resource usage. However, the soundness proof for AmorJiSe as-
sumes the soundness of the provided data types. The combined system is only as sound
as the underlying system. One might consider an unsound system with AmorJiSe to
enhance the applicability and precision by sacrificing soundness in corner cases.
With the presented method, AmorJiSe can analyse API activated resources and
language activated resources. The examples only used memory space as language
activated resources, but with a more detailed resource model other such resources,
like time or power consumption, can also be (over-)approximated with more detailed
resource models. With respect to the resource classification in Section 2.2.1, AmorJiSe
can analyse all four resource classes count, cumulative, unique and acquire-release.
Even the uniqueness property of blocking resources can be modelled by adding the
constraint n ≤ 1 to the LPP for all annotations n in the typing judgement. However,
with this adaption, no restriction can be posed on other apps. Therefore, blocking
resources cannot be handled. Otherwise, AmorJiSe is only missing a method to handle
resources which are defined via custom events like lowbattery or online.
The derived bounds can certainly be made more precise. Especially the rules (T-
MEMW) and (T-VARW) overwrite values without considering the reserved resource
units associated with the overwritten value. Instead, they could be extracted and re-
stored into the globally available resource pool.
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In some cases making the bounds more precise is more difficult. For example in
a binary search trough a tree, the analysis would have to assume about one resource
unit in each node of the tree. To reduce this number to the more precise resource unit
per level of the tree, the analysis would have to be able to read resource units from
other branches of the tree, which might not be possible in general. Similarly, amor-
tised analysis can only use its full potential with recursive data-structures. Recursive
functions which reduce an index parameter instead of the size of its data structure can-
not be analysed with a non-zero resource consumption. Similar functions have been
analysed in previous work by representing the decreasing numeric parameter as list of
the appropriate length. This translation is, however, complicated and not equivalent in
time and memory space. However, within those restrictions amortised analysis has the
advantage that it circumvents dependent types and can therefore be efficiently inferred.
The version of AmorJiSe published as [39] did not use the heap-dependent def-
inition of the potential Σ, yet. This, unfortunately, made the system unsound. This
flaw has been corrected in the version presented here with the inclusion of the capacity
annotations N.
The system is not yet usable on real world JavaScript apps. The language analysed
needs to be extended with some more language constructs of JavaScript. Strongly
related to the object analysis performed in AmorJiSe is the prototypal inheritance of
JavaScript, which has not been included in the covered language. Prototypes make
the object lookup highly dependent on the actual runtime state. Therefore, abstract
types, which over-approximate all possible runtime states, become more complicated
for prototypal inheritance. Prototypes have been handled by more complicated object
lookup functions in previous research. While I expect that these results can be adapted
to the inference of AmorJiSe, it would make the object lookup more ambiguous and
consequently decrease precision of the types and bounds.
Concerning functions, the theoretic core of AmorJiSe restricts the functions to use
exactly one variable with the identifier x. The implementation already relaxes this
and allows functions to have an arbitrary amount of variables with arbitrary identifiers
and even local variables. Still missing are nested function scopes and other scope
manipulating language features. The type context is already equivalent to an object
type. Therefore, scope objects in JavaScript can be typed using object types. The
appropriate scope object type would then be embedded into each function type. This
method naturally adds aliasing for the scope objects as a challenge. This challenge
could be solved equivalent to the object aliasing proposed in this chapter by using the
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sharing relation. This would dedicate a certain amount of resource units of the defining
scope to be used exclusively inside the function scope. These blocked resource units
might result in a less precise bound. Otherwise, the scope aliasing can be solved by
indirect type pointers into an typing heap. This would, however, be a major alteration
of the system.
Another part of JavaScript which is not included in AmorJiSe are labelled jumps
using break and error handling. It does not interfere with the resource consumption
heavily. Therefore, adaptations of the conventional methods are expected to suffice.
A rudimentary rule to handle while loops has been presented above. All other
loops (for, for each, until) can be handled in a similar way. However, the bounds
obtained from this handling are not very precise and would benefit from other known
loop analysis techniques like loop unrolling and constant propagation. Especially in
the case of for loops, shape analysis and other information about how often the loop
is executed is vital for more precise bounds. Arrays are also left out of the analysed
language. They could be modelled as objects with a δ field to describe arbitrary many
of the indexed fields.
The challenge of dynamically executed JavaScript code using the eval function
and others has not been addressed in this system. However, recent work as shown
earlier suggests that most dynamic code in modern apps can be rewritten to static code.
Those solutions are orthogonal to the type system presented here and could be added.
The implementation could benefit from a better description of the resource bounds.
As it stands now the output only contains the typing judgement for the analysed ex-
pression. The types of the variables in the initial and final typing context can also be
displayed optionally. From this output the bounds can be derived as described in Sec-
tion 6.5.2. An explicit data dependent and interaction dependent bound is not provided
by the system.
Lastly, in order to analyse real world JavaScript code AmorJiSe needs to handle
additional libraries on top of JavaScript. Most notable is the DOM library which lets
JavaScript interact with the current state of the HTML tree. Some parts of the DOM
library have been handled in the example code for the evaluation by adding types of
the relevant functions to the resource model. With the same method, the remaining
parts of the DOM library and other libraries could be added to the analysed language.
This avoids the blowup in complexity of adding the JavaScript code of the included
libraries to the analysed code base.

Chapter 7
On the soundness of JST0
The following chapter discusses a flaw in the soundness theorem (Theorem 1 in [9])
of the system JST0 . First this chapter will present an expression and a specially crafted
state which invalidates one of the steps in the proof for the addressed theorem and
formally show the validity of all needed preconditions for this counter example. The
second part of the chapter shows that this crafted stated is actually reachable by pro-
viding a program which first generates this state from the empty state and then uses the
flaw to produce a run-time error, even though the program can be typed as Int. This
contradicts the type soundness of JST0 directly.
In [9] the author admits that the soundness proof of the type inference is not fully
sound. Conjecture 3 in [9] states that the result computed from the closed constraints
set is a correct solution to the constraints, but the proof attempt provided in the ap-
pendix is based, as noted by the author, on two unproven conjectures. The flaw pre-
sented here effects, instead, the soundness result for the type checking rules, which
was, to the best of my knowledge, not known to be unsound so far. Upon contacting
the authors, they failed to provide a correction to the handling of the counter example
provided below.
A second flaw was discovered in the Theorem addressing the relation between type
checking and type inference (Theorem 2 in [9]). In addition to presenting a counter
example for this theorem, the last part of this chapter shows how the flawed inference
rule for type checking can be corrected imitating the corresponding type inference rule.
This addresses both presented issues. The modified typing rule is presented together
with a proof for the flawed step in the soundness proof for type checking.
This chapter references definitions, theorems and proofs from the most recent pub-
lication of JST0 [9]. The numbering of the theorems has been adapted to fit the format
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of this document, but the original numbers are provided with the theorem statements
for reference. However, the same counter examples also apply to the corresponding
theorems in [8], presented in ECOOP.
7.1 Error in the soundness proof
The main theorem for the type soundness of JST0 is repeated as Theorem 7.1.1 below.
The theorem uses the relations for typing 
 (Figure 7.3), evaluation  (Figure 7.4),
agreement , (Figure 7.2) and extension  (Definition 7.1.6). For the full set of rules
for evaluation and type checking, including those rules not interesting for the following
examples, consult [9].











 e : t ′|Γ′
P,Γ,T 
 H,χ
e,H,χ  w,H ′,χ′
there exists some T ’ with
P,Γ′,T ′ 
 H ′,χ′ 
T ′  T
and either
{
w = v with
P,H ′,T ′ 
 v t ′
}
or w = nullPntrExc
Apart from the agreement of the derived type and value P,H ′,T ′ 
 v t ′, the theo-
rem also claims the agreement of the heap typing with the heap P,Γ′,T ′ 
 H ′,χ′  as
an invariant of the type derivation.
The proof for this theorem explicitly constructs the new heap typing T ′ from T .
The proof distinguishes cases on the basis of the evaluation rule applicable to e. The
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rule (S-MEMASS) evaluates assignments to object members e1.m = e2 with expres-
sions e1,e2 and in particular assignments of the special form var.m = e2. The induction
step of the proof for the expression case var.m = e2 uses the induction assumption to
derive the existence of a new heap typing T ′′ after the evaluation of e2. From T ′′ the
required heap typing T ′ is derived in line (26) as
Now let:
T ′ = T ′′[ι → T ′′[m → (t,•)]]. (26)
Here ι is the heap location of the variable var and t is the type derived for the
expression e2. To establish the extension relation T ′  T required by the theorem,
line (27) claims
From (26) and the definition of  [see Def. 7.1.8] we get:
T ′  T ′′ (27)
which is not actually the case as will be shown in the following.
7.1.1 Counter example
This first counter example invalidates the agreement claim P,Γ′,T ′ 
 H ′,χ′  for the
explicitly constructed heap typing T ′. It consists of the expression
e := x.val=3
and the crafted state CE:
χCE : {x → ιx,
this → ιt}
HCE : {ιx → next : ιn ,
ιn → next : null,
ιt →}
ΓCE : {x → O◦,
this → []}
TCE : {ιx → O◦,
ιn → O◦,
ιt → [ ]}
The types have been abbreviated for readability:
O◦ :=μα[val : (Int,◦),next : (α,•)]
O• :=μα[val : (Int,•),next : (α,•)]
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Figure 7.1 Type Relations
t ≡ t ′
(t,ψ)≡ (t ′,ψ)
(≡ MEMBER)
∀m : M(m)≡ M′(m)
μα.M ≡ μα.M′
(≡ REORDER)
∃t ′′ t ′′[α/t]≡ t t ′′[α/t ′]≡ t ′









ψ′ = •⇒ ψ = •
ψ ≤ ψ′
(≤ ANO)
t ≡ t ′ ψ ≤ ψ′
(t,ψ)≤ (t ′,ψ′)
(≤ MEM)
∀m ∈ Dom(O′) : O(m)≤ O′(m)
O ≤ O′
(≤ OBJ)
t ≡ t ′
t ≤ t ′
(≤ CONG)
t ≤ t ′ t ′ ≤ t ′′
t ≤ t ′′
(≤ TRANS)
(b) Subtypes
Intuitively in the presented heap x contains a recursive linked list with two ele-
ments.
x • null
The list is able to store integer values in the field val as the type O◦ suggests with
val : (Int,◦), but there are no values stored so far. In the expression x.val=3, a value
is added to the head of the list.
x 3 • null
Throughout this example, the variable this can be ignored, but its type and value
is provided for formality.
7.1.2 Types for the counter example
The types of the fields of an object type can be read via the field lookup:
Definition 7.1.2 ([9, p. 48]). Field lookup
7.1. Error in the soundness proof 189
For a bound type O = μα.M with M = [m1 : (t1,ψ1), ...,mk : (tk,ψk)]




(ti,ψi) if m = mi for some i
Udf otherwise
where M[α/O] is the standard non-recursive replacing of α by O in M.
The first step is to show that the two types O• and O◦ are not comparable via
the relations congruence ≡ (Figure 7.1a), subtype ≤ (Figure 7.1b) and extension 
(Definition 7.1.6). For this it is useful to have additional properties of the relation ≡:
Proposition 7.1.3. Properties of ≡
1. The relation ≡ is symmetric: given t1 ≡ t2 it holds that t2 ≡ t1.
2. The relation ≡ is transitive: given t1 ≡ t2 and t2 ≡ t3 it holds that t1 ≡ t3.




(≡ REFLEX)t1 ≡ t1
(SUBSTITUTE)
t1[αnew/t1]≡ t1
(≡ FIX)t2 ≡ t1
2. Choose an α not contained in t2. With this choice it holds t2[α/t1] = t2[α/t3] = t2.
The fact t2 ≡ t3 is one of the requirements and the previous proof derives t2 ≡ t1
from t1 ≡ t2. The claim then follows from
t2[α/t1](= t2)≡ t1 t2[α/t3](= t2)≡ t3
(≡FIX)t1 ≡ t3
These proof trees will be abbreviated as the rules (≡ SYM) and (≡ TRANS) in the
following.
Now for the relation between O• and O◦, the first relation to consider is ≡, since ≤
and  both depend on ≡.
Proposition 7.1.4.
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1. For two object types O,O′, if
μα.[m1 : (tm1,ψm1), ...,mk : (tmk,ψmk)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
O
≡ μα.[m′1 : (t ′m1′ ,ψ′m1′), ...,m′k′ : (t ′mk′ ,ψ′mk′)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
O′
then {m1, ...,mk}= {m′1, ...,m′k′} and ψmi = ψ′mi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
2. O• ≡ O◦
Proof. 1. This statement can be proven via Induction on the derivation of the ≡
relation (see Figure 7.1).
Case (≡ REORDER): The preconditions of (≡ REORDER), are that all member
types O(m) are congruent. As a direct consequence, the sets {m1, ...,mk} and
{m′1, ...,m′k′} have to be equal, otherwise only one of O(m) and O′(m) would be
Udf which is only congruent to Udf . The two members can either be congruent
by the rule (≡ MEMBER) or (≡ FIX).
• According to the rule (≡ MEMBER), two member types (t,ψ) can only be
congruent if the states (ψ ∈ {•,◦}) are identical. Therefore the states ψm
have to be equal in both object types.
• If the rule (≡ FIX) was applied to deduce that the member types are con-
gruent, then the derivation of t ′′[α/O] ≡ O and t ′′[α/O′] ≡ O′ are shorter
than the derivation of O ≡ O′ and the induction hypothesis can be applied.
Since the substitutions [α/O′] and [α/O] do not change the state ψ of the
members, transitivity can be applied to get the equality of the states in O
and O′.
Case (≡ FIX): The rule (≡ FIX) has t ≡ t ′′[α/t] and t ′ ≡ t ′′[α/t ′] as precondition.
The induction hypothesis applies to those relations and the substitutions [α/t]
and [α/t ′] do not change the set of members {m′′1, ...,m′′k′′} or the involved ψ′′mi.
From this fact it follows that {m1, ...,mk} = {m′′1, ...,m′′k′′} = {m′1, ...,m′k′} and
ψmi = ψ′′mi = ψ′mi as claimed.
Case (≡ αCONV): The set of fields {m1, ...,mk} and the states ψm1, ...,ψmk are
trivially identical in the types μα.M and μα′.M[α/α′].
Case (≡ UNFOLD): The set of fields {m1, ...,mk} and the states ψm1, ...,ψmk are
trivially identical in the types μα.M and M[α/μα.M].
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2. Since for O• and O◦ it holds ψval = • = ◦ = ψ′val , this statement is a direct
consequence of the previous proof by contradiction.
The object types are not subtypes either.
Proposition 7.1.5.
1. For two object types in a subtyping relation O≤O′ and each field m with O(m)=
(tm,ψm) and O′(m) = (t ′m,ψ′m) the actual types tm and t ′m are congruent.
2. O◦ ≤ O• and O• ≤ O◦
Proof. 1. This statement can be shown by induction on the derivation for O ≤ O′
(see Figure 7.1):
Case (≤ OBJ):: This rule requires the subtyping relation for the types of each
field m. By the subtyping rule (≤ MEM), two member types (tm,ψ), (t ′m,ψ′) are
only subtypes if the actual types tm and t ′m are congruent.
Case (≤ CONG):: The requirement of this rule is t ≡ t ′ which obviously requires
each field to be congruent by the definition of ≡.
Case (≤ TRANS):: This rule requires the existence of an additional type O′′
with O ≤ O′′ and O′′ ≤ O′. By the induction hypothesis, all field types of O are
congruent to the field types in O′′. Equally, by the induction hypothesis O′′ has
equivalent field types to O′. The claim follows directly by the transitivity of ≡
as proven in Proposition 7.1.3.
2. Follows from the previous proof by contradiction since the types of field next





and Proposition 7.1.4 established that O• ≡ O◦.
Finally, consider the extension relation :
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Definition 7.1.6 ([9, Definition 2, p. 57]). Extension
O•  O◦ iff for all m:
• O◦(m) = Udf ⇔ O•(m) = Udf
• O◦(m) = Udf ⇒ O•(m)≤ O◦(m)
Proposition 7.1.7.
O•  O◦ and O◦  O•.
Proof. Using the definition of the field lookup for the field m = next again, the second
condition requires (O•,•) ≤ (O◦,•), which is not true as already discussed above.
Therefore O•  O◦. The argument works equivalently for O◦  O•.
This concludes the discussion of the relation between O◦ and O• with the result
that the two types are not related via the given relations.
7.1.3 Preconditions of the counter example
In order to show that the expression x.val=3 in the given state HCE ,χCE ,ΓCE ,TCE is
a counter example for Theorem 7.1.1, the following presents derivations of all precon-
ditions of Theorem 7.1.1.
7.1.3.1 Agreement
The agreement relation asserts that the types in the context ΓCE and the heap typing
TCE are adequate types for the values stored in the stack χCE and the heap HCE . The
definition of this relation ΓCE ,TCE 
 HCE ,χCE  is repeated in Figure 7.2. The rules
are syntax directed and therefore there is only one possible derivation for each such
statement.
In the given situation the rule (A-WLFHEAPSTACK) applies and reduces the agree-
ment to the following preconditions:
• Dom(TCE) = {ιx, ιt , ιn}= Dom(HCE) 















 ιn ≺ O◦
(A-STRONGADDR)
HCE ,TCE 
 ιx μα.[val : (Int,◦),next : (α,•)]

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Figure 7.2 Definition: Agreement
P,T 





P( f ) = function f (x) : G′{. . .}
G ≡ G′
P,T 




 ι ≺ O
(A-WEAKADDR)
P,T 
 ι ≺ O
H(ι) = m1 : v1, ...,mp : vp 
∀m : O(m) = (t,•)⇒∃i ∈ 1...p : m = mi ∧P,T 
 vi ≺ t
∀i ∈ 1...p : O(mi) = (t,◦)⇒ P,T 




Dom(T ) = Dom(H)









• HCE ,TCE 
 χCE(this)ΓCE(this)
(≡ REFLEX)
[ ]≡ [ ]
(≤ CONG)
[ ]≤ [ ]
(A-WEAKADDR)
TCE 
 ιt ≺ [ ]
(A-STRONGADDR)
HCE ,TCE 
 ιt  [ ]

• ∀ι′ ∈ Dom(TCE) with TCE(ι′) = O′ : HCE ,TCE 
 ι′ O′













 ιn μα.[val : (Int,◦),next : (α,•)]

7.1.3.2 Typing
The typing relation P,Γ 
 e : t ′|Γ′ asserts that in the context Γ the expression (here
e =x.val=3) can be typed with the type t ′ (here t ′ = Int). The relation is defined via
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Figure 7.3 Definition: Type checking
P,Γ 
 n : Int
(T-CONST)
P,Γ 
 this : Γ(this)
P,Γ 
 x : Γ(x)
(T-VAR)
P,Γ 
 e1 : O|Γ′
P,Γ′ 
 e2 : t|Γ′′
O(m) = (t ′′,•)
t ≤ t ′′
P,Γ 
 e1.m = e2 : t|Γ′′
(T-ASSIGNUPD)
P,Γ 
 e2 : t|Γ′
var=e′ is not a subexpression of e2
Γ′(var) = O
O(m) = (t ′′,ψ)
t ≤ t ′′
Γ′′ = Γ′[var → O[m → (t ′′,•)]]
P,Γ 
 var.m = e2 : t|Γ′′
(T-ASSIGNADD)
P,Γ 
 e : t|Γ′
P( f ) = function f (x) : G{. . .}
t ≤ G(x)
G(this) has no • fields
P,Γ 
 new f (e) : G(ret)|Γ′
P,Γ 
 f (e) : G(ret)|Γ′
(T-CALL)
P,Γ 
 e1 : t|Γ′
P,Γ 
 e2 : t ′|Γ′′
P,Γ 
 e1;e2 : t ′|Γ′′
(T-SEQ)
inference rules. The rules needed for this example are summarised in Figure 7.3
According to those rules, the example x.val=3 can be typed as Int
(T-CONST)
ΓCE 
 3 : Int|Γ′CE






CE [x → Γ′CE(x)[val → (Int,•)]]
(T-ASSIGNADD)
ΓCE 
 x.val=3 : Int|Γ′′CE
7.1.3.3 Evaluation
The big-step evaluation relation e,H,χ  w,H ′,χ′ asserts that in the environment H,χ
the expression e can be evaluated to the value w. The evaluation is defined using the
inference rules repeated in Figure 7.4.
According to those rules, the expression x.val=3 can be evaluated to the value 3
which agrees with the behaviour of real world JavaScript engines and the typing as
Int.
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e,H,χ  ι,H ′,χ′




H ′ = H2[ι → H2(ι)[m → v]]
e1.m = e2,H,χ  v,H ′,χ′
(S-MEMASS)
e,H,χ  v′,H1,χ′
P( f ) = function f (x){e′}
e′,H1,{this → null,x → v′} v,H ′,χ′′
f (e),H,χ  v,H ′,χ′
(S-FUNCCALL)
e,H,χ  v′,H1,χ′
P( f ) = function f (x){e′}
ι is new in H1 and H2 = H1[ι →]
e′,H2,{this → ι,x → v′} v,H ′,χ′′
new f (e),H,χ  ι,H ′,χ′
(S-NEW)
e1,H,χ  v′,H1,χ1
e2,H1,χ1  v,H ′,χ′
e1;e2,H,χ  v,H ′,χ′
(S-SEQ)
e,H,χ  ι,H ′,χ′
H ′(ι)(m) = Udf
e.m,H,χ  stuckErr,H ′,χ′
(S-NOMEM)
(S-VAR)
x,HCE ,χCE  ιx,HCE,1,χCE,1
(S-VAL)
3,HCE,1,χCE,1  3,HCE,2,χ′CE
H ′CE = HCE,2[ιx → HCE,2(ιx)[var → 3]]
(S-MEMASS)
x.val=3,HCE ,χCE  3,H ′CE ,χ′CE
7.1.3.4 Post-state
The given derivation in the provided starting state χCE ,HCE ,ΓCE ,TCE results in the
following intermediate and post-states:
χ′CE =χCE,1 = χCE
HCE,1 =HCE,2 = HCE
Γ′CE =ΓCE
H ′CE = {ιx → next : ιn,val : 3
ιn → next : null,
ιt →},
Γ′′CE = {x → μα.[val : (Int,•),next : (α,•)],
this → [ ]}
The proof of the soundness for the case of e uses the soundness of the typing
P,ΓCE 
 3 : Int|Γ′CE as induction hypothesis. Due to this induction hypothesis, there
exists a new heap typing T ′′CE , for which the agreement P,Γ′CE ,T ′′CE 
 HCE,2,χ′CE 
holds. Since the expression 3 does not change the state, i.e. HCE,2 = HCE ,χ′CE =
χCE ,Γ′CE = ΓCE , the heap typing T ′′CE in the induction hypothesis is chosen to be T ′′CE =
TCE .
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This concludes the discussion of the preconditions for the counter example. Since
they all hold true for the state and expression of the counter example, Theorem 1 [9] is
applicable.
7.1.4 Wrong conclusion
The two important lines in the proof for the Theorem 7.1.1 are:
Now let:
T ′ = T ′′[ι → T ′′(ι)[m → (t,•)]] (26)
From (26) and the definition of  we get:
T ′  T ′′ (27)
Applied to the counter example CE this specialises to:
T ′CE = T ′′CE [ιx → T ′′CE(ιx)[var → (Int,•)]]
and the result is the following concrete heap typing:
T ′CE = {ιx → μα.[val : (Int,•),next : (α,•)]
ιn → μα.[val : (Int,◦),next : (α,•)]
ιt → [ ]}
The relation  in line (27) is the extension of  for heap typings which is defined as:
Definition 7.1.8 ([9, Definition 2,p. 61]). We say that T ′ extends T ′′ denoted by T ′ 
T ′′ iff,
• Dom(T ′′)⊆ Dom(T ′) and
• T ′′(ι) = O ⇒ T ′(ι) O (for all addresses ι)
In particular, it requires O• = T ′(ιx) T ′′(ιx) = O◦ which was shown incorrect in
Proposition 7.1.7. Therefore, line (27) is not correct and the claim
T ′  T
in the results of Theorem 7.1.1 is not correct in CE for the constructed T ′. In addition
the agreement
P,Γ′,T ′ 
 H ′,χ′ 
also claimed by the theorem is invalid as it would require O◦ ≤ O•:







 ιx ≺ O•
(A-WEAKINT)
T ′CE 





 ιn ≺ O•
(A-STRONGADDR)
H ′CE ,T ′CE 
 ιx μα.[val : (Int,•),next : (α,•)]
For this simple counter example, a different (less expressive) T ′ could be con-
structed which validates the agreement. However, the following section addresses that
the example CE can be exploited to invalidate Theorem 7.1.1 independent of the choice
of T ′.
7.1.5 Full counter example
The previous section showed the wrong conclusion in the proof of the soundness the-
orem. This flaw results in a situation with inconsistent heap typing Γ′′,T ′ 
 H ′,χ′ .
This section extends the counter example above to a full JavaScript program which
is typed as Int but correctly returns a run-time error w = stuckError. This clearly
contradicts the claim of type soundness. Since the type inference soundness has the
additional precondition of an empty starting heap, this full counter example also shows
that the crafted state HCE ,χCE ,ΓCE can be constructed from the empty state. Note that
the empty state trivially satisfies the preconditions of Theorem 7.1.1. The full code of











The following sections present the formal derivation of the evaluation and typing
relation.
7.1.5.1 Evaluation
The evaluation to stuckErr is proven in 3 parts. The first part evaluates the element
function; the second evaluates the break function; finally those two function deriva-
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tions are put together to form a derivation for the main function call
break(new element(42)).
element
The expression new element(42) is needed twice in this example. The following
is the evaluation of this expression parameterised by H,χ, ι. It uses the following
modified states:
χe ={this → ι,x → 42}
H2 =H[ι →]
H ′ =H[ι → next → null]
The function element is defined via
P(element) = function element(x){this.next=null;this}






H ′ = H2[ι → H2(ι)[next= null]]
(S-MEMASS)
this.next=null,H2,χe  null,H ′,χe
χe(this) = ι
(S-VAL)
this,H ′,χe  ι,H ′,χe
(S-SEQ)
this.next=null;this,H2,χe  ι,H ′,χe
(S-VAL)
42,H,χ → 42,H,χ




this.next=null;this,H2,χe  ι,H ′,χe
(S-NEW)
new element(42),H,χ  ι,H ′,χ
break
The body of the function break consists of 3 statements. Each statement modifies the
heap and therefore 4 different heap states are necessary.
Hb0 = {ιx → next : null} χb0 = {x → ιx, this → null}
Hb1 = {ιx → next : null, ιn → next : null}
Hb2 = {ιx → next : ιn , ιn → next : null}
Hb3 = {ιx → next : ιn,val : 5 , ιn → next : null}







new element(42),Hb0,χb0  ιn,Hb1,χb0
Hb2 = Hb1[ιx → Hb1(ιx)[next → ιn]
(S-MEMASS)
x.next=new element(42),hb0,χb0  ιn,Hb2,χb0










x,Hb3,χb0  ιx,Hb3,χb0 Hb3(ιx)(next) = ιn
(S-MEMSEL)
x.next.val,Hb3,χb0  stuckErr,Hb3,χb0 Hb3(ιn)(val) = Ud f
(S-NOMEMBER)
x.next.val,Hb3,χb0  stuckErr,Hb3,χb0
In summary, the evaluation of the whole function body of break evaluates in the
following way:
e1,hb0,χb0  ιn,Hb2,χb0




x.next=new element(42);x.val=5;x.next.val,Hb0,χb0  stuckErr,Hb3,χb0
main
In order to evaluate the main expression of this example, 3 different heaps are neces-
sary. The stack is not changed throughout the whole evaluation:
H0 = {} χ0 = {x → 2,this → null}
H1 = {ιx → next : null}
H2 = {ιx → next : ιn,val : 5, ιn → next : null}
With these states the evaluation can be derived as
...
(S-NEW)
new element(42),H0,χ0  ιx,H1,χ0





break(new element(42)),H0,χ0  stuckErr,H2,χ0
Therefore, the evaluation results in stuckErr. In real world JavaScript, accessing
an undefined field of an object results in the return value undefined. This value is not
what the developer expects when accessing x.next.val and the system JST0 aims to
find values which are different than expected. This is the reason, why JST0 correctly
returns stuckError in this case.
7.1.5.2 Type checking
The type check for the whole example requires the following object types which co-
incide with the 4 steps to prepare the exploited object: creation of an empty object,
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assignment to next, folding into a recursive type, assignment to val
Oxe =[val : (Int,◦),next : (OL◦,◦)]
Ox◦ =[val : (Int,◦),next : (OL◦,•)]
OL◦ = μα.[val : (Int,◦),next : (α,•)]
OL• = μα.[val : (Int,•),next : (α,•)]
The proof requires the property Ox◦ ≤ OL◦ for which the reflexivity of the subtyping
relation is useful:
(≡ REFLEX)t ≡ t
(≤ CONG)
t ≤ t
OL◦ can be expressed as OL◦ = μα.M with M = [val : (Int,◦),next : (α,•)].







since M[α/OL◦] = [val : (Int,◦),next : (OL◦,•)] = Ox◦
In order to check the type of the whole program, first the types for the functions in
P need to be validated:
element : Ge = Oxe,Int→ Ox◦
break : Gb = [],OL◦ → Int
element
Two new contexts are necessary to type the body of the function element. The first
represents the typing at the beginning of the function body where this is an empty
object. In the second, this has been expanded with the field next.
Γe0 = {x → Int,this → Oxe}
Γe1 = {x → Int,this → Ox◦}
In those contexts the body of element can be typed as Ge(ret) = Ox◦:
(T-CONST)
P,Γe0 
 null : OL◦|Γe0




Γe1 = Γe0[this → Ox◦[next → (OL◦,•)]]
(T-ASSIGNADD)
P,Γe0 




 this : Ox◦|Γe1
(T-SEQ)
P,Γe0 
 this.next=null;this : Ox◦|Γe1
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This verifies the function type Ge for the function element.
break
Two new contexts are used to type the function body break. The first is the entrance
context for this body and in the second the object x has been extended by the field val:
Γb0 ={x → OL◦,this → [ ]}
Γb1 ={x → OL•,this → [ ]}





 x : OL◦|Γb0
Ox◦ ≤ OL◦
OL◦(next) = (α,•)[OL◦/α] = (OL◦,•)
(T-CONST)
Γb0 
 42 : Int|Γb0
Int≤ Int
P(element) = function element(x) : Ge{...}
Ge(this) has no • fields
(T-CALL)
Γb0 
 new element(42) : Ox◦|Γb0
(T-ASSIGNEUPD)
Γb0 
 x.next=new element(42) : Ox◦|Γb0
(T-CONST)
Γb0 
 5 : Int|Γb0
Int≤ Int
x=e’ is no subexpression of 5
Γb0(x) = OL◦
OL◦(val) = (Int,◦)
Γb1 = Γb0[x → OL◦[val → (Int,•)]]
(T-ASSIGNADD)
Γb0 




 x : OL•|Γb1 OL•(next) = (α,•)[OL•/α] = (OL•,α)
(T-MEMACC)
Γb1 
 x.next : OL•|Γb1 OL•(val) = (Int,•)
(T-MEMACC)
Γb1 
 x.next.val : Int|Γb1
Due to the rule (T-SEQ), the whole function body can be typed as Int which verifies
the function type Gb for the function break.
Finally, the main expression break(new element(42)) can be typed as Int.
(T-CONST)
Γ 
 42 : Int|Γ
Int≤ (Int= Γ(x))




 new element(42) : Ox◦|Γ
Ox◦ ≤ OL◦




 break(new element(42)) : Int|Γ
This shows that the code of the counter example is types as Int.
In summary, this section presented a full JavaScript program which can be evalu-
ated to a stuckError starting in the empty state, but is typed as Int in JST0 . In contrast
to the first small counter example, this is independent of the choice of T ′ and therefore
shows the type checking rules of JST0 unsound.
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7.1.6 Other weaknesses in JST0
In [9] Chapter 3.2, the author remarks that multiple parameters can be modelled as
fields in one parameter object. This translation is equivalent for the semantics. How-
ever, the type system allows object types to be extended with additional fields. The
types of the members of object types always have to stay congruent, which requires
the structure to remain unchanged throughout the execution. So, if a function is imple-
mented with multiple parameters, each parameter has a separate object type and can
be dynamically extended by assigning a value to a potential field. Using the parameter
block object, the block itself can be extended but each parameter must keep its struc-
ture and can therefore not be extended. This weakness is not significant since it should
not be difficult to extend the type system to handle functions with multiple parameters
by other means.
7.2 Fixing soundness
The type inference algorithm in [9] is defined separately from the type checking rules.
Theorem 7.2.1 then connects type checking with type inference by proving that the
result of the type inference algorithm also satisfies the type checking relation:
Theorem 7.2.1 ([9, p. 96]). Checking inferred types
For program a P, expression e, pre-environment γ, solution S, if:
γ 








then there exists t such that:
P,Γ 
 e : t|Γ′
t ≤ S( )
In order to understand the parts of this theorem, it is necessary to understand the la-
bels added by the type inference. During the inference, different states of the variables
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are treated with different types. Take, for example, the expression x.m=4 which adds
the field m to the variable m. In this case the type for x before and after the expression
has to be reasoned about differently. To distinguish the different states of the variables
the type inference adds unique identifiers as labels to variables. In the example, the
type of x before the assignment x.m=4 might be stored in the type variable xl . After-
wards a new label l′ is used with the type variable xl′ . With this in mind, the theorem
speaks about the following constructs:
• The pre-environment γ is a mapping from each variable name to its current label.
This identifies the type-variable to be used for this variable in the current typing
environment.
•   is the labeled expression corresponding to e, where each occurrence of each
variables has been labeled.
• The solution S maps labeled type-variables to full types.
• The function Γgen(γ,S) uses the solution S to complete the pre-environment γ
into an environment {this → S(this_γ(this)),x → S(x_γ(x))}.
• The function T (P,S) adds the function-types to the function definitions in the
program P according to the solution S to obtain the types program P.
The preconditions (see [9] for formal definitions) intuitively assert the following:
• γ 
 e :  |γ′|C: In the pre-environment the expression e can be labeled as   and
produce the new pre-environment γ′ and the constraints C during execution.
• S 
C: The solution S solves all the constraints in C.
• S,P 
 e: All functions occurring in e are defined in P and typed consistent with
the solution S.
The main claim of the theorem is that the expression e can be type checked with a
subtype of the result of the type inference algorithm.
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7.2.1 Relation between type checking and type inference
The proof for this theorem contains a similar fault as in the type checking soundness
theorem: Consider again the expression x.val=3 in the solution
S : x_1 → μα.[val : (Int,◦),next : (α,•)]
x_2 → [val : (Int,•),next : (μα.[val : (Int,◦),next : (α,•)],•)]
The labels 1,2 here are the labels for the variable x before and after the evaluation of
x.val=3. The type for x_1 has a state ◦ for the field val before the expression. After
the execution the state in the new type x2 has changed to • and the field next has been
unfolded.
For this state the proof derives the facts:
S(x_1)(val) = (t ′′,ψ) with t ′′ = Int (73)
S(x_2)(val) = (t ′′′,•) with t ′′′ = Int (75)
∀m′ = val : S(x_2)(m′)≡ S(x_1)(m′) (77)
S(x_2)(val)≤ S(x_1)(val) (78)
t ′′ ≡ t ′′′ (80)
In the considered example, all these facts are true:
• (77): The only other candidate for m′ is m′ = next and
S(x_1)(next) = α[α/S(x_1)]
= μα.[val : (Int,◦),next : (α,•)]
= S(x_2)(next)
• (78): S(x_2)(val) = (Int,•)≤ (Int,◦) = S(x_1)(m) with m = val
• (80): t ′′ = t ′′′ = Int and therefore trivially t ′′ ≡ t ′′′
Line (91) then states:
From (77),(78),(73) and (80) we get:
S(var_l′) = S(var_l)[m → (t ′′,•)] (91)
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which applied to the considered example amounts to
S(x_2) = S(x_1)[val → (Int,•)]
with the following values obtained from the solution S
S(x_2) = [val : (Int,•),next : (μα.[val : (Int,◦),next : (α,•)],•)]
S(x_1)[val → (Int,•)] = μα.[val : (Int,•),next : (α,•)]
The two types are obviously not equal. In the proof congruence would suffice, but
since the types of the field next are not congruent (see Proposition 7.1.4), congruence
does not hold, either:
S(var_2)(next) = μα.[val : (Int,◦),next : (α,•)]
S(var_1)[val → (Int,•)](next) = α[α/S(var_1)[val → (Int,•)]]
= μα.[val : (Int,•),next : (α,•)]
As a result, the proof of correspondence between type inference and type checking
is broken as well. Fortunately, those two faults seem to cancel each other out and
therefore the broken rule (T-ASSIGNADD) can be fixed imitating the inference rule
(CG-ASSIGNADD).
7.2.2 Corrected inference rule
The corresponding type inference rule to the type checking rule (T-ASSIGNADD) is
(CG-ASSIGNADD)
γ 
 e :  |Γ′′|C′
γ′′(var) = l
l′ ∈ γ′′(lab)
γ′ = γ′′[var → l′, lab → (γ′′(lab)∪{l′})]
var = e′ is not a subexpression of e2
C = {var_l≤ [m : (var_l.m,◦)],
var_l′≤ [m : (var_l′.m,•)],
var_l′m var_l,
 ≤ var_l′.m,
 ≤ var_l′.m =  }
γ 
 var.m = e : var_l′.m =  |γ′|C∪C′
(CG-ASSIGNADD)
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The main difference to (T-ASSIGNADD) is that the rule (CG-ASSIGNADD) uses the
constraint var_l′m var_l to specify the fields of the extended object. In contrast,
(T-ASSIGNADD) declares the new type directly using Γ′′ = Γ′[var → O[m → (t ′′,•)]]
and therefore simply copies all remaining fields m′ = m which causes the erroneous
result. The constraint approach can be directly ported to the type checking rule. Define
the constraint m as abbreviation of the following set of subtyping and congruence
relations:




With this definition, the broken rule (T-ASSIGNADD) can be modified to
P,Γ 
 e2 : t|Γ′
var=e′is not a subexpression of e2
Γ′(var) = O
O(m) = (t ′′,ψ)
t ≤ t ′′
O′ m O
Γ′′ = Γ′[var → O′]
P,Γ 
 var.m = e2 : t|Γ′′
(T-ASSIGNADD*)
The proof of soundness can be corrected in a similar way. Instead of constructing
the new heap typing T ′ by assignment, it can be constructed as
T ′ = T ′′[ι → O′] with O′ m O
Such a type O′ can always be constructed: if the type O is recursive and therefore of
the form μα.M, then unfold one step to make the type not recursive on the outer most
level M[α/μα.M]. After that the state of m can be modified to • if necessary since
modifying the fields of this new object does not interfere with the deeper structure of
the object.
For this new construction of T ′, the fact T ′  T ′′ in the soundness proof (line (27),
p.66) now holds:
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Lemma 7.2.2 ([9, (27)p. 66]). Extension soundness
Given
T ′′[ι] = O
T ′ = T ′′[ι → O′] with O′ m O
it holds that
T ′  T ′′.
Proof. By the definition of T ′ it is clear that ι ∈ Dom(T ′). The precondition ensures
ι ∈ Dom(T ′′). All other addresses are not changed in T ′ in comparison to T ′′ and
therefore Dom(T ′) = Dom(T ′′). Since only ι has been changed, all that remains to be
shown is that T ′(ι) T ′′(ι), which reduces to O′  O.
By Definition of m it holds
O′(m)≤ O(m)
∀m′ = m.O′(m′)≡ O(m′)
Since the 3 relations Udf ≡ t, Udf ≤ t and t ≤ Udf are only true for t = Udf , it is
obvious that O(m) = Udf ⇔ O′(m) = Udf . For m O′(m)≤ O(m) is given by O′ m O.
For every other m′ =m, the relation O′(m′)≡O(m′) holds due to O′m O. That induces
O′(m′) ≤ O(m′) by the rule (≤ CONG). Together this proves O′(m′′) ≤ O(m′′) for all





In this thesis I documented the results of my research into quantitative bounds on the
resource consumption of apps written in JavaScript. The presented research imposes
bounds restricting the app to a finite number of resource accesses instead of granting
unrestricted access. To capture the resource behaviour of modern apps, the bounds
depend on the size of data structures and on the way and extend the user interacts
with the user interface of the app. With these properties a policy can differentiate
legitimate functionality from unreasonable resource usage. The current access control
for resources on mobile phones based on permissions is not fine-grained enough to
make this distinction.
As a side-effect, the interaction dependent bounds intuitively describe the func-
tionality of the app. For example, with a button policy allowing one send message per
click on the button “Send” a user can assume the app has a messaging feature. Poli-
cies for multiple resources can quickly establish a comprehensive image of the feature
set of the app. This interaction-centric description of the functionality of an app can
amend or replace the free form description provided by the developer in the Google
Play Store.
Based on previous research, I have developed two different systems to produce
such bounds with different properties.
The dynamic system PhoneWrap presented in Chapter 4 enforces given bounds
during runtime. This is achieved by inserting a wrapping script at the top of the app’s
HTML file, which overwrites all resource consuming APIs with an instrumented ver-
sion. The instrumented APIs first check the given policy and, if the allowed resource
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access is exceeded, a deny behaviour is executed instead of the requested API. The
bounds enforced by PhoneWrap are described in terms of tickets, which each grant
one-time access to the resource. The policy describes how many tickets the function-
ality triggered by each UI element requires and generates exactly the specified amount
for each user interaction with each link, button, checkbox or dialog. This way, the
enforced bounds on the resource consumption are interaction and context dependent.
PhoneWrap can insert given policies automatically into PhoneGap apps for Android
downloaded from the Google Play store. The injected app can be executed on an un-
modified Android device and is limited by the resource bound specified in the policy.
PhoneWrap can be used by experienced device users to insert individualised resource
bounds. Alternatively, third party policy authors can publish the modified app pack-
age or the policy file such that users can use PhoneWrap and insert the wanted policy
themselves.
Via the runtime enforcement PhoneWrap only considers the resource usage of the
executed path and the actually consumed resources. The policy can alter the behaviour
of the app, if the bound is exceeded. This way it can restrict potentially malicious
apps to execute the wanted functionality without allowing access to the resource for
unwanted part of the app. A malicious app might still abuse the granted tickets. How-
ever, in that case the missing functionality is an indicator for the abuse and the damage
is limited by the tickets. Another advantage of the runtime monitoring is that dynamic
features of JavaScript, like the eval function are guarded by the policy as any other
code. The system has been successfully verified on a set of real world Android apps
and was able to correct the resource behaviour in one case.
The injection scripts of PhoneWrap are Android specific, but the written policies
are platform independent for all PhoneGap apps and the wrapper script enforces a
given policy in any JavaScript environment.
The system AmorJiSe statically derives bounds on the resource behaviour of the
given JavaScript code. The types and typing rules of AmorJiSe are formally specified
in Chapter 6 and the correctness of the resulting bounds is proven mathematically in
relation to the formalised evaluation rules. Thus, the resulting bounds hold without
the need to trust a third party implementation. As static type system AmorJiSe is able
to analyse programs before execution and over-approximates all possible runtime ex-
ecutions of the original code. This changes neither the behaviour nor the performance
of the code. During analysis the inference of the resource annotations is reduced to a
Linear Programming Problem, which can be solved by conventional solvers in polyno-
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mial time. Given the full resulting types, the correspondence to the analysed code and
the correctness of the annotations can be checked without solving the full LPP. There-
fore, the types qualify as digital evidence. They can be generated by a third party and
checked even on a smaller device like a phone without the need to trust the evidence
creator .
The types of AmorJiSe build upon existing data types which describe the data
structure of the values. Depending on the choice of this underlying system the type
inference can have different properties. However, the annotations added to the data
types are in any case inferred without the need to read or edit the analysed code. I have
discussed different candidates for the underlying type system in Chapter 5 and used
JST0 for an implementation. While working with the system JS
T
0 , I identified faults in
the soundness proof of its type checking and in the connection between type checking
and type inference. In Chapter 7 I discussed a counter examples in details and proposed
a solution fixing both errors. With the corrected rules, I have proven the correctness of
the faulty proof steps in the original proof.
The core of JavaScript AmorJiSe analyses is platform independent. Therefore,
AmorJiSe is not restricted to Android or mobile apps in general.
The two systems PhoneWrap and AmorJiSe provide similar bounds. The reserved
resource units within AmorJiSe types are in many ways equivalent to the tickets granted
in PhoneWrap policies. The API policies specified for PhoneWrap can be directly
translated into API types in the initial typing context for AmorJiSe. The tickets granted
initially in PhoneWrap correspond to the constant resource usage in the typing judge-
ment of AmorJiSe and the bounds specified in PhoneWrap’s interaction dependent
policies can be extracted from the function types of the event handlers in the typing
context resulting from AmorJiSe.
Due to their different properties, each system is preferable in different situation.
AmorJiSe can be used before installation to verify the absence of malicious behaviour
or compare the resource requirements of different apps. PhoneWrap, on the other hand,
can be used to suppress potentially included malicious behaviour or disable parts of the
functionality of the app.
8.2 Further work
There is a number of ways in which the presented systems could be extended.
The dependence of the bounds on user interaction events is motivated by use cases.
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However, there is nothing special about user event and the systems could easily be
extended to additional events like lowbattery, online or time. This leads to a new
set of possible policies. With PhoneWrap an app could be restricted not to use the data-
connection when the battery is low, only to send messages when Internet messaging is
not available or to access the location at most once per hour.
Another area of research would be the combination of the two systems. The re-
sults of the two different systems could be used to enhance each other in different
ways. First of all the individual results can be used to reduce the disadvantages of the
other system: The bounds inferred by AmorJiSe are mathematically guaranteed. If
AmorJiSe is able to proof a bound requested in the PhoneWrap policy the enforcement
code of PhoneWrap can be omitted and the runtime overhead reduced. The other way
round, AmorJiSe should be able to type an app injected with the PhoneWrap system to
produce a mathematical proof of a bound reasonably close to the requested bound.
Ideally the two methods should be integrated, such that AmorJiSe analyses an app
with a target bound. If this bound cannot be achieved statically in certain places, for
example, for the eval function, it inserts dynamic enforcement code and type checks
the enforced code. With the partial static information about the resource consumption,
the dynamically enforced bounds can be chosen to suit the bound inference. This
hybrid resource analysis would provide mathematically proven bounds with runtime




2 var original = {};
3 var policy;
4 var handlers = null; // list of handlers attached to deviceready
5 var expecting_deviceready = true;
6
7
8 // initialize policy ---------------------
9 policy = {}
10 //----------------------------------------
11
12 // var policy_creation = true;
13 //Default values
14 if (typeof policy.blockAll === "undefined") policy.blockAll = false;
// if true no accesses are granted no matter what the tickets say.
15 if (typeof policy.allowAll === "undefined") policy.allowAll = false; //
if true all accesses are granted no matter what the tickets say (unless
blockAll)
16 if (typeof policy.generate === "undefined") policy.generate = true; //
used internally: if false does not generate any new tickets
17 if (!policy.mperms) policy.mperms = 0;
18 if (!policy.buttons) policy.buttons = [];
19 if (!policy.deny) policy.deny = function()
{};
20 if (!policy.guard) policy.guard = [];
21 if (!policy.guard_exec) policy.guard_exec = [];
22 if (!policy.guard_require) policy.guard_require = [];
23
24 policy.mperms_local = 0;
25 policy.mperms_global = policy.mperms;
26 delete policy.mperms;
27




31 original.addEventListener = document.addEventListener;
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32 original.dispatchEvent = document.dispatchEvent;
33
34 //ToBE stored
35 // hasOwnProperty , typeof?, alert , apply?, call?, length , split , indexof ,
hasAttribute , getAttribute , match , toString?, toNummeric
36
37 var exec_guarded = function(f,f_this ,f_arguments) {
38 var allowed_global = (policy.mperms_global > 0);
39 var allowed_local = (policy.mperms_local > 0);
40 var perms_pre;
41 if (!policy.blockAll) {
42 if (policy.allowAll) {
43 var back = f.apply(f_this ,f_arguments);
44 //alert("original function executed");
45 return back;
46 }
47 if (allowed_local) {
48 perms_pre = policy.mperms_local;
49 var back = f.apply(f_this ,f_arguments);
50 policy.mperms_local = perms_pre -1; //only ever decrease by 1, even if wrapped
by this policy multiple times
51 return back;
52 }
53 if (allowed_global) {
54 perms_pre = policy.mperms_global;
55 var back = f.apply(f_this ,f_arguments);
56 policy.mperms_global = perms_pre -1; //only ever decrease by 1, even if




60 return policy.deny(f_this ,f_arguments);
61 }
62
63 var guard_API=function(orig) {
64 return function() {
65 return exec_guarded(orig ,this,arguments);
66 }
67 }
68 var guard_exec = function(clas ,meth) {
69 var ce;
70 if ((typeof Cordova !== ’undefined’) && (’exec’ in Cordova) ) {
71 ce = Cordova.exec;
72 }
73 if ((typeof cordova !== ’undefined’) && (’exec’ in cordova) ) {
74 ce = cordova.exec;
75 }
76 if ((typeof PhoneGap !== ’undefined’) && (’exec’ in PhoneGap) ) {
77 ce = PhoneGap.exec;
78 }
79 if (typeof ce === ’undefined’) {




83 //alert ("wrapping " + clas + ", " + meth);
84
85 wrapped_exec = function() {
86 if ( ( arguments[2] == clas) && (arguments[3] == meth) ) {
87 return exec_guarded(ce,this,arguments);




92 if (typeof Cordova !== ’undefined’) Cordova.exec = wrapped_exec;
93 if (typeof cordova !== ’undefined’) cordova.exec = wrapped_exec;
94 if (typeof PhoneGap !== ’undefined’) PhoneGap.exec = wrapped_exec;
95 };
96
97 var guard_require = function(plugin ,meth) {
98 if (typeof cordova === ’undefined’) return;
99 if (typeof cordova.require === ’undefined’) return;
100
101 var orig_req = cordova.require;
102
103 cordova.require = function() {
104 var api_obj = orig_req.apply(this,arguments);
105 if (arguments[0] === plugin) {
106 if (typeof api_obj[meth] === ’undefined’) {
107 alert(meth + " not found in plugin " + plugin);
108 } else {
109 //find exact location:
110 var iter = api_obj;
111 while (!iter.hasOwnProperty(meth)) iter = iter.__proto__







119 var wrap_APIs = function() {
120 for (var i=0;i<policy.guard.length;i++) {
121 var iter = window;
122 var last = window;
123 var path = policy.guard[i].split(".");
124 var found = true
125 for (var j=0;j<path.length;j++) {
126 if (path[j] in iter) {
127 last = iter;
128 iter = iter[path[j]];
129 } else {




134 if (found) {
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135 //alert("wrapping " + path);
136 last[path[j-1]] = guard_API(iter);
137 } else {
138 //alert(’not found ’ + path);
139 }
140 }
141 if (typeof navigator !== ’undefined’) {
142 if (typeof navigator.notification !== ’undefined’) {
143 if (typeof navigator.notification.confirm !== ’undefined’) {
144 // alert("wrapping dialog")
145 navigator.notification.confirm = guard_dialog(navigator.notification.
confirm);
146 } //else alert("confirm not found");
147 } //else alert("notification not found");
148 } //else alert("navigator not found")
149 }
150 var wrap_exec = function() {
151 for (var i=0;i<policy.guard_exec.length;i++) {





157 var wrap_require = function() {
158 // alert("Wrapping require apis");
159 for (var i=0;i<policy.guard_require.length;i++) {












172 // alert("deviceready received");
173 deviceReadyFired = true;






180 expecting_deviceready = false;
181 // call hold back handlers
182 var h = handlers;





187 //call hold back handlers by the cordova ’addEventListener’
188 h = document.addEventListener.getHandlers();












201 // listen whether additional libraries are inserted
202 var observer=new MutationObserver(function (mutations) {
203 for (var i=0;i<mutations.length;i++) {
204 if (!mutations.hasOwnProperty(i)) continue;
205 var mutation = mutations[i];
206 if (mutation.type === "childList") {
207 if (!mutation.addedNodes) continue;
208 for (var j=0;j<mutation.addedNodes.length;j++) {
209 if (!mutation.addedNodes.hasOwnProperty(j)) continue;
210 var node = mutation.addedNodes[j];
211 if (typeof node.tagName === "undefined") continue;
212 if (node.tagName.toLowerCase() == "script") {




217 //duplicate deviceready event to make sure it arives even in old versions of
Phonegap
218 document.addEventListener("deviceready",function() {if (!deviceReadyFired){
deviceReadyFired = true; document.dispatchEvent(new Event(’deviceready’)
);}});
219 } else if (policy_mark) {
220 var pol = eval_policy(node);
221 if ( policy_active(pol) ){
222 node.style.borderStyle = "solid";
223 node.style.borderColor = "red";




228 } else if (mutation.type === "attributes") {
229 var node = mutation.target;
230
231 var pol = eval_policy(node);
232 if (policy_active(pol)) {
233 node.style.borderStyle = "solid";
234 node.style.borderColor = "red";
235 node.style.borderWidth = "5px";
236 }




240 var config = {subtree: true, childList: true};
241 if (policy_mark) config.attributes=true;
242 observer.observe(document ,config);
243
244 //Wrap confirmation dialogs
245 var guard_dialog=function(orig) {
246 return function() {
247 //save button lables
248 var buttonlables = [ "OK","Cancel"];
249 if (arguments.hasOwnProperty(3)) {
250 buttonlables = arguments [3];
251 if (typeof buttonlables == ’string’) {





256 var orig_callback = arguments [1];
257 var new_callback = function(buttonIndex) {
258 //Go through all the possible confirmable tickets
259 var buttonText = buttonlables[buttonIndex -1];
260 // alert(buttonText);
261 for (var i=0; i<policy.confirmable.length; i++) {
262 if (!policy.confirmable.hasOwnProperty(i)) continue;
263 var cable = policy.confirmable[i];
264 if (cable.buttons.indexOf(buttonText) > -1) {
265 if (cable.local) {
266 policy.mperms_local += cable.mperms;
267 alert("Policy granted locally: " + policy.mperms_local);
268 } else {
269 policy.mperms_global += cable.mperms;




274 //Delete all confirmables (They had their chance)
275 policy.confirmable = [];




280 //Execute original dialog







288 //Wrap inputs --------------------------------------------------
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289 var iter = document;
290 while (iter.__proto__.addEventListener) {iter = iter.__proto__;}
291
292 //wrap dispatchEvent
293 iter.dispatchEvent = function() {
294 var ret;
295 var is_click = (arguments [0].type === "click");
296 if (is_click) {
297 var old = policy.generate;
298 policy.generate = false;
299 }
300 ret = original.dispatchEvent.apply(this,arguments)
301 if (is_click) {




306 /* expected return: Object containing
307 - mperms_local : the number of local tickets to be granted
308 - mperms_global: the number of global tickets to be granted
309 - confirm: list of confirmable tickets. Each element in the list is an
object with the following properties:
310 - buttons: list of captions of buttons , that confirm this ticket
311 - mperms: number of tickets that can be confirmed
312 - local: BOOLEAN specifying whether these tickets will be local or global
313 - (optional) allowAll: new value for the allowAll parameter of the policy
314 - (optional) blockAll: new value for the blockAll parameter of the policy
315 */
316 var eval_policy = function(target) {
317 var pol = {mperms_local:0,mperms_global:0,confirm :[]};
318 for (var i=0;i<policy.buttons.length;i++) {
319 var applies = true;
320 var button = policy.buttons[i];
321 if (typeof button.cond === "undefined") button.cond = [];
322 for (var crit in button.cond) {
323 if (!target.hasAttribute(crit)) {
324 applies = false;
325 break;
326 }
327 var tcrit = target.getAttribute(crit);
328 var pcrit = button.cond[crit];
329 if (typeof button.match !== "string")
330 button.match = "exact";
331 switch (button.match) {
332 case "exact":
333 if (tcrit !== pcrit)
334 applies = false;
335 break;
336 case "different":
337 if (tcrit === pcrit)
338 applies = false
339 break;
340 case "contains":
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341 if (tcrit.indexOf(pcrit) === -1 )
342 applies = false;
343 break;
344 case "regex":
345 if (! tcrit.match(pcrit) )
346 applies = false;
347 break;
348 case "begins":
349 if (tcrit.indexOf(pcrit) !== 0 )
350 applies = false;
351 break;
352 case "ends":
353 if (tcrit.indexOf(pcrit , tcrit.length - pcrit.length) === -1)
354 applies = false;
355 break;
356 default:




361 if (applies) {
362 var b_mperms = button.mperms;
363 // update allowAll and blockAll if neccessary:
364 if (typeof button.allowAll !== ’undefined’) {
365 if (typeof pol.allowAll === ’undefined’) {
366 pol.allowAll = button.allowAll;
367 } else {
368 pol.allowAll = pol.allowAll && button.allowAll;
369 }
370 }
371 if (typeof button.blockAll !== ’undefined’) {
372 if (typeof pol.blockAll === ’undefined’) {
373 pol.blockAll = button.blockAll;
374 } else {
375 pol.blockAll = pol.blockAll || button.blockAll;
376 }
377 }
378 // correct b_mperms depending on type of target
379 if (button.checkbox) { //defined and trueish
380 if (typeof target.checked === ’undefined’) b_mperms = 0; // target is not
what the policy asked for
381 else if (!target.checked) b_mperms = -b_mperms; // target
has been unchecked -> retract tickets
382 }
383 // add tickets to the correct pile in pol
384 if (button.hasOwnProperty("confirm")) {
385 //If the mperms need to be confirmed , save the condition and number
386 var cable = {buttons:button.confirm ,mperms:b_mperms}; // new confirmable
387 if (typeof button.local !== "undefined") cable.local = button.local;
388 pol.confirm.push(cable);
389 } else {
390 if (!policy.generate) continue;
391 if (button.local) //defined and trueish
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392 pol.mperms_local += b_mperms;
393 else







401 var policy_active= function(pol) {
402 if (pol.mperms_local !== 0) return true;
403 if (pol.mperms_global !== 0) return true;
404 if (typeof pol.allowAll !== "undefined") return true;
405 if (typeof pol.blockAll !== "undefined") return true;
406 if (typeof pol.confirm !== "undefined")





412 var exec_policy= function(target) {
413 if (policy_creation) alert("pressed \n" + htmlElement2string(target));
414
415 var pol = eval_policy(target);
416 var granted = false;
417
418 policy.mperms_global += pol.mperms_global;
419 policy.mperms_local += pol.mperms_local;
420 if ( (pol.mperms_local !== 0) || (pol.mperms_global !== 0) ) alert("Policy
granted: total (" + policy.mperms_global + "," + policy.mperms_local + ")");
421 window.setTimeout(function() {policy.mperms_local = 0},0);
422
423 if (typeof pol.allowAll !== "undefined") {
424 policy.allowAll = pol.allowAll;
425 alert("Policy activated: allowAll =" + policy.allowAll);
426 }
427
428 //store confirmable tickets
429 if (pol.confirm.length > 0) {
430 alert("Policy awaits confirmation");








438 //Auxiliary functions for policy creation
439 function htmlElement2string(h) {
440 var attrs = h.attributes;
441 if (attrs.length == 0) return "";
442 var str = attrs[0].nodeName + ":" + attrs[0].nodeValue;
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443 for (var i = 1;i<attrs.length;i++) {
444 if (!attrs.hasOwnProperty(i)) continue;







• mperms: Specifies the number of tickets the application is granted at launch. If
this value is not specified in the policy, the default value is 0.
• allowAll: a Boolean specifying whether to allow access to the resource inde-
pendent of the remaining tickets. If this parameter is set to true, no tickets are
consumed and access is granted to all requests. If it is false, the normal ticket
policy is in place. Since it can be set on button press, this can specify default
policies as specified on page 52. The default value of this parameter is false.
• blockAll: a Boolean specifying whether to block access to the resource inde-
pendent of the remaining tickets. If this parameter is set to true, all access is
blocked and no tickets are consumed. If it is false, the normal ticket policy is in
place. If both allowAll and blockAll are set, all access is blocked as this is the
fail-safe behaviour. The default value of this parameter is false.
• buttons: Contains the specification for the interaction dependent policy. The
value of this field is a list (JSON array) of button policies. Each button spec-
ification is again an object with the following fields. If no button policies are
given, the empty list is assumed for buttons, which results in an interaction
independent policy.
– cond: a list of key-value pairs specified as a JSON object. A DOM element,
which owns all of the specified attributes with the matching values will be
effected by this button policy and generate the specified number of tickets
for every click event. The default for this parameter is the empty set of
conditions, which means every element will generate tickets on click.
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– mperms: the number of tickets granted for each click event on the applica-
ble DOM element
– match: a string that specifies how the values stored in cond are compared
with the value of the DOM elements. Possible values are:
∗ “exact”: The two values need to be equal.
∗ “different”: Tickets are generated if the element’s value does not equal
the value specified in the policy.
∗ “contains”: Tickets are generated if the element’s value contains the
value specified in the policy as substring.
∗ “begins”: Tickets are generated if the element’s value starts with the
policy’s value.
∗ “ends”: Tickets are generated if the element’s value ends with the
value specified in the policy.
∗ “regex”: The string specified in the policy is interpreted as a Java-
Script regular expression and tickets are generated if the element’s
value matches this regular expression.
The default value for match is “exact”.
– checkbox: Boolean which specifies whether this DOM element is to be
treated as a checkbox. Checkboxes generate tickets, when they get checked,
but deduct the same amount of tickets, when they get unchecked.
– confirm: contains a list of strings. The tickets generated by this button
policy are only granted, if the user afterwards confirms the action with a
click on a button with one of the specified strings as caption in a confir-
mation dialog. If this parameter is not specified tickets are granted without
confirmation.
– allowAll: a Boolean which specifies if after the click on the applicable
buttons all accesses to the resource should be allowed. If set, the value of
this parameter is copied into the allowAll parameter of the policy after this
button has been pressed.
– blockAll: a Boolean which specifies if after the click on the applicable
buttons all accesses to the resource should be blocked. If set, the value of
this parameter is copied into the blockAll parameter of the policy after this
button has been pressed.
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– local: a Boolean which specifies the expiration of the tickets generated by
applicable buttons. If set to true, the tickets are deleted after all handlers of
this button have been executed. If set to false, the tickets generated by this
button can be used at any point after the button press.
• guard: a list of APIs to be included in this policy. Each call to the specified
functions will be reflected by a decrease of the counter. Each API function to
be guarded is specified as string. The usual JavaScript “.” notation to access
object fields is used. If this parameter is omitted, no APIs will be effected by
this policy. More details on this follow in Section 4.3.1.
• guard_exec: a list of calls to exec that will be governed by this policy. Each
call to exec with these parameters will be reflected in the policy state by a de-
crease of the ticket counter. Each element in the list is represented as string and
specifies the governed class and method separated by “.”. For example the pa-
rameter “SMSPlugin.send” specifies to guard the method send of the Java class
SMSPlugin. If this parameter is omitted, calls to exec are not filtered by this
policy.
• guard_require: a list of calls to the require function, which should be guarded
by this policy. Each element in the list is represented as string and specifies the
plugin and method of the plugin separated by “.”. For example the parameter
“cordova/SMSPlugin.send” instructs PhoneWrap to guard the send method of
the plugin cordova/SMSPlugin. If this parameter is omitted, no calls to the
require function will be filtered by this policy.
• deny: a function to be executed if a resource request is denied. The default
behaviour is to ignore the function call to the guarded function without further
effects. The policy object is accessible inside the deny function body. Therefore,
the behaviour can change the policy by for example setting blockAll to true
to deny all future requests.

Notations
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Aliasing paths Alias(p), 138
App P, 48
Capacity N, 120
Complete wrapping , 50
Conform (app) pol 
 P, 49
Conform (trace) pol 
 t, 49
Continuing paths Reach(p), 138
Data type lookup T (e), 135
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